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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

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6 May 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Kokoshin Named Russian 1st Deputy Minister of Defense

92UM0905C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Apr 92 First Edition p 1

[Russian Federation Presidential Decree on Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin, signed by B. Yeltsin, Moscow the Kremlin, 3 April 1992: "Russian Federation Presidential Decree on the Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense"]

[Text] Appoint Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense

[Signed]  
B. Yeltsin  
Russian Federation President  
Moscow, the Kremlin, 3 April 1992

#### Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin

Andrey Afanasyevich Kokoshin was born on 26 October 1945 in Moscow to the family of a military man. He graduated from MVTU [Moscow Higher Technical School] imeni Bauman in 1969. He is a doctor of historical sciences, professor, and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Until recently, he worked as deputy director of the United States and Canada Institute. He is a specialist on military political issues and national security. He is a reserve officer. He is married and has two children.

### Grachev Named Russian 1st Deputy Minister of Defense

92UM0905B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Apr 92 First Edition p 1

[Russian Federation Presidential Decree on the Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev, signed by B. Yeltsin, Moscow the Kremlin, 3 April 1992: "Russian Federation Presidential Decree on the Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense"]

[Text] 1. Designate Colonel-General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev as Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense.

2. Task Col Gen P.S. Grachev to carry out cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States Allied Armed Forces High Command on the issues of command and control of military formations that are located within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation  
Moscow, the Kremlin, 3 April 1992

#### Colonel-General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev

Colonel-General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev was born on 1 January 1948, he graduated from Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School, the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the General Staff Military Academy. He has served in various command positions in the VDV [airborne forces]. Recently, he was CIS Allied Armed Forces First Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Defense Issues. He is married and has two children.

### Head of Personnel Work Committee Interviewed

92UM0909A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 3 Apr 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Maj-Gen Avn Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov, head of the Personnel Work Committee of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent G. Drugoveyko under the rubric "Armed, United, Much-Suffering": "Russia Has Geopolitical Interests"]

[Text] Nothing is simple today. It sometimes seems that the economy, politics and human relations are competing with one another just when things are wound the tightest. Even in this setting, however, the problems of the armed forces stand out as extraordinarily acute. There is no need to explain the reasons for the universal interest in military affairs. Our correspondent interviewed Maj Gen Avn N. Stolyarov, head of the Personnel Work Committee of the CIS Armed Forces.

[Drugoveyko] Nikolay Sergeyevich, I have my own "test question" when I am speaking with someone and the talk turns to the armed forces. A certain detailed question, you know.... The answer tells me immediately what is worth discussing with the individual. Tells me whether it is worth continuing the conversation at all or would be better to bow out politely and never meet again. And so, what does the reform of the VS [armed forces] mean in your mind?

[Stolyarov] To me the concept of military reform is also a fine "test" of the individual. In my mind the military reform is....

The first point is the transition to a professional army. It would be impossible, of course, to explain the substance of this subject in an interview. I shall just mention the most important things. They are that the armed forces must be manned with people who have independently and voluntarily chosen the military service as a career, that every serviceman personally and the military collectives must have the highest level of special training and combat readiness and that the numerical strength of the armed forces should be cut only as the highest level of professionalism is achieved.

The second thing involves the development and adoption in military praxis of modern methodology for

training and educating the personnel. And modern methodology is a combination of the latest principles and those axioms which have stood the test of many centuries of experience in combat operations, ours and foreign. I shall frankly say that military science is making its way with difficulty into the forces. Many military officials are bitterly resisting the scientific organization of the combat training process.

Then there is the fundamentally new military doctrine. The fundamental modernization of military doctrine consists in its precise and validated adaptation to the realities of today. First of all we need to identify precisely and clearly just who is a threat to the security of the CIS peoples, and in what way. I believe that the source of the present danger is not somewhere on the other side of the world. It is generated by conflicts within the nation. Conflicts of varying degrees of intensity. At the present time we only see and react in some way to large-scale conflicts. When a future tragedy is just developing we orient our armed forces toward neutrality. We become active only when a lot of blood has been shed.

I shall name what is perhaps the main aspect of the military reform. It must be honestly established and openly stated that Russia has its own geopolitical interests. Abstract peacemaking is shameful hypocrisy and a harmful game.

Russia bears a heavy burden of military costs. Russia remains one of the world's guarantors of peace and stability on earth. Millions of Russians live outside their original historical territory. These are facts known to everyone, and they cannot be ignored.

[Drugoveyko] Geopolitical strategy is a normal political phenomenon. Remember Kuwait. Frankly, it is not right next door to America. The United States actively intervened in the Persian Gulf conflict, however. Why? There were many reasons. The main reason, however, were the geopolitical interests of the USA.

[Stolyarov] The military reform (if it is not an imitation) also involves integration into a system of international collective security. Also reliable social and legal protection for servicemen. Also optimal methods of troop command and control. Also constant public, state and parliamentary control over the vital functioning and the combat readiness of the armed forces. And much, much more.

[Drugoveyko] Yes, Nikolay Sergeyevich, it is now clear that the reform of the armed forces is not a word game for us. I recall, however, that you are not just a military leader but also a philosopher. My next questions are therefore fundamental ones.... We live at the end of the 20th century. It would seem that there has been time enough for man to measure up to a specific feature of his: the ability to reason. Right now, however, bizarre as it seems, someone is taking aim at someone. He presses the trigger, and another human life is snuffed out. Why are people still capable of killing one another? Why has the absolute rejection of force not been established?

[Stolyarov] Yes, the world community's road to civilization is paved with sacrifices. Millions of our compatriots have died in innumerable wars, but Moloch was never satisfied. Fateful, crazy, absurd happenstance unquestionably plays a role in history. There are also rigid patterns of history, however, and many bad ones. But I believe that one main problem stands out even here. It is adventurism and dictatorship. Force is their natural means of existence.

A society as a whole and individual communities cannot get along without control, without agencies of authority. But authority is subject to usurpation. They say that only he who has not tasted the poison of power considers love to be the most powerful passion.

Wretched from suffering, mankind has for centuries sought salvation from authoritarianism and dictatorship. Fortunately, the way was found long ago. It is democracy. States and governments have experienced wonderful eras of democracy more than once in the past. Everywhere and always democracy was accompanied by a flowering of the crafts, science and art. All the democracies of the past perished, to be sure.

The 20th century has deprived authoritarianism of every sort of prospect once and for all, however. That which was revealed by ethics long ago is finally being placed onto a reliable material foundation. Everywhere—and we are witnesses to this—totalitarian, dictatorial regimes are collapsing literally all of a sudden. This is because the way of life based on force, coercion and suppression is repudiated not only and not so much by noble human aspirations. Force is repudiated by modern technology. Unfortunately, the old is not exiting the stage of history without a struggle. It is refining and disguising itself, deceiving and creating fictions. It is plucking at all the accessible strings of human souls. Its vigor comes from what it calls fair historical revenge. It blinds the intellect with prejudices. It manipulates counterfeit accounts of mutual international offences. There are dozens of scoundrels behind all these avaricious and repulsive interests. When multiplied by the inevitable difficulties of the reformation, however, the bogus ideas are capable of stupifying thousands of people. Normal citizens are infected with hatred and turned into murderers. At such a time we need precise, responsible, far-sighted, courageous and determined conduct on the part of political leaders and state authorities. There must be a subtle sense of the limits to permissible compromise and passive nonintervention.

Violence is only inflamed by impunity. This is a fact long known. Twice in one week I have had to rescue military personnel held hostage. In Armenia and Moldova. I became convinced that persuasion and appeals for reason and good feelings are fruitless if they are not backed up with clear and unequivocal determination to defend the honor and security of servicemen with all possible means.

And so, good and evil, savagery and nobleness still exist side by side at the end of the 20th century. Only the savagery and evil are experiencing agony. Mankind's choice is obvious: civilized labor, well-being, creative endeavor with ones own talent and efforts, liberty. That is, democracy.

[Drugoveyko] No matter what the question, it provides food for very serious thought. This is obviously due to enormous neglect of military problems. I can imagine what a lot of dogmatic banalities I would have to listen to if I were talking with such experts on the soldier's soul as General Lizichev or Marshal Yazov. But let us discuss a more specific problem. You head the Personnel Work Committee of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. The committee's tasks are multifaceted. Obviously the most important one is that of developing a new system for educating the soldiers. What will be the basis?

[Stolyarov] It has three pillars: the restoration and assimilation of military traditions and our own military experience, the shaping of a specific military culture and the establishment of a democratic way of life for the armed forces.

Why the traditions and experience of the past? It might seem strange to some, but a military man is more in touch with the great and eternal aspects of life than his civilian compatriots: homeland, patriotism, honor, devotion, comradeship, life and death. There is a constant crystalizing of spirituality. And just where, if not in the homeland's military history, are we to seek spiritual support, examples for emulation and ideals to adopt? We have always seemed to talk a lot about the traditions and military history. Unfortunately, however, everything was limited to seven decades. But where is the other whole millennium? In oblivion at best. Banned at worst. The enormous moral potential acquired by our ancestors in battles fought for the homeland were not working for us, not helping us. Russia's history (and that of the other republics) was painted in two colors: black prior to October of '17, sacred from then on. And we need the historical truth—valorous, heroic, tragic, scandalous, just the way it was.

Military culture.... I shall not elaborate on this global subject. I would mention just one thing.... "I have honor!" was a form of address in the Russian army. Could a person who utters these words allow himself to engage in indecent conduct, lack of discipline or rudeness? Would he tolerate humiliation from a boorish superior? Put on a dirty shirt?

And the democratic spirit.... Once again, there is an entire program. From new regulations to regulation of the work day, from precise differentiation of relations in the service to the precise legal definition of an infraction, from officer's assemblies to the authority to release an individual from the armed forces at his official request.

I maintain with a sense of responsibility and a clear conscience that our army is ready for democratically

organized service and life. The army has acquired the democratic spirit through suffering like no other element of our society.

[Drugoveyko] Nikolay Sergeyevich, I have a feeling your subordinates are waiting for you. I know that you have a lot of things planned for today. I have to ask one last question though. These are extraordinarily difficult times for Russia, for the CIS and for millions of citizens. Where are the grounds for optimism, when prices are skyrocketing and production is not exactly surging, to put it mildly. The people are dissatisfied, impatient, confused and tired. Nor is the army thriving. There are more than enough political adventurers in the country. I am confident that the leaders of the CIS Joint Armed Forces will not become new putschists. But the desperation of millions of citizens, the suffering of thousands of military personnel... plus a longing for stability, plus the cry "Go home!" Just what could come out of all this?

[Stolyarov] Democracy has won in our society. Imperfect, undeveloped, nonprocedural democracy. Plus errors of state management. Plus excessive self-confidence and improper conduct on the part of political leaders. Disregard for the first law of democracy: an uncompromising struggle against political opponents during the elections, but immediately following victory a struggle to win over the recent rivals, an attempt to gain their respect and positive disposition, to achieve cooperation. It would therefore be a big mistake to believe that our democracy is indestructible, that totalitarianism has been overthrown once and for all. In this situation the political opposition, particularly those who dream of revenge, will seek access to the soul of the army without fail.

At such a critical time some sort of happenstance could be fateful. One has to be a complete moron and an inveterate criminal to shoot up a military post. What if a single soldier does not bear up but fires back. Who will stop things? How will it end?

I have to admit I am delighted with the behavior of the military personnel. The enlisted men and officers have the wisdom, the courage and the nerves for anything. I am not just confident, I know, that no political provocateur will succeed in drawing the armed forces into any sort of adventure. This certainly should not condemn the fightingmen infinitely to bear ordeals over and over without end, however. Regarding the armed forces as an perpetual martyr is political betrayal of the army. And a universal civic sin on our part.

#### Service Deaths Three Times Higher Than in U.S.

92UM0905D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 7 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major I. Ivanyuk: "Preventing People's Deaths"]

[Text] A collegium session of the Committee on Servicemen's Affairs under the Russian Federation President, to

which representatives of the ministries and departments, parents councils, military leaders and journalists were invited, became its distinctive presentation. The committee was created at the end of January 1992. As its Chairman A. Alekseyev said, active organizational work is now taking place. In time, the committee will consist of several dozen people who will implement state programs for the socio-legal protection of servicemen and their families and also coordinate and monitor the efforts of state structures that are involved with these issues.

In the opinion of the committee's collegium members, this will help the higher echelons of Russian authority to be better informed on all issues that concern unit and subunit personnel. Perhaps the most timely issue, the death and injury of servicemen, was introduced at the first collegium session.

The statistics are implacable—each year, more than three times as many people die in our Armed Forces than in the U.S. Army and thousands of persons become disabled. But it is not simply a matter of figures which, incidentally, still remain secret—the death of even one person is a tragedy. Along with illness, accidents are a cause of death with which we simply cannot reconcile ourselves—people are becoming victims of mutual relations that are at variance with regulations and they die in the flames of interethnic conflicts.

After a thorough discussion of the problem in which, besides committee collegium members, representatives of the CIS Allied Armed Forces General Staff, the Russian Federation Procurator's Office, the Main Military Medical Directorate, and soldiers' mothers participated, a resolution was adopted which specifically provided for the preparation, within a week, of a report on the problems touched upon to the Russian President. Department heads have been ordered to develop a series of measures within a month that will prevent the deaths and injury of servicemen. They also decided to set forth legislative initiatives which would increase social protection for the parents and minor children of servicemen who are killed or disabled.

### **New Criminal Code Retains Disciplinary Battalions**

92UM0905A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Military Tribunals Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General of Justice Anatoliy Ivanovich Muranov by Major A. Ivanyuk: "The Disciplinary Battalion Is Keeping Pace"]

[Text] As we all know, the Russian Ministry of Justice has submitted the draft of a new criminal code for parliament's discussion. It contains many changes in contrast to the one which has been in force since 1961. One of the rare standards that has practically remained in the same form—is the form of punishment that is specific to servicemen: assignment to a disciplinary unit.

We asked Military Tribunals Directorate Chief Lieutenant General of Justice A. Muranov to explain what caused this.

[Ivanyuk] Anatoliy Ivanovich, recently "disbats" [disciplinary battalions], as they are customarily called, have come in for a great deal of criticism. Just what have they not been called: both "army jails" and "schools of hatred". And still, it turns out that they will remain?

[Muranov] Approximately 300 changes have been made in the last 30 years. Right now, standards for new types of crimes, ecological, economic and others, are envisioned and new types of punishments, for example, imprisonment, are once again being introduced into the draft UK [criminal code]. At the same time, we propose retaining disciplinary units in the Armed Forces. But this does not at all signify that they are an anachronism being left miraculously intact, which they sort of "forgot" about during preparation of the draft.

On the contrary, passionate polemics were conducted for a long time on this issue. I recall that at one time the President of the USSR even tasked the procurator, the Supreme Court, the Ministries of Defense and Justice, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB to present their views on this score. The opinion of the experts was unambiguous—we need to preserve the disciplinary units.

[Ivanyuk] And still, as far as I know, it is not a rarity when, prior to the pronouncement of the military tribunal's sentence, a soldier requests to be sent to a colony and not to a disciplinary battalion...

[Muranov] I do not dare judge what the reasons are for that phenomenon. It is possible that someone is paying tribute to the pseudo-romantic criminal world, however, I think that a lack of information has more of an impact when, as they say, they attempt to choose the lesser of the two evils. And they are mistaken.

Nearly 700,000 of our fellow citizens are now serving their sentences in jails and colonies and many were condemned for perpetrating terrible crimes. From year to year, the rate of recidivism among criminals is increasing and has now reached 36 percent. It is no secret that the system of corrective labor institutions is also going through a crisis. Acts of protest, strikes and the seizure of hostages are the excessive confirmation of that. A few statistics: the Russian system of corrective labor institutions currently contains 2,600 formations of convicts who have been convicted for negative orientations, 190 "thieves in the law", 3,800 various criminal "authorities", 2,200 members of organized criminal groups, and more than a thousand racketeers. More than 130 kilograms of narcotics have been seized at places of incarceration. Last year, nearly 6,000 criminal acts were committed in the colonies. The administration does not always abide by the law: each year nearly 3,000 cases of illegal confinement of convicts in punishment cells and in isolation are discovered as a result of procurators' inspections.

In a word, this environment does little to help reeducate a person who has deviated. Unfortunately, this is one of the sore points of our society.

[Ivanyuk] But you agree that there are also many shortcomings in disciplinary units. And obviously, it is no accident that attempts have been made to eliminate them in our history.

[Muranov] This, I would say, is the "journalistic" method in polemics surrounding disciplinary units. Of course, there were, there are, and probably will be shortcomings in them. It is another matter how these shortcomings are to be eliminated and prevented. And besides, is the idea at fault if it is poorly executed.

But remember when we eliminated the disciplinary battalions. There were none in 1917-1918 or 1934-1940, that is, in the periods of extreme measures and the offensives against democracy. And I think that it is noteworthy that both of these attempts failed. And this tradition is strong not only in Russia (disciplinary units have been in existence for more than a century and a half). They are functioning in pedantic England and in pragmatic America. The Poles, Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians have not rejected them...

Indeed it really does not take great wisdom to put a serviceman in jail when he has been convicted of a crime. All the more so since he answers for military crimes in addition to all general crimes. And criminal punishments that are not associated with confinement, but that prescribe definite labor obligations are unacceptable due to the specific nature of his legal situation. For example, such punishments as suspended sentences with the obligation to work and correctional labor without confinement which, in practice, total roughly one third of people's courts' sentences. The existence of disciplinary battalions was called upon to fill that legislative gap.

Basically, they send compulsory service military personnel there for the perpetration of military crimes. This punishment is not confinement but, at the same time, it prescribes restrictions on service and an obligation for productive labor. The contingent of disciplinary battalions is similar and not burdened with criminal experience. On the other hand, the force of general military regulations, the military uniform and military training classes allows the convicted servicemen to feel they have not been forcibly separated from the army and facilitates their return to the ranks of regular military units.

[Ivanyuk] But Anatoliy Ivanovich, opponents of disciplinary units have a not "journalistic" but a purely juridical argument—they say, how can it be so: there is one law for everyone, but here privileges are being created for violators...

[Muranov] That is not entirely so. An assignment to a disciplinary battalion is not a privilege, but a specific measure of criminal punishment. Besides, I think that in any case, the result is the most important thing.

Despite all its shortcomings, this system is highly effective. Of those servicemen sentenced to disciplinary battalions, 70 percent are released before their sentence has been completed. For the majority of those servicemen who later serve conscientiously, the sentence served in the disciplinary battalion is calculated in their term of service. So, many servicemen manage to return to civilian life along with those servicemen who were drafted with them and all are without negative legal consequences in the form of a conviction.

And that is one of the advantages of the disciplinary battalions. The absence of a conviction practically precludes the problem of social adaptation for those servicemen who have served their sentences and, along with other factors, largely predetermines the insignificantly small recidivism rate of 2 percent among them—that is, 18 (!) times lower than after a colony. So, in their experience, military tribunals proceed first of all from the most effective educational impact and it is natural that such a measure of punishment, as an assignment to a disciplinary battalion, is employed with regard to every other convicted serviceman.

But as for the inadequacies, they begin where the very idea is distorted. I think that increasing the term of punishment to a maximum of three years has played a negative role—noticeably more "non-random" people began to turn up in the disciplinary battalions. The principle of staffing these units with leftover officers and warrant officers has had an impact. The poor development of industrial facilities has resulted, in some places, in only 15-20 percent of the convicts being employed in useful labor. The consequences of this are serious.

[Ivanyuk] And yet, what specifically can the new draft Russian Criminal Code change?

[Muranov] It specifically suggests restricting the term of confinement in a disciplinary unit to one year. The draft law on executing punishments in the form of duty restricts, arrest and assignment to a disciplinary battalion with regard to servicemen sets forth the preconditions that are essential to mitigate the regime of serving a sentence and to improve a convict's social- everyday living conditions and to expand the rights of the court and society to control and the opportunity to influence the educational process. All of this is now in the channel of the ongoing processes of democratization both in society and in justice.

At the same time, I will point out that a series of organizational measures has been planned in the Armed Forces, including the creation of a single organ to manage disciplinary units. I recall that right now they are reserved to the military districts. We propose changing the system for manning these units with officers, warrant officers and sergeants and granting them additional privileges.

I am personally convinced that these and other measures will promote the increase of the disciplinary units' prestige and the need for their existence has been confirmed by many years' practice.

## CIS: POLICY

### Army Faces Problem of 'Political Culture' in Training

92UM0935A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
15 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Col (Res) Yaroslav Podolyak, docent and candidate of technical sciences: "Does an Officer Need 'Political Culture'?"]

[Text] There would be fewer problems in the country if professionals were solving them, if politicians were involved only with politics, economists with economics, and the military only with military organizational development and combat training. Unfortunately, we do not have a system of professional selection of political figures, creators of a new economy, and military leaders and strategists. Therefore, each does what he wants: the people's deputy decides the fate of the army, and the Officer's Assembly makes recommendations to the ministers of defense and presidents. The situation is akin to that about which a well-known writer of fables wrote: "You have trouble if a shoemaker begins to make pies..."

Today it is hard to find a person who would not talk about what is vital—about politics and its consequences. Society has become so politicized that it is only natural this process has also engrossed the army. Depoliticization of the politicized armed forces has become a phenomenon of our times. In the barracks and at the training area, in the classroom and at the duty station—everyone is discussing political news, but no one controls military-political thought, and no one is helping the soldier to understand the political contradictions. Political classes have been abolished, political self-education is allowed to take its course, and there is no ideological work... Is this right?

Can we ignore the fact that the young people being drafted into the people's army have participated to one degree or another in the political life of society, but officers during their extended period of service have received a certain political world outlook and acquired the qualities of a propagandist and political studies instructor? From the psychological standpoint, we must not do this, just as we must not by order erase from the memory a tenet or forbid a habit. It is better to use the intellectual capabilities of officers to raise the 'political culture' of servicemen.

History attests that the army has never stood apart from politics. The political objectives of war, reflecting the interests of the government, must be brought to the consciousness of the fighting men with the aid of the powerful apparatus of ideological workers. For a soldier

to go to his death, he needed faith in God, in the czar, in the fatherland. To protect the fatherland against aggression, political objectives were understood by each, and trust in the government was formed comparatively simply, but not always, since no one wanted to die even for a just cause. But when the government began a war of conquest, the apparatus of ideological brainwashing obedient to it resorted to all sorts of demagoguery and psychological camouflage that the army supposedly was outside of politics but was fighting for the interests of its people on alien territory.

Some people now say that in all developed countries the army is "completely removed from the relevant political battle: the civilian society determines the change in power and the mechanism of resignation of unlucky or unskilled politicians, but the army does not interfere in these processes." I think such an assessment of the political role of the army is quite superficial and unconvincing. And this is why.

The outcome of any war and even armed conflict is determined in the final analysis by the spiritual strengths and ideology of people who do not lose the will for victory. This is known to all: both politicians and military leaders. It is no secret that a large apparatus of propagandists, psychologists, sociologists, and chaplains has been created in the U.S. and NATO armies. They are engaged in such subtle ideological indoctrination of service members that one can only guess about it based, for example, on such facts. The selection of professionals in the U.S. Army and volunteers into the Armed Forces of Great Britain is accomplished after a careful check of their political trustworthiness. In the Bundeswehr, the degree of political devotion to the bourgeois system is an important principle when selecting paid volunteers and drafting young people. The party of big capital, the Christian Democratic Union, and the neo-Nazis, propagating ideas of revenge, have a great influence over the officer personnel of Germany. Despite the fact that the NATO armies regard the party affiliation of officers "neutrally," not a single one of them has been a communist or progressive socialist.

Today, NATO officers and generals constantly analyze the military-political situation created by the breakup of the USSR and the formation of sovereign states. They are changing their strategy—from static opposition to the armies of the Warsaw Pact to dynamic reaction in any region. Believing that the combat readiness and morale of the CIS Armed Forces are now at a low level, NATO strategists nevertheless fear those states which have nuclear weapons. Therefore, ideological indoctrination of personnel of the NATO armies takes place under the banner of "Freedom Through Vigilance."

Increasing the political culture of a serviceman is a complex, contradictory, and to some degree formal process. A soldier or officer can be told about the President's policy so that he agrees with it and even approves of it aloud. It can be suggested to a soldier to take the oath, and he will do this. But will a military man give a correct

assessment of the event which he read about in the newspaper or heard at a rally? It is not likely!

Sociological surveys have shown that the system of political education and political classes which were instilled in the Soviet Army for decades did not form stable convictions or expand the political outlook of servicemen, but focused their thinking on strictly assigned themes which constantly emphasized the eminent role of the CPSU. "Three notebooks" and mandatory outlining of source materials and decisions of the congresses did not ensure political culture, but took up the bulk of the time and caused grumbling. More than 80 percent of the officers surveyed in field units and higher educational institutions considered party-political diktat in the system of political education unreasonable and proposed a restructuring: grant an officer 4-6 hours a week for political, moral, economic, and legal self-education, and instead of seminars hold debates and "round tables." Unfortunately, due to depoliticization of the armed forces, these proposals were left on paper, and political self-education continues, but in the direction of renovation.

So, we have a paradox: on the one hand, a depoliticized army; on the other, its soldiers, having the most varied political views and outlooks. It is known that when an idea grips the masses... Who now is instilling ideas in the barracks? Who is satisfying the political needs of personnel? There are no political workers, and educators cannot understand where to begin in molding the soul of a new soldier. There is even this proposal: maybe it is time to invite priests and mullahs into the barracks, who will "quickly" build up the morality of the servicemen. But there are also objections: besides ethnic conflicts, will there not arise religious conflicts in the military collectives? For the time being one thing is clear: if a commander-educator does not control the political situation in the collective, the potential enemy will. This is obvious!

Now not just the soldiers but also officers understand differently the reasons for the political crisis, the events of August, and the subsequent collapse of the mighty USSR. Many cannot delve into the essence of the democratic transformations on the highest level of power, why the President of the USSR removes three Slavic leaders from power based on the Minsk Accords and the USSR minister of defense is charged with treason and imprisoned. No one is conducting explanatory work in the units and subunits—hence the false rumors, doubts, and arguments.

However, the mass media are trying with all their might to present to the narrow-minded person original opinions of latter-day reformers of the state and army. Some criticize the idea of preserving a unified CIS Army, citing the "convincing" argument that "world history knows no examples when several states had a unified army." Others speak out against creating national armies, saying that this path is unfavorable in the political, economic, and military-technical respect. Too often the newspapers write about the imminent threat of officer cuts, making

an officer's career dependent on his devotion to the new power. In the situation of increasing impoverishment of the people and excessive military spending, political leaders are promising officers a multiple increase in wages and resolution of the housing problem. Such information does not unite people, but gives cause to inflame anti-officer sentiments in society. The prestige of the officer profession is declining, many officers are losing confidence in the future, and their thoughts are occupied not with combat readiness but with practical questions of everyday life and the size of their future pension.

One would not envy officers before whose eyes a civil war flames up and women and children die due to ethnic strife. How much self-control is needed to watch indifferently as bandits "privatize" combat equipment, hold garrisons under siege, and threaten the families of servicemen? Where and when was this that the army, educated in the spirit of unity with the people, cannot help them find peace and tranquillity? Whom does this benefit? Who has worked so well that the army was brought to its knees without war, without a nuclear strike? Another horrible question arises in this regard: "Is an army that is unable to cope with internal problems capable of preventing a civil war or holding out against an external enemy?"

I think that the solution to this problem is not in the Yugoslav variant, not in the half-measures being conducted by the former USSR President on confiscating weapons from the civilian population, not in the nonplus arguments of people's deputies about the national independence of one people from another, but in an efficient nationwide rescue program in which the army would not be neutral but an actively restraining force restoring order in any region. It becomes shameful when ethnic fighters of Transcaucasia invite UN troops to restore order, and our servicemen, adapted to the local conditions and loyal to international duty, are hastily abandoning military camps, carrying out some higher political objectives...

When a superpower loses its status and breaks up into sovereign states, then comes the agonizing process of dividing its armed forces. It is difficult to say what kind of a national army there should be without in-depth and comprehensive scientific research of this most important problem of a young state. One can state the numerical composition, structure, and armament and then also estimate the appropriate military budget. But what about the military doctrine, assessment of potential adversaries, and their combat and moral-political potential? For the time being it is also unclear about strategic forces. Their creation will facilitate collective defense and make armed conflicts between republics virtually impossible. This does not suit national-patriots who want to secure themselves, above all, against their immediate neighbors, with whom there have been good relations, peace, and harmony from time immemorial. But peoples do not fight one another; armies fight for the political objectives of their governments, and the more

effective political education of servicemen, the more successful they are. Only firm convictions enable a soldier to comprehend a commander's order and not carry it out if it is criminal and directed against his neighbor. Such was the case in August 1991 in Moscow and other "hot spots" of the country, and such may also be the case in revising borders by armed means. Consciousness of actions and not automatic subordination distinguishes a people's army from mercenaries.

(To be continued)

### Intelligence Officer Complains On Personnel Policies

92UM0945A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 15 Apr 92 p 6

[Article by Colonel Ivanov, Intelligence Officer: "Military Intelligence—On the Verge of Collapse?: GRU Suffering From Influx of Amateurs"]

[Text] For intelligence professionals who have dedicated their lives to serving the fatherland, love of country remains the only satisfaction and reward, in spite of the meager pay, the constant risk of being exposed in the country where stationed, and the danger of being slandered in one's own country by ambitious "well wishers."

The weak cross over to the other side. Some traitors in our present day have, for all practical purposes, been honored as heroes of democracy. There were a few. They, as a rule, led brilliant careers, and had powerful sponsors among the ranks of intelligence and armed forces leadership. Because of this, they forced their way into wealthy countries, pushing aside the more capable and worthy. There, abroad, their real faces were revealed: that of a coward, cheat, or degenerate. The overwhelming majority of intelligence officers, however, continue to unselfishly serve their country and their people.

From ancient times until now, not one regime has managed without intelligence, the eyes and ears of a nation. Can it really be that it is no longer needed by the soothsayers appearing as of late in our country, who are ready to give up anything and everything for the sake of SKV [freely convertible currency]?

"Democrats" suddenly began crying out about the moral side of intelligence, arguing about something, which they not only lacked an understanding of, but in which many apparently had vested interests in seeing collapse. They needed bridges to the West purely for their own aims of shamelessly selling off the riches of Russia. Intelligence and counterintelligence defend the interests of their country, they place filters on trade.

I have become convinced on many occasions that "bourgeois" patriotism is no weaker than the "socialist" variety. Personnel in western special services know what is of value, what to protect, and what is worth taking risks for. They are, for the most part, professionals. There are no amateurs among them.

The craze that has captured the nation is now spreading to the intelligence community. Some officials have been seized by a blind desire to go tearing abroad to military-diplomatic posts and dedicate themselves (better late than never) to the business of representing their country. They do so without any knowledge of the language, culture, or history of the foreign country, nor with any knowledge of military science or the corresponding training. It used to be that apparatchiks who had burned out, or failed at their posts, were sent abroad as ambassadors, trade mission representatives, permanent representatives, consultants, and the like. The viscous practice lives on. Attempts are being made during our time to revitalize it.

Major-General Nikolay Stolyarov, aid to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] in personnel-related matters, suddenly fancied himself as an attache on questions of U.S. defense. There is an abundance of teaching work available in our armed forces, but the fascination with life abroad knows no rest. Political figures, like party functionaries, consider themselves ready to fill any position.

The order authorizing the general to go to Washington is now being issued from Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov. Worst of all, this game of personnel politics is being organized while another officer, a professional, having received an American visa, and gone through all the necessary procedures, is completing his preparations for a business trip to the U.S.

Danger lies in a precedent capable of becoming a viscous practice. In the history of the GRU there was a period when staff and line officers and generals were appointed to military attache posts. Many of them were wonderful people, but the damage done by their unpreparedness and incompetence exceeded all expectations.

As has become known, in the near future other parliamentary figures, who have had little contact with defense issues, will be preparing to take their place in line to go abroad via the military-diplomatic route.

At this moment, and I hope it is not the last, it is imperative that an end be put to the vain attempts made by irresponsible people to destroy military intelligence, for the latter is making a sizeable contribution to ensuring the security of our country.

Colonel Ivanov, Intelligence Officer

P.S. Aleksandr Yakubovskiy, head of the press communications section of the Committee for Personnel Matters of the CIS OVS, affirmed that "there had been a proposal for Nikolay Stolyarov to go abroad to fill a position related to military-diplomatic work." However, a week ago, at a work meeting held by committee members, Major-General Stolyarov announced, that "the question concerning a business trip to the USA has been closed." In his opinion, "now is not an opportune time to be far removed from events taking place in society and the armed forces."

### Legal-Procedural Requirements for New Military Doctrine

92UM0922A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Apr 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major of Justice Yu. Zhdanov, candidate of juridical sciences, under the "Point of View" rubric: "Military Doctrine and the Law"]

[Text] Our military doctrine was for many years subject to the influence of the political situation, and to the moods and views of a narrow circle of political and military leaders, virtually bereft of a serious legal basis. This led to contradictions in the political and technical military content of the doctrine proper or in that which passed for one. This being the case, our peacetime foreign policy initiatives in the pre-war years amounted to mere statements, and, in addition, were in conflict with the practice of military construction. An example of this is the Field Regulations of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army] of 1939, in which the features of the military doctrine were embodied in the following statement: "In the event an enemy launches a war against us, the Workers and Peasants Red Army will become more aggressive than the most aggressive of armies of all time. We will wage the war offensively, carrying it into the enemy's territory." That is why those years saw the creation of offensive force groupings—mechanized corps and airborne units—intended to carry out offensive actions in the depth of an enemy's territory. Similar irregularities are to be found in subsequent times. The Soviet Union, declaring itself to adhere to a decidedly defensive nature of military doctrine, in 1982 going so far as to obligate itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, did at the same time become drawn into the pointless and ruinous arms race.

I can cite other examples, but I see no point to digging up cases where someone did or did not do something properly in the area of military construction. What I do wish to state is that an absence of precise legal and juridical principles in constituting a military doctrine endows the latter with lack of controllability and predictability. It is possible (as it was 10 years ago) to say one thing, intending something else, do a third thing, and so on without end. Any jurist can see the need for legal solidification of the military doctrine.

The legislative procedure for effectuating this kind of document is abundantly clear: The military doctrine (speaking with Russia in mind) should obviously be presented by the President to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation for discussion and approval. The doctrine upon passage would become juridically effective for everyone. The very fact of parliamentary approval would entail a most significant principle inherent in a civilized democratic society: parliamentary and civilian control of a state's military policy. Incidentally, in the USA the basic tenets of the military doctrine

are written into the so-called "national security strategy," on which the President reports annually to Congress for acceptance as an official document.

Of importance is the substantive aspect of a document which would provide a legal foundation for the tenets of a military doctrine. It would appear impossible—even purposeless—to include in a single act of legislation the entire complex of military matters and minor details. For this reason, Russia could pass an act (law) which would at least set down the system of fundamental views associated with military policy. Examples of what could be included are: the state's basic international legal military obligations incumbent on it as a result of pertinent international agreements; justification and methods of employing armed forces, including in foreign countries; the concept of "armed attack" as a basis for seeking individual defense or collective self-defense under the U.N. Charter; a mechanism for arriving at a decision relative to use of mass destruction weapons in accordance with the requirements of international law; principles of military construction; etc. This kind of legal document would not be directly applicable per se, but it would automatically exert an influence on all remaining military legislation. The significance of this would be that any divergence of the basic tenets of the military doctrine from regulations, orders, and instructions would result in a change in the regulations proper, not in the doctrinal document. In addition, this would eliminate discrepancies between political and technical military aspects of the doctrine.

Speaking in favor of juridical delineation of a military doctrine is another significant consideration: Russia has not been independently subject to international law since 1917. Now, with Russia's having become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, she carries "major responsibility for maintaining peace and security" (Article 24, U.N. Charter), and the acceptance of a suitable military doctrine will tend to enhance greater trust in her on the part of the world community.

### Ukraine Officers Pessimistic on Military Reform

92UM0954B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Apr 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Does the Officer Need It?: Development of the Armed Forces: Problems of Education"]

[Text] A survey carried out in several military collectives in January 1992 showed that most officers (69 percent) think that the army must not be a trump card in the political game, that its function is to stand guard over the general interests of the state. Officers are quite pessimistic about the forecasts of the fate of the CIS and attempts to preserve the armed forces in their previous form: one out of two has doubts about the stability of the military and political union CIS, and 65 percent of the respondents are losing faith in the possibility of carrying out military reform in the near future.

It is a noteworthy fact that in some collectives there has been a dramatic change in the attitude toward the establishment of a national army. After the swearing of the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine, one out of three servicemen considered himself to be a patriot of the new state and one out of five officers said that as a professional he will serve in the army where they pay him the most, especially since for the time being none of this is foreign but rather is all ours. Some officers frankly state that the quality of their service will depend upon the realization of the promises of the government and president on increases in their salaries and pensions and the provision of housing and other privileges. A significant number of officers—46 percent—are absolutely against the inflaming of nationalistic passions in military collectives. A national army must be international in its composition and in the spirit that is cultivated in it.

Naturally these data cannot be interpreted as being indicative of the opinion of the officers comprising the national army on account of the limited sample. A more in-depth analysis of these problems requires extensive sociological studies of all categories of service personnel. Only the active application of scientific methods will allow the command to optimize the political education of the personnel of the new army.

The essence of the optimization of political education is for the officer to strive for the best results in the formation of political culture and the development of the social and political qualities of service personnel at the least expenditure of mental and psychophysiological effort. It can be said that the optimum is the minimum amount of time in the course of which noticeable changes take place in the consciousness and behavior of soldiers under the influence of political action.

If we want to put political education on a scientific basis, then it is necessary first of all to resolve the question of principles, that is, the pedagogical mechanisms of this process.

The basic principles of political education may be taken to be: its scientific nature and objectivity, openness and democratic spirit, unity of political and moral education, an individual and collective approach, reliance on the positive convictions of the individual, and uniformity and coordination of educational actions by the government and command. Political education in the military units and military educational institutions is organized and carried out in accordance with these principles.

Who must be involved in the political education of military personnel? The law in the army is that senior personnel educate junior personnel and the superior instructs his subordinate. But this is not enough, the new army needs specially trained people for whom education would not be a secondary matter but a profession. A professional educator must receive in-depth knowledge of the psychology of the personality and psychology of the collective, sociology and psychology of propaganda, psychological pedagogy and psychology of command and

control, and political science and political psychology, that is, the entire set of social sciences that they present to the officer in foreign armies. The social scientists of the VUZ's understand this but uncertainty is paralyzing their initiative and creative work to produce new textbooks.

Studies that we carried out in seven higher military educational institutions show that the cadets are almost completely ignoring the old textbooks on military psychology and pedagogy and they have no particular interest in lectures on social disciplines. "Give us good textbooks," the cadets ask, "and we will figure out the social and political problems by ourselves." But where can good books be obtained? The artificially created paper shortage does not mean that you cannot write a textbook from a compendium of lectures! Teachers write their lectures on the back side of old compendiums.

And in conclusion some thoughts about new social disciplines for cadets and officers.

A new sociology is now being established that has been freed of party and class biases and that is capable of giving answers to questions of vital importance to a person trying to understand what is happening to the society, whether it is developing or deteriorating, and who is controlling it and how. It is difficult for the average reader to be guided by books on Marxist and bourgeois sociology, between which there never was ideological agreement, for the first is based on historical materialism, whereas the second is based on the philosophy of positivism. But let the scientists look into this. The officer does not need theoretical disputes but concise textbooks on military sociology.

It is necessary for such textbooks to do more to illuminate the practical functions of military sociology, the methodology of sociological surveys, and scientifically founded forecasts of the social development of the army and individual branches of the armed forces. Especially important for the officer are practical recommendations on the formulation of plans for the social development of large and small military collectives in the situation of massive personnel cuts. It is inadmissible to reduce military sociology to the study of public opinion. It is necessary to provide for more methods for the study of the motives, goals, aims, interests, values, ideological notions, and political culture of different categories of service personnel. Military sociology must not be detached from social psychology. Many of their themes are interrelated but whereas the topic of study in the first is macrogroups, the second deals with medium-sized groups and microgroups. Neither topic loses sight of the personality of the soldier and the laws governing its socialization.

Textbooks on political science need above all to include an analysis of the history of the development of military and political thought from its origin to our days. Knowledge of the past permits one to forecast the future and to consider the mistakes of the leaders and commanders in

the development and command of the armed forces. At the present time, the military policy of contemporary states and its results are extremely contradictory and are interpreted differently in different sources. Many books have been written about World War II but unfortunately one rarely encounters a political analysis that examines the role of military policy in the course of the preparation, unleashing, and waging of war. Subjectivism and falsifications distort the truth and give rise to gloomy thoughts that the people and their armed forces were ignorant of the political steps of their government but, incited by propaganda, always did its will. The officer needs to know the truth about the past war to be successful in strengthening defense.

### CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

#### Efforts To Designate Strategic Forces Viewed

92UM0916A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
8 Apr 92 pp 2-3

[Article by Lt Col Nikolay Gorenko, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "Ministry of Defense of Ukraine—CIS Joint Armed Forces: An Attempt To Determine Positions on Strategic Forces"]

[Text] A working meeting of representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with the top leaders of the CIS Joint Armed Forces was held over three days at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Lieutenant-General N. Bizhan, deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, headed Ukraine's military delegation.

The following attended from the CIS Joint Armed Forces: General of the Army Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces; Colonel-General V. Prudnikov, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces; Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets, first deputy commander in chief of the Navy; Colonel-General of Aviation P. Deynekin, commander in chief of the Air Force; Colonel-General of Aviation I. Kalugin, commander of Long-Range Aviation; Colonel-General of Aviation V. Yefanov, commander of Military Transport Aviation; and many other generals and officers—experts of the General Staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

The main topic of the meeting was to determine the list of forces and assets, from among those stationed in Ukraine, which are considered strategic forces and, in accordance with legislative acts passed by Ukraine, should be either disbanded and dismantled or withdrawn from the territory of an independent sovereign state pursuing a nuclear-free policy.

In essence, they examined questions on which agreement was not reached at the meeting in Kiev on 20 March, that is, on the composition of strategic forces.

The position of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was clearly determined at the meeting: troops stationed in Ukraine are the property of Ukraine in accordance with

international legal acts, and all questions pertaining to these troops should be resolved based on this legal principle.

Colonel-General K. Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, held a closed, confidential discussion with the Moscow delegation.

The fact that the talks were held has a fundamental state-political significance. Beginning in September, from the moment Ukraine determined its position as an independent sovereign state building its own armed forces, a policy of confrontation has been developing on the state-political level between Ukraine and the command of CIS Strategic Forces. The tactic of ignoring Ukraine as an independent state, unfortunately, is growing stronger.

In this context, the meeting had, in my view, one very important distinguishing feature: our Ministry of Defense firmly expressed its point of view with respect to troops which the leadership of the CIS Joint Armed Forces regards as part of the strategic forces. They are the property of Ukraine. According to the agreement on strategic forces, at the meeting Ukraine stated its willingness to resolve the fate of units and large units on a legal basis, not laying claim to appropriation of forces and assets of a truly strategic nature, but also not foregoing adherence to principle with respect to the fate of the units which the CIS Joint Armed Forces knowingly falsely classified as strategic. There are quite a few such units, which reconfirms the reluctance of the command of CIS strategic forces to recognize state-political realities. Put more simply, it convinces us of their desire simply to take away from a sovereign state that which belongs to it by the right of the internationally recognized "zero option" principle.

The deputy minister of defense emphasized in particular that the political position of Ukraine should be taken into account when deciding the fate of strategic forces: the territory of the state is to be a nuclear-free zone in the future. This has been announced to the entire world; this is the political strategy of an independent state; and this reality must be considered.

Certainly, the conversation about the plan of destruction or relocation of nuclear forces is among the fundamental questions of the meeting. Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan consistently defended the idea that it is necessary to compile a plan of destruction: then the list of strategic forces will take shape on its own. The command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces did not agree with this position. The list compiled by the Moscow side was discussed. Many items on the list, for certain forces and assets, are not considered strategic by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

The following understandings have been reached for the branches of armed forces.

**The Strategic Rocket Forces.** Tactical nuclear weapons will be eliminated in accordance with the earlier adopted

plan, that is, they will be removed from the territory of Ukraine by the end of 1994. Liquid-propellant operational-tactical missiles will be blown up. It is planned to destroy solid-propellant missiles using a new technology at one of the defense plants in Russia. In reconciling the positions on nuclear forces, Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan emphasized the need for Ukraine to create a system of monitoring the "nuclear button." General of the Army Yu. Maksimov assured the leadership of the republic's Ministry of Defense that Ukraine would be able to monitor completely the process of non-use of nuclear weapons by Russia. Summarizing this portion of the negotiations, Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan again singled out the idea that the main thing in the talk about nuclear forces is not to whom they will be subordinate but Ukraine's fundamental position as a nuclear-free republic.

As before, they were unable to reach an agreement on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. The deputy minister of defense of Ukraine stated that the supreme command of the Navy is taking the previous position of ignoring the fact of the sovereignty and independence of the state of Ukraine. Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets, first deputy commander in chief of the Navy, defended the well-known point of view that the basis of the principles of forming the Black Sea Fleet is the interests of overall security and that "the fleet should not be divided territorially." The admiral announced the proposal of the commander in chief of the Navy relative to Ukraine's share in the Black Sea Fleet: according to views of the supreme command, Ukraine may be allotted 22 percent of the forces and assets of the Black Sea Fleet.

"The Black Sea Fleet has strategic missions and performs them in the interests of the CIS," the admiral said. He also stated that the fate of the fleet should be decided by politicians and not by the military, to which the Ukrainian side reasonably remarked that the politicians would make the decision based on the proposals of the military. "When we come to an agreement, these proposals will go to the presidents," Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan stated. Unfortunately, the idea of working out fundamentals of proposals to politicians on the fleet was not supported by the Navy's commander in chief.

General of the Army Yu. Maksimov made the statement that the fate of the fleet should be decided based on the determination of whether or not our presence is needed in the water areas of the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. Lieutenant-General I. Bizhan assessed the policy of the CIS Joint Armed Forces with respect to the Black Sea Fleet as illogical and inconsistent: the NATO grouping in Europe has not changed, but Ukraine is forbidden to have a navy.

The Moscow delegation was also told that while the commander in chief of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, is issuing directives on the sale of material assets of the Black Sea Fleet (FD-5 of 23 March 1992), Ukraine is to a considerable degree maintaining the Black Sea Fleet—0.5 billion rubles have been allocated

for maintaining the fleet. To the information of the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine on the order by the commander in chief of the Navy on the transfer of seven repair yards to the commercial association "Nevikon," Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets responded that it was the first he had heard about this...

Seventeen percent of the total value of the four fleets of the former USSR belongs to Ukraine. The value of the Black Sea Fleet is 10 percent of the total value, i.e., just over half of what by law is due to the state. It was emphasized that if the entire Black Sea Fleet were to be transferred to Ukraine, this would comprise only part of what Ukraine has the right to inherit. But it is willing to forgive the 7 percent to the CIS Joint Armed Forces just to solve the issue of to whom the Black Sea Fleet belongs, which would remove psychological tension in the fleet collectives...

On strategic installations of the Air Defense Forces, the sides agreed that according to the agreement on strategic forces, radar centers should operate for Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine is willing to share information with the Ministry of Defense of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the General Staff.

In deciding the fate of strategic aviation, the sides agreed that all strategic bombers will be withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine by the end of 1994. Until then, they are operationally subordinate to the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Not laying claim to the strategic bombers, at the same time, Ukraine firmly stated that Military Transport Aviation and the personnel of which had pledged allegiance to the people of Ukraine are part of the Air Force of Ukraine.

The exchange of opinions regarding intelligence installations, the airborne division stationed in the Odessa Military District, and various storage and repair bases is sharp. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine firmly stated that in deciding the fate of these installations, Ukraine will proceed from the fact that they are the property of a sovereign state.

For the strategic communications brigade, the following decision was made: it is under the jurisdiction of Ukraine, but performs missions in the interests of the commonwealth.

The Ukrainian side did not agree with the part of the list of strategic forces on ground forces. The leadership of the CIS Joint Armed Forces proposed considering 43 installations as strategic. The Ministry of Defense stated that many of them are not strategic in nature. In particular, directed to the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the General Staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, it was stated that its "position does not hold water."

The meeting and the agreements made certainly have a positive significance, contribute to determining the list of strategic forces, and, on the whole, outline the range of state-political principles and approaches to resolving the fate of nuclear strategic forces...

## CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### Long Range Aviation's Fuel Shortage

92UM0959A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA  
in Russian No 43, 3 Mar 92 p 1

[Article by Leonid Kostrov in the column "50 Years of Long Range Aviation": "The 'Black Jack'—Not a Game for Politicians"]

[Text] It was precisely 12 hours before we were to set out on a visit to a long range aviation unit that we learned that the 5th of March was to denote the exact half-century mark of our long range aviation. We were motivated to travel to the base of the TU-160 supersonic strategic bomber, known in the West as "Black Jack," by Russia's President's announcement that production of this aircraft would cease. We at that time were attempting to talk our way into securing a visit to Kazan, where new TU-160s, which had received the "go-ahead" previously from Air Force authorities, were standing on the scaffolding of one of the aircraft plants heading for shutdown.

The last time one of these bombers took to the sky was on 14 February, when it was being ferried from the airfield of the Guards Order of Lenin and Red Banner Poltava-Brest Heavy Long Range Bomber Regiment stationed in the Ukraine to Minsk, on occasion of the meeting of the Commonwealth states.

The Black Jacks are still parked. To make the single flight to Byelarus, it was necessary to draw fuel from the emergency rations. Incidentally, there are insufficient supplies of kerosene for the entire long range aviation, not only for the TU-160. It was an irony of fate that we were the first journalists to travel to the aviation regiment by train, not aircraft.

Fuel shortage is something to which the regiment has grown accustomed. So that the TU-160 crews do not "stay out of the skies too long," they receive training in a specially-equipped TU-134UBL, a craft which is much more economical, but one which is in no way comparable to the strategic supersonic aircraft in flight characteristics and piloting details.

We unfortunately were not able to interview Valeriy Gorgol, the commander of the decorated regiment. We were given information on the unit by Major Vasiliy Lepekhin, who started off by taking us to the aviation regiment's museum.

This was the regiment that saw the introduction of the famous TU-16 bombers—the prototype of the civilian TU-104, the TU-22 Backfire, and a number of other aircraft. The first TU-160 arrived there from Kazan on 26 April 1987. There are now 19 of them. No, not in the regiment—in the entire former Union. Incidentally, each bomber is the equivalent of a nuclear submarine in striking power.

"About half my comrades have been to the North Pole, thanks to the TU-160," joked Vasiliy Lepekhin. "Above it, to put it more accurately. The flights usually take 12 to 14 hours, but even that is not the limit."

By the way, a person can gain some idea of where the Black Jacks fly from the geography of diplomatic notes that from time to time were received by the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. That means that they fly fairly well.

However, the aircraft is still not "fully done." The TU-160 is still in the trial stage; it is the target of quite a bit of criticism from crews and from ground support personnel. The final completion phase was halted when the money recently ran out.

In creating the modern and worthy aircraft, someone managed to "forget" about technical servicing equipment. To prepare the craft for flight, the approach used is what the support personnel call the "prehistoric level," one requiring a great deal of time and effort. An example is the fuel trucks. The standard load per truck is 18 tonnes. The TU-160 takes on almost 10 times as much. That is quite a disparity, to say the least.

Thousands of persons involved with the TU-160 in some way or other have no idea what tomorrow will bring. It is a fact that the Russian peace initiatives specify two aircraft types that will no longer be produced. In this connection, if the plant producing the TU-95 MS is capable of making a painless transition to production of the TU-204, the new civilian aircraft, the losses resulting from cessation of production at the Kazan plant will be staggering.

The Black Jack carries a crew of four. About 20 computers manage the navigation, engines, and armament. Each one of us could not help but bump his forehead on the instrument panel located above as he tried to climb into seats of the pilot and copilot. That happens to everyone who tries to familiarize himself with the bomber. The regiment has nicknamed the panel the "Carlucci switch," after an occurrence in 1989, when the former U.S. defense secretary also suffered a little when he tried to climb onto the TU-160 pilot's seat.

The emergency seat ejection system designed by specialists of the Zvezda Machine Building Plant makes it possible for all four crew members to be catapulted at the same time, with their K-36 seats "deployed" in the air. There was an occasion when this system, which was an object of constant admiration by foreign specialists, underwent an unexpected trial under true-to-life conditions, when a sudden failure of the electric power system caused the engines to catch fire.

The bombers are to relocate to Russia by 1994. Their exact destination is still unknown. Virtually the entire regiment—the only one capable of flying and servicing the TU-160—is slated to "move." It is unlikely that everyone will wish to leave the place where he has

become comfortable; it is possible that some will desire to remain, to serve in the Ukraine Armed Forces.

There is a question circulating in the regiment: In which army are they serving? Strategic aviation comes under the command of the CIS Unified Forces. Russia—in contradistinction to the Ukraine—has no army. Not as yet. This is not some kind of abstract thinking: The differences of opinion and various interpretations of regulations and other documents have a direct bearing on the lives of enlisted personnel and officers, not only on the service proper. For example, the Ukraine Ministry of Defense has announced that it intends to pay for leave for officers and their wives, and all their dependents. The CIS Armed Forces are not as generous in this regard.

We were hoping that a TU-134 incoming into the regiment would take us at least to Ryazan if not to Moscow. However, the aircraft took off for another destination; flights of long range aviation over Ukraine are associated with many difficulties. The TU-160 aircraft were lined up on the edge of the airfield. Training equipment was being unloaded from one of them, while a fuel truck pump was chugging away at another. Does this mean, nonetheless, that the aircraft will take off? Will it fly in the way in which it was intended?

#### **25% Shortage Of Personnel In Moscow S-300 SAM Elements**

*92UM0944A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Apr 92 p 4*

[Unattributed article: "Sparkle and Indigence of Air Defense"]

[Text] A meeting unplanned in the protocol took place on the steps of the garrison officers club of one of the four air defense divisions in the Moscow region to which journalists had been invited by Colonel-General of Aviation A. Kornukov, troop commander of the capital district. An elderly woman tried to get answers from the commanding officer to the questions she deemed most important: Why does a liter of milk in the garrison commissariat sell for a whole 25 rubles, and where is a lieutenant to come up with 6,000 rubles to pay to enroll his child in kindergarten?

These seemingly simple, at first glance, questions left the general at a loss. Because he, like the old woman, can't understand much of what is happening in the country. For example, where is he supposed to get the money to maintain hundreds of garrisons that were built almost 50 years ago and are literally falling down before his eyes? How can he reequip his "eyes and ears"—the radioelectronic troops, 60 percent of whose equipment is hopelessly obsolete? How can he reach mutual understanding with the authorities of the 25 oblasts and three autonomous entities in which the district's troops are stationed? And most importantly, who is going to safeguard Russia's airspace?

There is a catastrophic shortage of soldiers. Even his "elite" surface to air missile division—the highly sophisticated S-300 system, which, in specialists' opinion, is far superior to the American Patriot—is staffed at just 75 percent, and that through the efforts of officers who have gone around to all Moscow's assembly points for deserters. Today many guard details, especially those protecting arsenals and ammunition depots, consist of officers. The personnel shortage has made it necessary to reduce the strength of alert forces by half throughout the district this year. If this situation continues, the commander observed, combat readiness will plummet next year.

The reductions that have become commonplace in the army apparently do not threaten the Moscow Air Defense District. It protects one-fifth of the country's entire industrial potential and over 600 critical installations, among them 40 power plants (eight of them nuclear). In our troubled times, no one would dare leave them vulnerable from the air. But who is going to help the defenders themselves, who is going to solve their problems?

#### **CIS: NAVAL FORCES**

##### **Kozhin Fired By Kasatonov: More Units Take Ukraine Oath**

*92UM0914A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 9 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Nikolay Gorenko: "On the Situation at Donuzlav Naval Base"]

[Text] During the evening of the day before yesterday, officers of the naval base headquarters which Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin commands took the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. Thirty seven people took the oath which is more than 50 percent of the base headquarters officers.

Base Commander Rear Admiral B. Kozhin was removed from his post at 2 a.m. by order of Black Sea Fleet Commander I. Kasatonov.

Naval infantry military subunits of up to a battalion in strength and four armored personnel vehicles have moved onto the base. The naval infantrymen are armed. They have placed the brigade headquarters under guard: headquarters staff officers are not being permitted into the building. Brigade Commander Captain 2nd Rank Petr Kalashnikov, who was appointed to replace Captain 2nd Rank Yuriy Shalyta who was removed from the post of brigade commander earlier, was also armed. As an eyewitness reported to me over the telephone, the officer stated: "I am armed because I am not assured of my own safety..."

Four ships have moved into the base's harbor: two small antisubmarine warfare vessels [MPK] that arrived from

Sevastopol, each with personnel strength of up to 100 men on board, and two missile patrol boats from Chernomorsk with up to 40 men on board. The MPK's and missile boats have the mission of blockading base ships on which the Ukrainian oath has been taken. In Captain 2nd Rank P. Kalashnikov's brigade, 75 percent of the personnel have taken the oath.

As an officer reported to me on the telephone from the base, in the nearby search and rescue ship brigade which Captain 1st Rank Chernokhlebov commands, "the people down below are seething" and are prepared to take the oath, but the commanders "are controlling the situation". Chernokhlebov has allegedly received a command from fleet headquarters "to be prepared to raise St. Andrew's flag on the ships of his brigade."

The officer who telephoned me also reported that an information blockade is being carried out. For example, during the Ukrainian minister of defense's speech on Ukrainian television, the second half was suppressed with noise.

**NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gorenko received the information from Donuzlav Naval Base over the telephone.**

#### **German Ambassador Views Conditions at Liepaja Naval Base**

*92UN1225A Riga DIENA in Russian 21 Mar 92 p 1*

[Article by Erik Kulis: "The CIS Naval Ship 'Salutes' the Count"]

[Text] (Liepaja, 19 March.) When the pilot boat carrying the German ambassador passed the minesweeper, its crew members "saluted" by dumping the contents of a rubbish container into the sea. The ambassador lit up a cigarette but wisely did not throw the match overboard as the water covered by a film of oil products was reflecting all the colors of the rainbow...

This was the situation the German Ambassador to Latvia, Count Hagen von Lambsdorf found when he devoted several hours to touring on the pilot boat in the waters of the Liepaja Naval Port. Along with his wife and the first secretary of the embassy, he was visiting in Liepaja to become acquainted with certain aspects of city life.

The first questions of the ambassador were evoked by the water-filled pontoons in the channel next to the city thermal power plant, where the city self-administration had intended to build a pier for transport vessels carrying oil products.

Later, when H. von Lambsdorf saw in the winter harbor the naval ships with disassembled deck superstructures and broken portholes and read the slogan "Glory to the Navy of the Soviet Union!" he did not have any more questions. The count silently looked at the piles of

damaged submarine storage batteries which were leaking electrolyte while the lead plates had fallen into the water...

When the ambassador's view fell on the hull of the old cruiser Sverdlov and a whole armada of torpedo boats that were reminiscent of scrap, the count said that the West had clearly overestimated the importance of the Liepaja base for the USSR Navy.

As for the presence of the cruiser Sverdlov in port, from private conversations with the officers it was learned that the Sverdlov was in no way protecting the hospitable and hardworking Latvian people against the encroachments of the imperialists but rather the thick wallet of the naval officers stationed in Liepaja.

In accord with the orders of the military bureaucracy, it is enough to moor one single cruiser at the pier in order for the port to receive immediately the status of a Navy base and the corresponding increased pay for the command personnel.

The count also saw the enormous empty port areas which now could be leased to foreign tourist firms in order to attract tourists to the Liepaja Navy "cemetery—museum." The ambassador was interested in whether the process of the further transporting of the fuel from the port was a complicated one and also under what conditions did the Liepaja Self-Administration enter into commercial relations with foreign firms. All the questions of interest to H. Lambsdorf were answered by the deputy mayor of the city Andris Jaunsleinis and the Commander of the Latvian Naval Forces Ilmar Lesinskis.

#### **KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Article on Shore Defense Troops Article**

*92UM0914D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 9 Apr 92 p 1*

[Letter by the personnel of 1st Naval Infantry Battalion, Senior Lieutenant Shitenkov, Lieutenants Yefimov and Orekhov; Senior Sergeants Korotchenko and Strents, Seamen Rolya, Kalistratov, Vistiery, Dzhumaybayev, Mamedov and others (a total of 78 signatures), under the rubric: "What is the Fate of the Shore Defense Troops": "Who Nationalized and... Disbanded Us"]

[Text] Today, in the days when political passions surrounding the status of the Black Sea Fleet have been inflamed to the limit and articles of various interpretations that are not always objective and are often false appear in the mass media. And doubly dangerous is that deception when it is engendered from the hands of a highly-placed official who has been endowed with both rank and position. So, on March 12, 1992 an article by Naval Shore Defense Troops Chief Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov called "Natsionalizirovat i... rasformirovat? [Nationalize and... Disband?] " appeared in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

As the author anticipated, this article, did not leave the people about whom it was written indifferent. The thing is that it caused the opposite reaction. Officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and seamen of the Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantry's 1st Battalion are outraged by the undisguised lies and juggling of facts. The following question is the dominant theme of the article: "Why does Ukraine need naval infantry?" And the author himself provides the answer to it: "In order to nationalize the Black Sea Fleet's shore defense troops for the sake of today's political ambitions and then to inevitably disband them to the detriment of the CIS's interests."

How could you have written that, knowing that the CIS Navy Commander-in-Chief's directive on disbanding the Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantry Brigade's 1st Battalion had been signed on February 14, 1992, although you, Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov, while persuading unit commanders to refrain from taking the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine and to wait for a political solution at the beginning of February 1992, solemnly promised that not a single unit would be disbanded or reduced.

So, in whose interests was this battalion disbanded? It has great combat traditions and it is from it that Black Sea Fleet naval infantry took its beginning, on the rolls of 1st Company is forever listed Hero of the Soviet Union Major Tsezar Lvovich Kunikov. In whose interests is the best battalion among similar ones according to the results of combat training for 1991? It is that battalion which, already in 1991, was submitted for the Black Sea Fleet Commander's Prize for Firing Training.

To all of these questions that have been set forth above, not one commander (senior commander) could provide a rational answer to either the battalion's officers, warrant officers, or compulsory service military personnel.

And the reason behind it is something else. This is that battalion which in January 1992 expressed the need to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine and practically as a whole took it on February 22, 1992.

And Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov is mistaken when he states that the majority of officers and warrant officers support the status of the shore defense troops and specifically the Black Sea Fleet naval infantry in the CIS troops and this "is not a blow to the back of the commander" as the brigade commander attempts to present it. On January 4, 1992, at a general brigade officers assembly which its commander himself conducted, more than 80 percent of all the oath takers advocated the need to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. And Brigade Commander Colonel A. Kocheshkov advocated taking the oath at that time.

But everything changed after the arrival of Colonel Kocheshkov from Moscow. The officers began to be subjected to pressure with the aim of preventing them from taking the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. And the brigade saw "emissaries" from Ukraine only

once. This was the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet delegation. And then during that same period of threat against the officers and warrant officers who had expressed a desire to take the oath to the people of Ukraine, we heard from Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Kasatonov, his Deputy Admiral Larionov, and Shore Defense Troops Commander Major-General Romanenko.

The article discusses those "more than 70 percent of the young replacements, who just recently took the oath to the Commonwealth." Is that about those two of 174 seamen of the Brigade's young replacements who took the oath to the CIS on February 2?

But here there is a fraction of truth about percentages. After the failed attempts to conduct the oath to the CIS, these young seamen were sent to subunits and their commanders and deputy commanders for personnel were warned by Colonel Kocheshkov that their professional qualities would be determined by the percentage who took the oath to the CIS, those same ones who need a percentage will not get one and they will be removed from their posts. And they forced the young seamen after the next processing into subunits to take this oath one or two at a time. That is how the 70 percent emerged. And Lieutenant-General Skuratov knows this quite well, he talked with these young seamen who desired to serve and take the oath to their own people—the people of Ukraine.

Lieutenant-General Skuratov is actually correct when he says that "everything" has been set into motion. Major Rozhmanov, our battalion commander, and Senior Lieutenant Rud, his deputy commander for personnel, after the taking of the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine on February 22 were removed from their posts and expelled from brigade territory, and they were not even permitted to return to the battalion to get their personal effects, already not talking about how to appropriately surrender their posts, even in violation of all orders, laws, and fundamental human rights that are in force. The chief of staff was given a written order to surrender the unit Battle Flag and secret documentation within three hours and to depart at the disposal of the Black Sea Fleet shore defense troops commander. Company Commanders Senior Lieutenants Onopriyenko and Ilyenko were removed to the staff. Platoon Commanders Senior Lieutenants Goldmakher and Bulanov, the latter was generally on leave, were ordered to depart for another garrison in 24 hours. And only the interference of the procurator's office allowed Goldmakher to remain in the brigade on the staff.

To the question, why did not one of this officers of this battalion pass onto the rolls of MZhK [translation unknown] members, all commanders, with the exception of Deputy Brigade Commander Lieutenant Colonel Maranchak, answered that we put a knife to the back of the command authorities and now we still want to obtain apartments. Even the demands of battalion sergeants and seamen who are threatening a hunger strike if their officers are not returned, did not affect that decision of

the command authorities but these sergeants and seamen were immediately transferred to other units so that they would not "go on a rampage."

So, in whose interests, Comrade Lieutenant-General Skuratov, was this battalion so rapidly disbanded? The CIS? Or, maybe, in the "interests" of Ukraine?

[Signed] Personnel of Naval Infantry 1st Battalion: Senior Lieutenant Shitenkov, Lieutenants Yefimov and Orekhov; Senior Sergeants Korotchenko and Strents, Seamen Rolya, Kalistratov, Vistiery, Dzhumaybayev, Mamedov, and others. A total of 78 signatures.

### Withdrawals Reducing Effectiveness Of MARS-75 Radio-Navigation System

92UM0950A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
22 Apr 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Sikorskiy: "Readers Raise Problem: Will the Stars Alone Point Our Way?"]

[Text] There haven't been any blank spots on the map of the Baltic Sea for some time now. Nevertheless, sailors still consider the Baltic, with its numerous ebbs and flows and other hazards, to be extremely difficult to navigate. Each of the littoral states has set up its own safety system here—navigation is too dependent on the current military and political situation. By merely cutting off electric power, for example, an erstwhile ally can pose the threat of a competitor's losing a ship. If navigation lights go out, ships will not be able to determine their location. Therefore, Navy hydrographers on the Baltic have spent decades setting up a navigation support system. In recent months, however, that system is collapsing right before our eyes.

"The designation MARS-75 is familiar to any navigator," I was told by Captain 2nd Rank V. Kovtun, head of the space-navigation and radio-navigation division of the Baltic Fleet hydrography service. "This radio-navigation system provides data to warships and combat planes, fleet auxiliary vessels, and civilian ship lines. The accuracy of the coordinates it gives is made possible by the location of its four stations, two of which are now sited on the territory of Baltic states (Tallinn and Ust-Dvinsk) and another on Wustrow Peninsula in Germany. I would like to stress that their sites were checked by numerous groups of hydrographic specialists and members of research institutes who took into account and analyzed dozens of factors: the geographical location of the installations, the quality of radio wave travel between them, the effect of climatic conditions, the intensity of interference from outside sources. But now, in addition to these factors, it seems that we will also have to take into account political circumstances."

Our forces are leaving Germany. True, by agreement with the German government, the MARS-75 station continues to function for the time being. But when the training facility near which it is located is moved, the radio navigation system will have to leave as well. The

same fate awaits the two installations of the MARS-75 system that are located in Estonia and Latvia. The Baltic Fleet has already selected new sites for the stations, but this is an instance in which the well-known arithmetic rule is not operative: When the locations of the MARS-75 system's factors are changed, its overall effectiveness will not remain unchanged. In particular, the radio-navigation system's operating radius will be reduced by almost 400 kilometers, and the fallibility of its calculations will be more significant. In addition, it will take money to move the stations to Kaliningrad, Pskov, and Leningrad oblasts in Russia, as will have to be done.

The Baltic hydrographers will also have to reorganize the coastal radio-navigation support system. It "covered" the Baltic coastline from the Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Gdansk and could pinpoint a ship's location within five to 60 meters. Now all this is history, and nearly 45 percent of the Baltic coastal zone will no longer be monitored by the radio-navigation stations.

Given this situation, aircraft and ship navigators could get help from space—not in the form of intervention into navigation problems by members of alien civilizations, but from the GLONASS satellite navigation system, which is our country's version of the American NAVSTAR system and has been developed precisely for this purpose. But ships are only just starting to be equipped with GLONASS equipment, and it's hard to say if the equipment will continue to be available—it was produced jointly by enterprises in Russia, Byelarus, and Ukraine.

And so political changes in both Europe and the former Soviet Union have intervened in navigation affairs in the most radical way. At the same time, we shouldn't forget about feedback: After all, a navigator, through a calculation error, can also intervene in relations between states. An example is the incident involving the Baltic Fleet submarine that ran aground in the territorial waters of Sweden and complicated our relations with our northern neighbor for an entire decade. How would such an incident be viewed by the newly independent states that take a negative view of even imagined encroachments on their sovereignty? And what about damage to the environment that can be triggered by a navigation accident?

In general, reality is such that navigation support in the Baltic, and perhaps in the Black Sea as well, could at some point force our navigators to turn to the navigation classics and determine their bearings the way it was done in the good old days—using the stars.

### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

#### Maj-Gen Yarmak Interviewed on Housing Issue

92UM0926A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (Signed to press  
18 Mar 92) pp 4-7

[Interview with Maj-Gen D. Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the Main Military Commissariat of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by Lt-Col V.

Kutishchev and Lt-Col Namsarayev under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "A Matter of Prime Importance, or, A Professional's View on the Housing Problem"]

[Text] There are few specialists of the kind Maj-Gen D. Yarmak, deputy chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the Main Commissariat of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, is considered to be in his field. Dmitriy Danilovich has a lifelong involvement in the construction and maintenance of housing and industrial facilities; buildings, foundation pits, trenches, boiler-houses.... Difficult work involving great responsibility, sometimes thankless, but unquestionably needed by the people.

The situation in the area of work of the GlavKEU [Main Billeting Administration] is acute today. Hundreds of thousands of families of officers and warrant officers have not had a roof over their heads in many years. It is not enough just to be a good specialist in this situation. One sometimes has to be a diplomat, a psychologist, a politician, has not just to help someone but also to be able to resolve issues pertaining, as an example, to the withdrawal of troops from the countries of Eastern Europe or the Baltic states. On the day of our visit Dmitriy Danilovich was receiving a delegation from Lithuania. The parliamentarians raised their voices and demanded that the evacuation be started immediately. They were not interested in the housing situation in Russia. That is how it goes. Some people make a mistake, others correct it, yet others suffer....

Dmitriy Danilovich did not make specific predictions in the interview. Probably no one would dare to make them today. We think that the information presented in the article will help the reader gain a better understanding of the situation which has developed, however.

[Correspondent] Dmitriy Danilovich, how realistic are the chances that a serviceman will receive housing in the situation of drastic changes in the nation's economy, political situation and state structure? What is the situation right now? What are the prospects?

[Yarmak] Housing is the most pressing problem today. It has never before been as acute for the armed forces as it is today. The causes are well known, I believe. And the instability of the economy, in my opinion, is making it even harder to implement programs for providing social security for the servicemen and their families.

The withdrawal of units and formations from the groups of forces and from Mongolia is also exacerbating the situation. Judge for yourself. More than 120,000 families of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers are to return to the homeland during the period 1991-1994. More than 70,000 of them do not have homes. At the same time the housing situation at the garrisons where the troops will be quartered already leaves a great deal to be desired. The number of servicemen not provided with housing where they are stationed had reached 185,000 by the end of 1991.

The executive committees of local soviets owe us more than 750,000 square meters of housing. That is, around 23,000 apartments. Less than 35,000 square meters has been turned over to us as of today. Those in charge and the government promise that the rest will be received. The situation with respect to the allocation of housing built with funds designated for shared construction from the military department's budget is also not good. The indebtedness here has been set at 735,000 square meters, or 12,700 apartments. The 1991 plan called for us to receive more than 600,000 square meters, but we received less than 82,000 in the first half of the year.

Furthermore, the number of families separated from the army and navy but continuing to live on military posts has grown considerably in recent years. There are almost 80,600 today. Local authorities are in no hurry to take concrete steps, and the Main Military Commissariat of the CIS Joint Armed Forces is being forced to enlarge the housing areas at the garrisons, to allocate capital for the construction of new power-supply facilities and to rebuild and develop the utility systems. This is the situation.

The housing problem in the armed forces in the future is to be resolved primarily by considerably increasing our own construction volumes. The plans call for the military construction organizations to build 19 million square meters during the period 1992-1995 and for contract organizations to build 5 million as shared participation by the Main Commissariat of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. It will not be possible to provide for all those in need, however, even though the housing construction plan is based on the maximum capabilities of our production base.

[Correspondent] The press has reported that the government has approved emergency measures to provide housing for servicemen and their families. There have yet been no perceptible results, however.

[Yarmak] The Program of Social Security for Servicemen and Their Families and for Individuals Released From Active Military Duty was worked out at M.S. Gorbachev's instructions. The USSR Council of Ministers approved it on 15 September 1990 (Order No. 1545). Several months later the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Defense prepared the draft decree. It indicated planned assignments for the Union republics for the delivery of sets of components for large-panel apartment buildings and bricks, and specified construction volumes and sources of financing. Among other things, the Ministry of Defense was instructed to see that the housing construction plans are fulfilled and that its own production base is developed for the production of components for large-panel apartment buildings. The plans also called for limiting service transfers of officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty personnel, and the relocation of units and formations.

I believe that this would have enabled us to lessen the severity of the problem. Unfortunately, however, these and other documents governing the provision of housing were not implemented for a long time.

[Correspondent] Dmitriy Danilovich, you mentioned a figure of 80,600. So many families of former servicemen have been forced to live on the military posts. What is to be done about them?

[Yarmak] By 1995 it is planned for the Commonwealth to build 4.5 million square meters of housing for them. That is, 80,000 apartments. In 1991 Gosplan released money and resources for construction and installation work totalling around 400 million rubles (in 1991 prices). The remainder is to be financed out of republic and local budgets.

It should be noted that such measures were also approved previously. Decree No. 734 passed by the Council of Ministers on 7 September 1989 and the decree passed by the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1989, for example, called for everything necessary to be done promptly to provide housing for servicemen released into the reserve or into retirement as a result of the reduction of the army and navy. Only 10,800 families received apartments in 1990, however, and the number requiring apartments grew by 20,000 to nearly 50,000.

Local officials are announcing today that they are unable to provide housing for all the former officers and warrant officers on a timely basis.

They cite as the reason market relations, lack of allocations and the disinclination of enterprises and organizations to allocate land without recompense. I believe that B.N. Yeltsin's ukase will force many of them to change their attitude, however.

[Correspondent] The concept of the military reform calls for servicemen released into the reserve to receive housing out of turn and to be paid monetary compensation if this is impossible. But how can one equate an actual apartment with worthless money? This is troubling to many people.

[Yarmak] The people's concern is understandable, although there are no particular grounds for worry. The matter of assigning housing out of turn to individuals released from the armed forces during the military reform is being studied. It is still premature to make any promises yet. With respect to the payment of monetary compensation, this is included in the draft Law on the Status of Servicemen.

It says, among other things, that servicemen without permanent housing who have joined housing construction (housing) cooperatives or are building (or purchasing) their own homes are provided with financial assistance without repayment at their place of service: those who have served irreproachably 15 to 20 calendar years in the army or navy, 50% of the debt incurred to

pay for cooperative housing or to repay a bank loan obtained for building a house; those who have served more than 20 years, 75%.

This right applies to officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty personnel released from the armed forces with the right to a pension from the Main Commissariat of the CIS Joint Armed Forces on the basis of age or state of health or due to the reduction of the military establishment. Decree No. 734 passed by the Council of Ministers in 1989 extended to them the right to join housing construction or housing cooperatives out of turn. The implementation of these provisions should considerably relieve the severity of the problem.

[Correspondent] Dmitriy Danilovich, right now a lot of hopes are pinned on the construction of housing for military personnel by foreign companies. Exactly what is to be built with their help?

[Yarmak] Under an agreement signed by the governments of the FRG and the USSR on 9 October 1990 the German side committed itself to help implement a special housing construction program for troops withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces to the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Byelarus. A total of 7.8 billion German marks was allocated for this. It will be used to build 33 housing developments with an average of 1,000 apartments each for a total of 36,000 apartments, and two housing construction combines.

Attempting to grab something for themselves, however, certain officials are demanding that some of the apartments be assigned to the local soviets and dragging their feet in the matter of building the utility systems, access roads and so forth. All of this is detracting from the main purpose, delaying dates for the release of facilities and straining nerves.

[Correspondent] There is a lot of talk in the capital about privatizing housing. What is your attitude toward this? How is it planned to resolve the housing problem for servicemen? Will they be sold apartments or placed onto the waiting list?

[Yarmak] You are right. There is considerable talk about privatizing housing. In my opinion, however, the regulations defining the procedure for paying off an apartment as personal property need to be thoroughly reworked. Why? For one thing, the government and the deputies of the capital's city soviet have not yet come up with a compromising and fair decision which would suit all citizens. The matter of privatizing housing has not been raised at all in the majority of the nation's cities, and the parliaments have not considered laws on the matter.

As far as we are concerned, the possibility of privatizing apartments belonging to the military department is being worked out. In the process we are taking into account the fact that some of the housing is at closed or isolated military posts and other housing is in the Far North or

equivalent areas. It is therefore essential to weigh everything thoroughly. I am still convinced, however, that servicemen must have the right to acquire housing as personal property along with other people.

At the same time the draft Law on the Status of Servicemen states directly that servicemen are provided with housing by the state. It also specifies that officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty personnel along with their families are to receive housing where they are stationed. It is allocated, of course, out of the housing pool of the Main Commissariat of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and that of other ministries, departments and local authorities. It seems to me that this alternative for providing servicemen with housing would be preferable.

[Correspondent] Dmitriy Danilovich, at one time the Moscow soviet adopted a decision to assign dormitories not yet occupied to officers without apartments. What is the situation with respect to this matter today?

[Yarmak] That is entirely correct. There was such an agreement. The Main Billeting Directorate is doing everything possible to implement the agreement made jointly with the Moscow soviet. We know that the Moscow Construction Committee has dormitories designated for out-of-town workers. Many of them are vacant, since there is a practical ceiling in Moscow now. We have requested that some of the dormitories be turned over for use by officers without apartments. Moscow's government has met us half way. I shall say at the outset, however, that there are many problems. For your information, various cooperatives, as well as joint and small enterprises are attempting to buy these dormitories.

[Correspondent] And what are the families of officers who need better housing to do? Many of them live in crowded conditions, after all.

[Yarmak] You put it very mildly. According to our information, every third military family in Moscow alone occupies an area not conforming to the established health standards. We attempted for a long time to resolve this issue and finally reached agreement with the city government that servicemen whose living space per member is less than 5 square meters is entitled to be placed onto the waiting list for improved housing where they are stationed. This makes us confident that a significant part of the officers and warrant officers will be able to improve their housing within the very near future without relying on the construction of housing by the military construction workers.

[Correspondent] In the address by Russia's President at the All-Army Officers' Assembly he stated that by the middle of this year the housing debt would be entirely repaid. We have learned from bitter experience that the promises of our leaders are frequently not kept of late. Will that not be the case this time?

[Yarmak] At the very beginning I said that the indebtedness of the local soviets amounts to more than 750,000 square meters of housing and that less than 35,000 square meters has been paid. Now calculate how many apartments will have to be built in 6 months. For Moscow it amounts to around 20 200-apartment buildings. The production capacities of civilian construction organizations can cope with this task without any particular strain.

Just why was housing not provided before? A wise and responsible political decision had not been adopted by the head of state. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's statement is a real guarantee that the housing problem of many thousands of people will finally be solved. In any case a certain degree of hope appeared and was further strengthened following the president's signing of the ukase.

[Correspondent] One final question. What are the most difficult problems today?

[Yarmak] There are many. I repeat, however, housing continues to be in first place. In the situation of exacerbated international relations and "military laws," we are not in a position to solve the housing problem without the help of republic and local authorities. And it is not always possible to achieve agreement, not to speak of interaction, with them. I do not believe that this will be possible in many regions until the future of the armed forces is clear.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview.

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#### **Surplus Export Duty to Go to Social Needs of Servicemen**

92UM0933B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 6

[Unattributed article based on information gathered by ITAR-TASS: "Business Not for Servicemen: General Deynekin Favors Trading Fighters for Pilots' Housing"]

[Text] This March past, the Center for Military-Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research, CIS OVS [Unified Armed Forces] conducted a survey to ascertain servicemen's opinions relative to entrepreneurial activity. The results indicated that 24% of the respondents see in the latter a viable opportunity to secure their social protection, reasoning that the state is not capable of promoting a normal standard of living. In this connection, men on active duty who expressed a desire to start a business at the present time—while still in service—would not be permitted to do so if Parliament passes the Law on Social Guarantees for Servicemen in the Territory of the Russian Republic. On the other hand, the draft law would allow members of the Army to engage in scientific, technical, and artistic activity. In this connection, products resulting from such activity if associated with military matters may be sold if

so permitted by military authorities. Also permitted would be work of a one-time nature performed for money, if the work does not conflict with service interests.

In the meantime, social tension among Armed Forces personnel is running counter to the interests of the service. The lack of trust servicemen harbor toward the state as a guarantor of social rights can be overcome only by taking deliberate steps which would bring the Army out of its impasse with social problems. This is the major thrust of a decree issued by the President of the Russian Federation that grants permission to conduct tax-free export sales of surplus aviation and other equipment held by units stationed within the borders of Russia. (This pertains to units of the Air Force.)

A considerable portion of the resulting monies will be allocated to social programs. Heading the list is housing construction. If accomplishment of the decree is successful, the Air Force will employ whatever revenue is gained to build about 20,000 apartments a year. Colonel General Petr Deynekin, commander of the CIS Air Force, feels that these measures will make it possible to resolve the unit housing problem on Russian Federation soil by 1995.

The capital city government took the first practical step to carry out the Zhilye program by distributing 250 hectares of land in Mytishchinskiy Rayon. This program was developed by the Zhivoye Koltso White House Protectors Union. The union is an amalgamation of 18 social organizations working for social protection for former servicemen. Zhilye has plans to build four settlements along the lines of a unique model—that of the “housing settlement,” which will feature an efficient system of all services necessary for comfortable living.

#### **Construction Troops Finance Housing Through Road Building**

92UM0932A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Apr 92 First edition p 1

[Article by Maj-Gen A. Radchenko: “Who Still Needs Good Roads—Russia or the Soldier-Road Builders?”]

[Text] Almost four years ago, road construction units were dropped into the Non-Black Earth Zone of Russia. The tent camps in the buzzing of mosquitoes, equipment on open ground, an unsettled daily life... It seems this was yesterday. In three and a half years, more than 750 km of hard-surface roads were built just by the units stationed on the territory of Kirov, Perm, and Yekaterinburg oblasts, and more than 220 million rubles [R] were spent on construction and installation work. Thirty-two military camps and a powerful construction infrastructure appeared on the bare site.

After seeing the first tens of kilometers of highways built by the military in the most inaccessible areas, people believed in the rebirth of the Non-Black Earth Region and began returning to abandoned villages. In addition,

the road builders provide much assistance in performing agricultural work, particularly during the planting and harvesting seasons, and play a significant role in the cultural development of the villages of the Non-Black Earth Region. Teachers, medical workers, and other specialists—wives of the servicemen—are simply indispensable here. More than 1,500 soldiers have remained here after discharge to work in the Non-Black Earth Region, and many of them have made families. During their stay, the collectives of military road builders have trained thousands of construction specialists for the national economy of Russia and other republics.

From the very beginning, the people in our large unit believed in the need for the missions they were carrying out and in the need to revive this remote area of Russia. They coped with incredible difficulties and made certain sacrifices. At first, everything was turning out smoothly; nevertheless, fulfillment of the annual highway construction plans proceeded at a growing pace. In 1988—54 km, in 1989—180 km, in 1990—240 km, in 1991—280 km. Behind these figures is the labor of those whom fate and an order brought to the Non-Black Earth Region—soldiers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, officers, workers, and employees.

During the adjustment period, there were pauses and misunderstandings. This is quite natural—the units were formed not from construction troops but from combat soldiers. But during the past years in the Central Road Construction Directorate of the former USSR Ministry of Defense, a system of training young specialists was developed. Many officers were trained in special courses, and planned training was organized. All this enabled the former tankers and artillerymen, motorized riflemen and combat engineers to learn a new job for themselves in a short time.

The objectives, tasks, and prospects were clear. We were confident in our destiny and in the need and usefulness of our labor. But beginning in 1990, we began to lose this confidence. At all levels there was talk about the need for reorganization or maybe about cutting military road construction units.

The outflow of officers from units subordinate to the Central Road Construction Directorate was not long in coming. Whereas 154 and 118 officers were discharged into the reserves in 1990 and 1991, respectively, in the first quarter of 1992 their number is already over 90. Furthermore, units are manned only at a level of 64 percent. One out of every three is subject to discharge into the reserves this spring. So far, the question of a spring draft has not been decided. If you consider that almost 3,000 soldiers, who ended up as citizens of other states against their own free will, are serving in our units, each road construction company will have 10-20 people left after the spring discharge into the reserves and the recall of “foreigners” from the territory of Russia.

Talk about the upcoming reduction has also had an effect on the allocation of housing for servicemen by the

local authorities. Our supply of apartments there is not very high—only 48 percent. In 1991, only 91 of the planned 458 apartments were allocated: 88 apartments for Kirov Oblast, 3 for Yekaterinburg Oblast, and not a single one for Perm Oblast. It would seem to be possible to find a solution even in these conditions: the road builders are willing to build the housing themselves. However, in Kirov, for example, before authorizing construction of a single house, they are requiring that general service lines be built for the entire microregion, without allocating the corresponding funds for this.

But the road builders themselves are also very short of money. Last year, they did not begin receiving the needed financial assets until late May. The customer could not pay even for the work done, and for several months people were not paid wages or temporary duty pay. This year, the situation is made worse by the fact that funds are allocated only for paying the troops. The customer's indebtedness for work performed in 1991 was more than R27 million, of which R11 million is owed by the concern Rosavtodor and more than R14 million by the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia.

The lack of finances does not make it possible to pay suppliers of road construction equipment, transport, and construction materials. Indebtedness is already tens of millions of rubles. Due to the inability to pay, the contracts concluded for delivery of material and equipment resources are being canceled, and ties that were very difficult to arrange are being severed. Skilled workers and employees of the Soviet Army are being laid off, and cooperatives, which were a good support in our work, are collapsing.

The immediate future is also unclear: 3 months of 1992 have passed, and there are still no plan quotas. Literally the other day, the following was determined with the customers: 50.5 km for Rosavtodor and 14.8 km for the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia. A total of 65.3 km. These, of course, are ridiculously low figures.

The strangest consequence of all this is idleness. It gives rise to apathy, drunkenness, and irresponsibility. Cases of people going absent without leave are on the rise. Discipline is breaking down before our very eyes.

We have repeatedly informed President of Russia B. Yeltsin, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian

Federation R. Khasbulatov, and Vice President of Russia A. Rutskoy about the situation. Urgent measures must be taken, for further pay and production activities of the road construction units are impossible in these conditions.

Decree No 12 of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation "On Road Construction in the Rural Areas in 1991-1995," dated 4 January 1991, calls for building 4,290 km of roads in Kirov, Perm, and Yekaterinburg oblasts alone. In this situation, the military units are waiting for a clear-cut position from the leadership of Russia and a weighty answer to a question: Are the military road builders needed?

Of course, there are quite a few shortcomings in our work. They were closely analyzed by a commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation on questions of construction and renovation of highways, gas supply, and electrification of the Non-Black Earth Zone of the RSFSR. It was noted that the efficiency of the work of military road builders is not very high due to an imperfect management system with an unwieldy staff and low financial concern of personnel in the results of their labor. Specific proposals were worked up for eliminating intermediate and parallel management elements, shifting to cost accounting, and solving social problems.

Nine months have already passed, but no specific decision has been made so far on the results of the commission's work. If you add the fact that the chief of the Central Road Construction Directorate, three of his deputies, and two directorate chiefs have been preparing for a long time for discharge or have been discharged into the reserves, it turns out that the military road builders are virtually left to the mercy of fate: without concerned leadership and without finances. Psychological pressing is more terrible for people than any reorganizations or cuts.

Who will put an end to this chaos and confusion? Enough time has already passed to determine in what form the military road builders will exist and work, especially since there are not very many variants. The main thing is to prevent the vast sums of the people's money invested in the "Roads of the Non-Black Earth Region" program from being tossed to the winds.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Union Militarists Said To Threaten Baltic Independence

92UN1129A Riga LATVIJAS JAUNATNE in Latvian  
13 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Eduards Berklaivs: "New Wave of Assaults on Democracy"]

[Text] Recently information on alarming events in Moscow and Latvia appear in the press, on radio and television almost every day. They attest that the powers of the reactionaries, military and civilian, have begun a new, powerful offensive to renew the USSR.

Russians and Russified people have now recovered from the fright that overtook them seeing the passionate national awakening movement, and are now mobilizing forces to recover power. This new offensive's organizers do not count on the support of the people.

The armed forces are entrusted as the main power to achieve their goal. Everything is determined for them through the orders of the highest- and mid-level officers. This part of the officer corps has always been in a privileged position (big salaries and pensions, big apartments, summer homes, limousines, all sorts of provisions). They are prepared to defend their privileges, even to use weapons. In the Soviet Union the army from the very beginning was created mainly to fight, not against invaders from outside, but against the internal enemy; the internal enemy was none other than the oppressed peoples. I am unable to believe that the same army, those same generals and colonels will suddenly cease to fulfil this function in conditions which threaten directly their—the generals' and colonels'—privileges.

That is well understood by civilian Communist Parties, Soviet institutions, and economic bosses. They want to exploit the discontentment of the high-ranking officers to renew the old power throughout the territory of the former USSR, siccing the army first on the non-Russian peoples. And concrete activities are already noticeable. For instance, on February 19 the sixth regular emergency session of the organizing committee for convening the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies took place (one might think that such meetings have occurred all along, although the USSR is officially liquidated). The question of the Congress's agenda was addressed in the session. This was openly announced by the former USSR Supreme Soviet deputy A. Kraiko. The main question for the Congress will be the situation in the state (apparently it must be understood to mean the USSR) and the possibilities for eliminating the "catastrophe." It is not difficult to imagine what kind of instruments they plan to use to eliminate the "catastrophe."

It has already been announced that an emergency session of the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies will take place in Moscow on March 17. Even a press conference was planned, where they condemned the decree of the

Russian powers that are liquidating the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies and announced instead the establishment of a new USSR Supreme Council and government and the renewal of a unified USSR. Another deputy, J. Golik, figured that such an idea was supported by more than 400 deputies.

Is that all just drum beating and empty swaggering? I do not think so. Of course, everything will depend on the stance of the leader of the most influential, most powerful country in the world. In any case the situation is serious. Let's not fool ourselves, figuring that the people will not permit it. The army and the earlier powers of the state never took into account the will of the people and they have never asked for permission to operate.

What other developments can be foreseen?

It might happen that Boris Yeltsin, to salvage for himself the throne of Russia (perhaps even hoping for the whole Union), might seek a compromise with the leaders of the armed forces. For the Baltic states that would be the worst scenario. That eventuality might arise if Yeltsin, in his last foreign trip, had received secure guarantees from the "world's powers" that an armed coup d'etat would not be permitted. But I do not believe that the USA, Germany, England and France would involve themselves in a military conflict with the Russian empire's armed forces for the reason mentioned.

### On the situation in Latvia.

The aforementioned events and situation in the empire determine also events in the Baltic states, particularly in Latvia. Here the headquarters of the former Baltic Military District continues to operate in full swing, only with a different name, and non-Latvians here remain the majority. It must also be taken into account that the Communist Party, although it is banned, continues to operate in Latvia, as announced by some Latvian Defense Ministry bureaucrat in the newspaper DIENA. We know that banned USSR army veterans organizations and Russian patriotic (chauvinist) organizations are becoming active. The press has already conveyed the news that a Russian patriotic organization, the Cossack national cultural association, "Kazachii krug," which has some 2,000 members, was founded in Latvia. It is composed chiefly of former officers in the USSR armed forces. This organization has set out to establish its armed units in Riga, Liepaja, Daugavpils, Jelgava, Rezekne, Ludza and elsewhere. Members of this organization are supposed to wear traditional Cossack uniforms and armaments. We know from history that such Cossack units murdered people in Russia. There is already news that this organization, having its origins in Latvia, has established relations with analogous organizations in Russia. If we do not begin to act with all due haste, this organization could replace or even surpass OMON.

What is the counterforce to these organizations, these democratic organizations that have developed in Latvia?

The democratic powers have unforgivably crumbled. Internal battles take place. Even the numerically largest democratic organization—the PFL [Popular Front of Latvia]—has fragmented. Its Council has grown more radical and defends views that on the chief issues are similar to the stance of the LNIM [Latvian National Independence Movement], though there is no sure stability. Local organizations no longer want to subordinate themselves to a vacillating center.

For more than a year already the LNIM has been purposefully caused to crumble. Utilizing the name, honor and power of the LNIM, greedy people within the LNIM have formed various groupings: the Republican Party, the 18th of November Union, the group "Spirit of Imants," and others.

Individual people in the Committee of Latvia disturb the well-planned RL [Republic of Latvia] citizens movement's real activities to work for the good of an independent, Latvian Latvia. They also deliberately delay the development of a coalition of democratic forces.

The Latvian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP] can be found to the left of not only these organizations, but to the left of even of the center. It is now headed by two familiar and competent lawyers: Bojars and Plotnieks.

Beside this party a second one is developing—the party of Dainis Ivans, Janis Skapars, Vladlen Dozorcev and others—which will be close to the LDLP in orientation. The idea of the initiators, to rally around them that heretofore politically passive, insufficiently politically oriented, popular part of the intelligentsia, those "involved" recent Communist and PFL veterans and to add to this mix possibly many non-Latvians. Then an assortment to be taken into account would be put forward, and might meet with some success in the next election.

There is a basis for counting among the democratic forces about 30 national cultural organizations which have developed, and which are united in an association. Most of these organizations are loyal, support the democratization process, and understandably resist the Latvians' desire to be masters in their homeland.

The remainder of the recently created non-Latvian organizations are chauvinistic and reactionary. These organizations hostile to Latvians and the democratization process work closely with reactionary forces in Russia and inflame hatred of Latvia in the Russian press.

What are LNIM and similarly oriented socio-political forces doing in this complex situation?

We are not fearful. We are not panicking. We are convinced that we will win.

The assignment seems clear: Truly we must capture all, or at least most, of Latvians and loyal non-Latvians in a unifying coalition which is prepared to support the battle to liquidate the consequences of occupation and colonization, to renew a truly independent, Latvian Latvia. We have taken on such a task before, but there are no satisfactory results in this area. The chief reason, in my opinion, was that we were not flexible and tolerant enough. The work of uniting must be undertaken with a great deal of tolerance, ignoring offensive injuries resulting from thinking different from ours. It is necessary to cooperate with people who may be useful to us, and with larger groups, attention should be paid to the intelligentsia.

We must turn against the chief forces of destabilization—a foreign army and civilian Great Russian chauvinism—in an open, energetic and well-argued manner. Resist insulting organizations and institutions as a whole. With concrete facts we must retaliate against officials, their actions in the Supreme Council, as well as in the government and, if necessary, we must request their replacement.

The people must be activated so that they do not fall into lack of faith and apathy. As the sections of the organization work more intensively, more often practising open meetings of the organization, we must recruit young competent forces into the organization, to be able to work together to resolve economic, educational and other questions more productively and more qualitatively. It is necessary to work ceaselessly to achieve coordinated action by all the Baltic states' leaders in all areas. We must work together with like-minded democratic forces in the former USSR republics and coordinate our work with them.

We must work together more closely with people and their organizations in exile, so that the governments, press and political parties of their countries understand events and needs in Latvia.

To carry out various campaigns, undertakings with the people's broad participation in them, we must persuade Latvia's representatives to be unyielding and persistent in international negotiations with Russia, Byelarus and Ukraine, and we must persuade them to recall all their citizens who are serving in army units stationed in Latvia, and that Russia should ensure the withdrawal of all armed forces from Latvia by next year.

From Russia we must request compensation for all losses resulting from occupation and annexation and compensation for those political prisoners who were interred in work camps and other places of confinement, and also for confiscated and destroyed movable and immovable property.

**Transcaucasus MD Commander on Status of  
Troops, Russian Army**

92UM0955A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 14, 5 Apr 92 p 19

[Interview with Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel-General Valeriy Anisimovich Patrikeyev by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Special Correspondents Vladimir Kiselev and Akakiy Mikadze: "Caucasian Captives: Interview with Transcaucasus Military District Commander Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev"]

[Text]

**The MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Dossier**

Valeriy Patrikeyev was born in 1938 in the village of Bogolyubov in Tambov Oblast. In 1955, he enrolled in a military school immediately after graduation from middle school. He graduated from two military academies with gold medals—the Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the General Staff Academy. He was promoted ahead of time to two ranks—lieutenant colonel and colonel. His son—also Valeriy, is a major and a military academy student. His daughter presented him with a grandson several years ago. He is an amusing child, the general misses him and is impatiently waiting for Valeriy the third to visit.

Recently late one evening a burst of automatic weapon fire slashed along the windows of General V. Patrikeyev's office. His wife Yevgeniya Nikolayevna gathered the 5.45 caliber bullets and wrapped them into a small handkerchief as a keepsake. You can't say anything—can it be a gay affair to head an army formation that is located on the territory of three independent states, two of which are fighting among themselves, and in the third a civil war is now going out and now flaring up again, where Zviyad Gamsakhurdiya, who had still not yet run away from the anger of his own people, had legitimized for the troops the status of occupiers and where they take officers and soldiers, with the letters SA [Soviet Army] that have lost any meaning, hostage and kill them. The Soviet Army is no more. The Presidents of the Transcaucasus republics have nationalized the army's property, combat vehicles, and arms through their decrees and they are turning off the electricity, heat, and water at military garrisons.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] Why are troops in the Transcaucasus? Whom are the military and border districts located there protecting right now?

[Patrikeyev] Actually whom and whose interests? It is not service, but torture. But to lead the army beyond the main Caucasian mountain range means to expose Russia's southern flank. As we all know, nature does not tolerate a vacuum. And it is easy to guess who can end up here. For nearly eight months after the August Putsch, the Transcaucasus Military District belonged to no one and all that time I fought so that Russia, as the successor to the former Union, would take us under its jurisdiction. It has finally been accomplished and we are now Russian troops. And obviously already in the near future

the military district will change its status and will become a group of forces. And if the republics are interested in their presence, then all of the conditions must be stipulated in inter-state agreements.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] Valeriy Anisimovich, but how can you count on an army that clearly cannot stand up for itself or protect its arms and ammunition from being looted?

[Patrikeyev] Nearly 60 servicemen guarded Agdam Depot in Azerbaijan. You imagine this picture: the local residents—children, women, the clergy, and deputies arrive with an decree from the leadership of Azerbaijan on nationalization of all units on republic territory. And from behind, covered by the people—armed guerrillas. Well, what could they do? Fire? What would that have brought, besides misfortune and grief?

[Kiselev/Mikadze] We understand your situation but pretty soon they will take away everything that the army has and not nearly to write it off as scrap.

[Patrikeyev] We need to resolve these issues at the inter-state level through political means. For now we have been compelled to increase the security of military facilities, to mine depots, and to create perimeter defenses for our military posts.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] So, maybe Vice President Rutskoy was correct when he stated that we should stop tolerating the harassment in the Caucasus, there have been enough victims, and we need to immediately withdraw the troops within a two-week period?

[Patrikeyev] Even if this decision appears that, in my opinion, would be a mistake, we need to do everything in a civilized manner. We can't even begin talk about a two-week period. We aren't going to send our soldiers to live in tents at training grounds! And what about the thousands of families of officers and warrant officers—where are they going to live?

[Kiselev/Mikadze] You have not been sullied by the blood of the Georgian people that was spilled by troops on 9 April 1989 and it was after these events that you headed this military district. Did you not sense the complex of guilt that is affiliated with an army that kills peaceful citizens?

[Patrikeyev] No, because the army only carries out the decision of governmental figures and it is immoral to accuse it of participation in some maybe not totally fitting acts.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] And during your leadership of the military district, have you attempted to use the troops, as you expressed it, in not totally fitting acts? By way of illustration, in the deportation of the population of the Armenian villages of Karabakh or in the dispersal of armed formations in Khedron.

[Patrikeyev] I was always categorically against the troops interfering in an interethnic conflict. But why would we take the side of the Armenians or, the other way around, the side of the Azeris? That is absurd. Our units are in both republics. And they have been forced to respond to fire with fire only when we have been provoked or when our servicemen or military facilities have been attacked.

So that is how it was with Khedron residents, it was they who fired on a reconnaissance battalion.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] Many people think that this does not correspond to reality.

[Patrikeyev] Read other newspapers and not only the one you know. Before asserting something, you need to have conclusive evidence. We are talking about things that are too serious. Even former Minister Yazov attempted to convince me to do something many times. I demanded only written orders, there was no urge to do that, and the Tbilisi experience of April 1989 was still having an effect.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] How did your relations with Zviad Gamsakhurdiya develop?

[Patrikeyev] As with any man, I do not have anything against him. During our encounters, he conducted himself in a restrained and proper manner. Unfortunately, his words were at variance with his deeds. It was as if we conducted negotiations with understanding and then suddenly an decree was issued that we are occupation troops. And the attitude in the republic toward us corresponded to that. At one time it was even unsafe to show up on the streets of Tbilisi in uniform. A trip in a military vehicle was equal to a combat sortie—endless attacks and seizures. The interim government that has come to power has removed the label of occupiers from us.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] You met with Gamsakhurdiya on 19 August along with General Shuralev, deputy to then still Minister of Defense and GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] Member Yazov, who had conveniently arrived. How did this meeting proceed?

[Patrikeyev] Essentially, immediately after it, Gamsakhurdiya signed an decree on the disbandment of the national guard and events in Georgia began to develop quite abruptly. Well, how did the meeting proceed? I frankly stated that there would be neither soldiers nor armored vehicles on the streets of Tbilisi. And there weren't any. I did not see any need to indulge in saber rattling. And, you will agree, the situation was normal in Georgia.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] But were you not in the city during the recent combat operations in Tbilisi?

[Patrikeyev] I was not. I left for leave in 1991 and there was absolutely no link between my departure and the firing that began.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] Nevertheless, the ex-president accused you of having an alliance with Kitovani and Siguya and that the army helped them with arms.

[Patrikeyev] What alliance? We are serving here and, God help us, we will continue to serve. Why create conflict situations? That is neither in the interests of the army, Russia, nor of the Transcaucasus republics. On the contrary, we need to seek a rational compromise.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] Valeriy Anisimovich, many weapons are flowing from military units. How can you halt that?

[Patrikeyev] Many weapons are actually walking away. Unfortunately, not only throughout the Transcaucasus—but throughout the entire Commonwealth. They are being both stolen and there is treachery. We have two units that are nearly 30 percent manned with individuals of local nationalities. In Azerbaijan, up to 90 percent of the soldiers are Azeris in some subunits. Many weapons arrive from abroad, both by land routes, by air, and by sea.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] And how are you holding the border?

[Patrikeyev] We held it at one time but right now you yourself know, what border. Yes, we have recently set up production of arms at our own plants. We are manufacturing both small arms and mortars, and whatever else we like, we have just about every model.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] And are at least some of the stolen arms being returned?

[Patrikeyev] I would say that they are being partially returned. We need to radically change the military district troop manning principle. Personnel must be primarily Russian speaking and hired on a contract basis. And we need to properly pay soldiers—from 1,500 rubles and higher.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] That is common sense but Russia does not have the money.

[Patrikeyev] But here better is less and better. The army, we might as well admit, is inflated by a heap of reduced strength units which essentially are not combat capable. We need to remove them—that is unambiguous. Enough proposals have been worked out and we cannot delay any longer. The army in general, and especially in the Transcaucasus, must be professional.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] When there were troops in Karabakh and their security detachments were located along the Armenian-Azeri border, both sides said: just withdraw the soldiers and we will rapidly sort this out. It seems that they have clearly overestimated their capabilities. But do you see a solution to this increasingly complicated situation?

[Patrikeyev] Our lads separated the hostile parties for nearly two years. I was against that and I argued: will we really be able to serve here normally after this? But I did not find understanding. It is another matter—to deploy a neutral corps from the allied armed forces on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic and along the Armenian-Azeri border which will be directly subordinate to the Heads of State Council. That will create the conditions for negotiations with Azerbaijan. But right now they are accusing us of all sorts of sins and they are demanding that Russian personnel be withdrawn and that we leave behind the weapons and equipment for the creation of a national army. The logic of the Azeri side's arguments is as follows: We have been betrayed and left

face to face with Armenian guerrillas. Armenia has created its own armed forces and we relied on the military district troops. Now they are no longer protecting us. So, why are they needed at all?

[Kiselev/Mikadze] And how do you regard the very idea of the creation of a national army?

[Patrikeyev] Positively, although this business is extremely expensive and demanding. The republics are already capable right now of creating national units to resolve internal problems—to maintain order and to fight crime. If our troops remain here, they will be obligated to cooperate with the national formations. First of all in the mission that is common for us—protection of the borders of the sovereign states.

[Kiselev/Mikadze] But still—this is just a possible variation in the development of events... And it seems more desired by you than real.

[Patrikeyev] The recent years have certainly not been in favor of the Transcaucasus formation of the former Soviet Army. And the moral spirit of the troops has clearly not grown stronger. However, the fact that Russia has taken us under its jurisdiction gives us hope. The main thing is that the extended period of uncertainty and hard times has ended. Moreover, the Transcaucasus republics and Russia actually have many areas of common interest that require the presence of powerful armed forces here. And I believe that common sense will prevail.

**Protocol 'Solves' Problem of Transfers to Ukraine**  
*92UM0890A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
7 Apr 92 pp 2-3

[Article by Judicial Service Lieutenant Colonel Petr Kozyr, chief of the Legal Department, Administration of Affairs of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "The Issue of Reassigning Servicemen to Ukraine Has been Resolved"]

[Text] The issue of reassigning officers and army and navy warrant officers from one state to another is not only very important but also extremely complex.

Unfortunately, many people underestimate the complexity of this problem.

It would appear that nothing could be simpler than issuing an order, and having tens of thousands of people move across the once wide and boundless Motherland. However, this has to do with other, much more complex problems developing next to that of reassignment.

After all, before an officer or a warrant officer is uprooted at his well-established domicile, it is necessary to decide where he will serve and whether it will be possible to place his wife in a job. The issue of providing housing for an arriving family, and slots in preschool facilities and schools for their children is even more complex.

In addition, issues of computing the length of service and payment of retirement benefits are significant when officers and army and navy warrant officers are reassigned or retired.

This is precisely why we called, and still call on officers and army and navy warrant officers who serve outside Ukraine to not make hasty decisions on their own, all the more so because the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is taking all possible measures in order to resolve this problem as soon as possible and to reduce to a minimum, discomfort and difficulties associated with reassignments.

A draft agreement on the training of officer cadres and on transferring officers and army and navy warrant officers from one state to another was prepared as early as the period of preparations for a meeting of the heads of Commonwealth states on 20 March 1992 in Kiev, on the initiative of Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel General K.P. Morozov.

Unfortunately, this document was not considered by the heads of Commonwealth states during the meeting in Kiev, through no fault of the Ukrainian side.

This is why a back-up scenario was activated. Specifically, on 1 and 2 April of this year, a working meeting between representatives of the High Command of the CIS United Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was held here, in Kiev.

This meeting resulted in a document which has been eagerly awaited by thousands of our fellow citizens wishing to return to the motherland.

On 2 April of this year, the **Protocol Concerning an Agreement Between the High Command of the CIS United Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on the Organization of the Training of Officers, and Procedures for Reassigning (Transferring) and Discharging Officers and Army and Navy Warrant Officers** was signed by Lieutenant General I.V. Bizhan, deputy minister of defense, for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and by Colonel General Yu.N. Rodionov, deputy commander in chief for personnel, for the CIS United Armed Forces.

—This document regulates the use of military educational establishments, and the training of officers for the needs of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth. Article 2 indicates that from 1992 officers will be trained by military educational establishments on requisitions, on a contractual basis.

—Article 3 resolves the fate of cadets and college students who were admitted for study prior to the signing of the protocol, that is, April 1992. An agreement was achieved to the effect that they will be granted the right to complete their studies free of charge in the higher schools of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth.

Provisions have been made for the possible exchange of cadets wishing to continue their studies at a higher school in another state.

—Article 4 sets forth procedures for assigning graduates of higher schools who were admitted for study before April 1992, to other states of the Commonwealth. In the process, the desire of a cadet to move to another state of the Commonwealth will be taken into account, as well as legitimate grounds to move to a particular state.

The same article establishes procedures for commissioning graduates. Those who state their wish to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be commissioned by the minister of defense of Ukraine. Those who state their wish to go into the Armed Forces of other states of the Commonwealth will be commissioned by orders of the commander in chief of the CIS United Armed Forces, ministers of defense, or chairmen of committees for defense affairs, depending on the member states of the Commonwealth which they select for service.

—Articles 5 and 6 regulate procedures for the transfer of officers and army and navy warrant officers from the CIS United Armed Forces to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and vice versa.

Transfers from the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth to the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be effected by order of the High Command of the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth upon the receipt of the consent (request) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Vice versa, transfers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be effected by orders of the minister of defense of Ukraine upon the receipt of the consent (request) of the High Command of the CIS United Armed Forces.

As you can see, the consent of, or request by the side accepting the servicemen is the main element. This is done to prevent chaotic movements.

**What documents should be filed for a transfer from the United Armed Forces to the Armed Forces of Ukraine:**

1. A letter of request addressed to the minister of defense of Ukraine on one's desire to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and readiness to swear allegiance to the people of Ukraine. It is necessary to include information on the place of service (military unit, position held, military rank), as well as information on the availability of housing in Ukraine.

2. A detailed autobiography which, along with social and demographic data, must include data on parents and immediate relatives of oneself and one's wife (relationship and place of residence). Data on the record of military service with an enumeration of positions, duration, and places of service should also be included here.

These documents should be sent to the following address: Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kiev-168.

The issue arises of what is to be done with the 18,000 letters of request which have already been received by the minister of defense of Ukraine.

This has to do with the fact that many letters of request do not include information which is necessary to process a transfer request. This is why it was deemed advisable to resubmit the documents with the above information included.

Transfers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the CIS United Armed forces will be processed somewhat differently.

Officers and army and navy warrant officers who did not swear allegiance to the people of Ukraine and do not wish to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine should send letters of request through the chain of command.

The personnel organs of formations and districts should submit these letters to the Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and the issue of transfers will be resolved thereafter.

Article 9 of the protocol regulates procedures for discharging officers and army and navy warrant officers from military service if upon their discharge they opt for a place of residence in another state of the Commonwealth.

They will be discharged by order of competent officials at the place of service. They will be struck from personnel rosters and dispatched to the chosen place of residence only after a complete settlement with them at the place of service.

—In addition, the protocol provides for measures of social and legal protection for the interests of officers and army and navy warrant officers who state their wish to be transferred to the armed forces of Ukraine or another member of the Commonwealth.

Thus, Article 7 and Article 9, Part 1 indicate that the Contracting Parties, i.e. the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the High Command of the CIS United Armed Forces undertake to not interfere with the transfer of such servicemen, and to prevent any pressure or infringement of rights and freedoms with regard to them.

Enclosure: Text of the protocol on three sheets.

### **Officer's Union Congress Addresses Areas of Russia-Ukraine Tension**

92UM0917A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
8 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Maj Gennadiy Klyuchikov: "There Are Many Achievements But Even More Problems"]

[Text] One of the founders of Marxism called the revolutionary processes the locomotives of history. He was right about this. Just four months have passed since the

holding of the previous congress of the Ukrainian Officers Union [SOU]. But the changes which have occurred during the period of the revolutionary events are truly striking. Much that the most progressive officers dreamed of and fought for has become the reality of today. Ukraine has become an independent state and the work of organizing its own Armed Forces is in full swing.

Does this mean victory? Does it happen that totalitarianism was not so strong and the imperial fetters were not so tight?

The atmosphere among the delegates to the Third SOU Congress did not seem at all triumphant. A predominant majority of the SOU activists was well aware what the current political situation inside Ukraine and beyond it was and how the process of organizing the Armed Forces was going—all this in no way disposes one to optimism or complacency.

In what area should the main work of the SOU be carried out? What must be done so that the Union as before assumes an authoritative and active position in the construction of an independent Ukraine and its National Army? Is the current leadership of the SOU capable of making full use of the powerful potential of this social organization for achieving the set goals?

The delegates to the current congress had to answer these questions.

It must be said that on the eve of the congress, certain oblast SOU organizations strongly raised the question of the need to reelect a chairman, justifying this by the fact that V. Martirosyan, in heading concomitantly the Committee for The Social Protection of Servicemen Under the Cabinet of Ministers, in the first place, in simple physical terms was unable to work actively in two jobs and secondly, could not defend the interests of the servicemen with the previous degree of independence. Certain indications pointed to the possibility of a split in the course of the congress. Much should be clarified by the report of the SOU chairman and which was to open the congress.

But before, the delegates sincerely and cordially congratulated Vilen Arutyunovich [Martirosyan] on receiving the military rank of major general.

In terming the SOU one of the guarantors for stability in the army and in Ukraine, Martirosyan urged his confreres to maintain all that had been achieved. And much had been done during the short period of the organization's existence. Having declared the development of their own Armed Forces as their basic goal, the SOU members put down a sound legal basis for this. Cols V. Lazorkin and V. Pilipchuk, Col (Res) R. Kostyuk and others were actually the first to partake in working out the military legislation of the young state.

The SOU members to a significant degree helped to protect military property against selling off and removal

of it outside Ukraine. How much spiritual and physical effort was spent to aid the servicemen in making a correct choice and in taking the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people in an organized manner.

All this is undoubted pluses for the SOU. But a person would be wrong if he felt that we have already won. The Union has only gone through the first stage and has halted at the line where it is essential to evaluate what has been achieved and plan the goals along the further path.

In speaking about the priority areas of work, Vilen Arutyunovich said the following:

1) Active participation in the establishing of the Armed Forces, particularly in the personnel policy of the Ministry of Defense. Here, in the opinion of the chairman, obvious mistakes have been made and the SOU cannot remain on the sidelines in the process of placing the personnel in key posts in the army. Martirosyan could not avoid the question of the Black Sea Fleet, having stated that the government must establish an alternative command for the Fleet as this would make it possible to check the admirals and eliminate the duplicitous situation. A majority of the naval officers supports the Ukrainian President;

2) The return to the homeland of servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens. This important matter must not be allowed to run on for years. The officers in the "hot spots" must be brought back immediately, in creating reserve subunits in the Armed Forces and assigning as housing for the officers the empty foreign student hostels in the VUZes. The young patriots can join the ranks of not only the Armed Forces, but also the militia, the SNBU [Ukrainian Security Service] and the National Guard;

3) the social protection of the servicemen and the solving of the housing question. Here a maximum of effort must be made. The SOU leadership is helping to establish a fund for the social aid of the servicemen, and the money in it will go for housing construction. Martirosyan requested that the minister of defense help in allocating a certain quantity of military equipment for this purpose.

The chairman's report was significantly supplemented by the speeches of other members of the SOU leadership.

The First Deputy Chairman, Lt Col V. Chechilo described the work of the SOU Secretariat over the previous period. Noting the insufficiently close ties with the Union's oblast organizations, Vitaliy Ivanovich [Chechilo] pointed to the necessity of creating a strong group of activists who could correctly assess the military and personnel situation and would give their recommendations to the SOU leadership.

The SOU Deputy Chairman, Col V. Lazorkin focused the attention of the delegates on the need to actively influence the personnel policy in the Armed Forces, here

not taking over for the personnel bodies, but helping them to make correct appointments to key posts. Such posts should be filled not by simply professionals, but by true patriots. In Lazorkin's opinion, the SOU is capable of providing serious help to the Ministry of Defense on this level.

The SOU Deputy Chairman, Militia Lt Col G. Omelchenko cautioned members against the attempts to begin searching for enemies by establishing who is of which nationality. In no instance must this be permitted. Our true enemy is the socioeconomic crisis, corruption and abuses by individual officials.

The SOU Executive Committee member, Col A. Skipalskiy who holds the post of chief of the Military Counter-intelligence Directorate of the SNBU, advised that we not give way to complacency. Outside Ukraine and within it there are serious forces which are trying to involve our state in bloody conflicts in order to put an end to our independence. For this reason, any contradictions within the SOU and particularly its splitting would only play into the hands of the reactionary forces.

The speeches by the Ukrainian people's deputies evoked the close interest of the officers and the deputies, regardless of the very acute political situation, found the time to participate in the congress work.

The First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, Lt Gen V. Durdinets in a concise but complete manner described the domestic and foreign policy of our state. In taking up the process of the development of the Armed Forces, Vasily Vasilyevich [Durdinets] had high praise for the contribution which the SOU members were making to this. It is largely due to the unstinting and effective work that Ukraine is the only of the CIS states to have such a solid package of military laws.

However, the adopted laws must be made to work. And for this we must concentrate all efforts on consolidating the democratic forces, including the officers. Vasily Vasilyevich urged the Union to work actively, and advised that we pay serious attention to the questions of professional training and strengthening the combat readiness of the troop units.

The delegates evidenced great interest in the speech by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov.

The minister of defense took up the bitter lessons from the history of the Ukrainian People's Republic which had everything for its independence—both the universal support of the people, a democratic government and talented leaders, but the lack of a regular army led to a tragedy for the people and the state was drawn into the empire. For this reason, our independent state from the very outset should establish its own reliable defense.

In analyzing the four months of intense work since the start of actually implementing Ukraine's right to create its own Armed Forces, Col Gen K. Morozov pointed out

that the real problems in this unusually complex matter turned out to be much more complex than was assumed. The main reason here was the difference of views among the CIS countries. Not one of the decisions taken during the time of its existence, including on military questions, has been carried out. Nevertheless, in accord with the adopted decisions, the measures are being implemented in the first stage of establishing the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The troops of three military districts, Air Forces formations and Air Defense formations were made directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The concluding period was begun in the organizing of the headquarters bodies of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Staff... New commanders were appointed for the military districts and the seven armies. Before the end of the current month, certification will be completed for all the division, brigade and regiment commanders.

In speaking about the complexity of the work with the officer personnel, the minister of defense particularly pointed to the fact that servicemen who have not taken the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people continue to serve in our ranks. Among them are some 9,000 officers or about 12 percent of the entire officer personnel. For the officers—from the regimental commander and higher—the decision has already been taken and they will be released from performing their service duties and upon their request will be discharged or transferred to the CIS Armed Forces.

The Congress delegates were acquainted in detail with the measures being undertaken by the Ministry of Defense to recover for Ukraine the servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens and serving in "hot spots."

In reporting on the difficulties of organizing the personnel of the Ministry of Defense, Col Gen K. Morozov mentioned the following fact in confirmation: out of the nine examined candidates for the posts of deputy ministers of defense, not one passed the recruitment testing. But progress is being made. A number of appointments to crucial positions has already been made and is being readied.

The problem of troop discipline remains acute. The minister of defense urged everyone to implement actively the entire range of measures to instill in all serviceman categories patriotic feelings and a pride for serving in the Armed Forces of independent Ukraine.

The Ukrainian People's Deputies S. Khmara, I.N. Porovskiy and I. Zayats, having voiced high regard for the contribution made by the SOU to establishing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, at the same time cautioned the delegates against street demonstration attitudes and pointed to the errors made during the period of work between the congresses. Regardless of the uncompromising criticism, the people's deputies who have rich experience in the struggle for democratic principles, helped the delegates more accurately define the general directions of the Union's work.

All the same, through the calm, balanced speeches by the delegates one could feel an increasing tension. This was apparent in the impatient outbursts and in skirmishes in the corridors. A predominant majority of those present, in expressing the opinion of their oblast organizations, was dissatisfied with the work of the SOU. It is possible and necessary to do much more.

The delegates were inclined to explain the committed errors and mistakes by the personal failings of the organization's leadership and first of all its chairman.

As might be expected, the quietly building dissatisfaction gained release during the discussion of candidates for the post of SOU chairman. Col V. Lazorkin, Maj Gen V. Martirosyan, Militia Lt Col G. Omelchenko and Col (Res) R. Kostyuk were proposed as candidates. They all made a brief preelection speeches.

Unfortunately, in his speech, V. Martirosyan was unable to restrain his emotions and his characteristic temperament. At one moment, it seemed as though the Union was on the brink of splitting. All that had been kept in with such effort began to break out.

To the honor of the delegates, the inherent officer restraint and the ability to subordinate one's emotions to the common interest gained the upper hand. Vilen Arutyunovich found in himself the strength to take the courageous and probably only correct step in the given situation—he withdrew his candidacy in favor of G. Omelchenko. The same thing was done by R. Kostyuk. In the course of the open voting held, a predominant majority of the delegates elected Militia Lt Col Grigoriy Yemelyanovich Omelchenko as the new chairman of the SOU.

It would be possible to go on for a long time about the great popularity of Omelchenko both among the SOU members as well as among the servicemen of the Kiev Garrison. His uncompromising position is well known from his numerous speeches in the troop units and from articles in the press.

In answering the question of how he sees the further work in the SOU, Grigoriy Yemelyanovich set out his credo this way. He has always been and remains a firm supporter of legal methods of work. He recognizes only the supremacy of the laws. And he will do everything to prevent any political party for using the SOU in its own ends.

Omelchenko again emphasized that in no instances must we allow the search for the image of the enemy or attempts to divide along nationality lines. Our chief enemy is the economic and sociopolitical crisis. Ukraine does not have any other enemies.

The crisis which all the SOU activists sought to avoid was over. From the moment of the election of the new chairman and his deputies for the various areas, the congress moved away decisively from confrontation and

set out on the path of consolidation. This critical situation showed that the SOU has sufficient intellectual and spiritual potential not only to assess its steps objectively but also to advance across personal ambitions and insults.

What was the main conclusion of the passed Third SOU Congress? The delegates demonstrated with new strength their readiness to dedicate all their forces to the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces which are the dependable guarantor for the independence of our state. In turn, the representatives of the Ministry of Defense emphasized their readiness for constructive collaboration in this complex and crucial matter with the most patriotically inclined portion of the officer personnel and as such the SOU has proven to be.

### Story of Nagorno-Karabakh 366th Regiment Detailed

92UM0891A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Apr 92 pp 3,5

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Special Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Mamchur: "The Drama of the 366th: It Has Still not Been Corrected but Let It Become a Bitter Lesson and a Warning"]

[Text] Deployed in Stepanakert (Khankendi) until quite recently, the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment has still not left the pages of the press. [Consider] what has already been written, about what has taken place! But life takes its normal course and now the attention of military reporters is fixed on the 14th Army, on the Dniester Republic, and on other hot spots—there hasn't been any room left for the regiment in the flow of daily reports from the front. And the regiment itself no longer exists...

And yet let us return to it and try to think of what occurred as at least necessary. In fact it is easier to better understand what is occurring with other division-sized and smaller units in areas of interethnic conflicts, having a precedent to predict their fate.

The 366th's bitter fate is too important for the army to forget about it...

The last "brown berets" have left Karabakh, but the 366th, exhausted by the endless exchanges of gun fire and by the fodder shortage, as before awaited its fate. There was almost no hope left for an organized, dignified withdrawal from half-destroyed Stepanakert: with the smallest movement of equipment, all exits from the location were blocked by city residents and guerrillas. Incoming fire, to which motorized rifle regiment personnel did not have the right to respond, became increasingly fierce, but the people "upstairs" did not make any clear decisions. And, despite random visits from higher staff, it began to seem to the people that they had been cast to the whims of fate...

There is a limit to anyone's patience. Not being capable of resisting the general mood, having themselves been

reduced to despair, the battalion and company commanders (in such cases, they say—"separate") secretly resolved: to withdraw the regiment. At their own risk. They developed a detailed plan, laid out routes, and established communication and coordination procedures. To withdraw completely, in their combat vehicles, with the Battle Flag at any price, even with engagements, to breakthrough to Russia!

And if one of their charges opposed—arrest him. Even if it is the regimental commander...

The evening of that same day the Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Zarvigorov, hastily assembled the officers. He exhorted, threatened, and appealed for them to reject irrational actions, to avoid killing themselves or their subordinates: "In 1922, a cavalry brigade also wanted to withdraw from Shusha to Russia! And what happened? They only had sufficient strength to reach Yevdal, and they were drowned in blood!"

The officers were divided. Some as before insisted on an immediate withdrawal and others were inclined to obey the order.

The pocket of the commander's camouflage jacket bristled. Right there—he had a grenade.

At one time one of the best regiments of the Transcaucasus Military District—the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Mozyr Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment was approaching the end of 1991, the sixth year of its stay in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The 366th...

The regiment was brought into Stepanakert in 1986. The decision was made at the highest level: storm clouds were thickening over Karabakh and, obviously, a lightning rod was needed.

But then again, this type of statement is a risky business. As the experience of our colleagues shows, any careless word about the much-suffering kray can be misinterpreted and entail unpredictable consequences. Therefore let me immediately qualify my statement: I am talking neither about Nagorno-Karabakh nor about the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. I am talking about the 366th that found itself at the epicenter of this confrontation. And all collisions—first of all through the prism of the perceptions of soldiers and officers who were involved with the affair of the generals.

This is also the prehistory.

Stepanakert was wealthy and famous. Veterans of the regiment recall that time like a fairy tale. Marvelous climate. Enough of everything. The people were friendly and generous, the dances—till you were about to drop, and the toasts were from the heart. This is where it is a real pleasure to live and serve.

But they soon had to forget about dances. For the good, it was as if a sort of secret understanding existed between

the hostile parties: do not bother the regiment. And it was involved with its own business—with infrastructure and with combat training. Indeed, with time, it had to take refugees under its wing, without asking about the ancestral tribe. And yet, despite the strikes, exchanges of gunfire, arson and similar "delights" of interethnic strife, the situation on the whole remained tolerable for the regiment. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict flared up with new force sometime in the autumn of 1988. Martial law and a state of emergency were introduced and here they could no longer get by without the military. In the background of the worsening relations between the republics and the Kremlin that was inflamed in many regions by anti-army hysteria, the following was heard at rallies for the first time: "Occupiers, go home!"

Meanwhile, the regiment was brought up to a war-time strength level. According to logic, the stabilization factor at a hot spot would thus be increased. But this was a factor of a center that was hated by many people. Which side it adhered to there—is a matter for politicians and historians. In the officers' opinion, the Armenian portion of the population had the most negative attitude toward the regiment. And news about the fact that subunits of the 366th jointly with the internal troops had participated in an operation for "verification of the passport regime" in Armenian villages of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] inflamed relations to the limit. And although only equipment from the regiment was diverted to this operation, even today the officers recall with unkind words those people who brought them into this, putting it mildly, unsightly story. And they attempted to balance the rest—they evacuated Armenian families from dangerous areas and hauled food to remote Azerbaijani villages...

August 1991 arrived. The 366th stopped being the personification of the collapsed center. There was light at the end of the tunnel: the leaders of Russia and Kazakhstan began their famous peacemaking mission... Alas.

In the regiment, they are not inclined to view it as cause and effect related but, after the departure of the presidents, the war flared up with unprecedented ferocity. Regular exchanges of artillery fire began in Stepanakert.

Explosions. Shrapnel. Gloom. Cold. Canned meals one day in three. And here snipers dominated them from the surrounding heights—the regiment was clearly sitting ducks for them. There was no peace, either day or night. The dot of light from a cigarette—a bullet. Stick your helmet out—a bullet. They shot one soldier in the ear and another in the leg. From morning until evening—they moved along the walls with jumps and dashes. Go home like a Cossack infantryman. It was a good thing that there was a transformer vault halfway to the nearest street behind which you could at least catch your breath. They also named it: The "Vault of Life"...

And "upstairs" they knew one thing: do not fire! Find the locations of targets but do not open fire—not yet... Nerves break down, like that tank crewman lieutenant's,

who stared and stared at his crawling comrades, shrugged, grabbed a machinegun, and...the immediate result,... protests and commissions: Who dared? From where? Why?

And here once again in the heart—the families. Not all of them managed to leave and to find refuge in the "Large Land" beforehand. Many as before lived in modular houses without basements and didn't even have anywhere to take cover in the event of an exchange of gunfire. Evacuate? Try, when the slightest hint of assemblies would attract aroused crowds in an instant. Warrant Officer Zakharyan loaded his household belongings, they demolished the vehicle, they destroyed what had been acquired over time, and he and his wife were hidden somewhere for a while—for the edification of the others...

Everyone understood: the regiment will not withdraw while the families of the officers and warrant officers are here. And the regiment remained the last hope for survival for the residents of Stepanakert. The Armenian guerrillas have their own interest: access to the motorized riflemen's vehicles and weapons, given time! During one of these attempts, Private Tulingenov was shot at pointblank range. Finally, the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh largely counted on the regiment: according to logic, the very presence of the military unit in the center of the city should have acted as a cooling agent against the belligerent.

But that is—according to logic.

The primary force of a regular military formation is not in cannons or tanks but in the fact that the power and authority of the entire state machinery must stand behind its standard. If a small group of hunters fires at an American G.I. no matter where they are or how many of them there might be, there is too great a chance of bumping into aircraft carriers and similar "arguments," which is precisely what took place in Grenada and Panama, taken together. First they [the Americans] greet their heroes with medals and then [afterwards] they figure out who was right. They will dig the person who offended them out of the ground, whether he is three times a dictator or an ordinary terrorist.

Who and what stood behind the 366th? What authority and what force? The officers bitterly admitted that lately they do not even understand who they are, whom they serve, and whom they defend.

The residents of Stepanakert miscalculated with regard to the "cooling" factor. When a no longer mighty but somewhat torn up and weak power stands behind the regiment, the regiment is transformed from an awesome combat unit into just an ordinary target, into a hostage, and into a scapegoat—for whomever he might be.

And if only the 366th...

The columns of families huddled together under the cover of darkness. While taking the chance of ending up

under fire at every minute, the officers and warrant officers said goodbye to their wives and children. The commander brought his family out last.

But not all of them left. Alla Maksimova, Svetlana Shpirko, Nataliya Kozlovskaya, and other servicemen's wives only sent their children to live with relatives. The husbands coaxed, the leadership gave them a dressing-down, but they had their way: something will happen, you will see, there will be wounded, what other misfortune could befall you—that you will be without women's hands?

The military district command authorities rushed between Moscow, Baku, and Yerevan, but no one made any radical decisions. One side demanded the withdrawal of the regiment, whose presence in Khankendi was viewed as a means of pressure on independent Azerbaijan. The other side had its own reasons: the military unit of the Combined Armed Forces does not have the right to leave us face to face with armed Azerbaijani formations.

Meanwhile, bullets and shells flew into the regiment from one side and pleas and curses rang out from the other side: why aren't you striking back? Where is your military honor? Where is your male conscience? The old and young are dying before your very eyes!

Then, at the end of December, the officers' patience was also at an end, and hot heads decided to breakthrough to Russia....

The leadership arrived unexpectedly from Division, Army, the Military District, and from Moscow itself. At another time, the instigators' heads would have rolled. But, considering the situation, they threatened, shamed, and promised to better supply them, to set up an air bridge, and they conducted an Officers' Assembly... The 366th remained. And when it had already become completely unproductive, they authorized them verbally, glancing back, and ambiguously, to suppress the weapons positions that were firing at them.

It would seem that now someone had just poked his nose into this—you cannot find a damp spot. No it was not here... Suppress them, suppress those positions when they are beyond line of sight, beyond the crest of the heights. They are firing at you in areas and a bullet will find its fool. But how will it be here? There are people around, and homes, if you make an error of one iota—you will take a soul and that sin that you will never wash out. But for the local population [it is different]: what are you waiting for? We will die!..

Sometimes you hit the target right on the money—it also takes quite a bit of courage...

From the first answering shots, the regiment was automatically elevated to "bitter enemy of the Azeri people" and "accomplice of the Armenians." Later, even at the higher staff you had the opportunity to hear: the regiment was pro-Armenian.

It was instilled in us from the cradle: the army and the people are one. In and of itself, we kept in mind the Soviet people and the Soviet Army. Now there are many peoples. The Army is essentially still largely as it was before. So with whom is it one today? With some single people? With all of them, taken together? Or with each one individually? Difficult, painful questions...

The 366th did not select which people to live among and to serve. During the years spent in Nagorno-Karabakh, the military and the local population were tied by hundreds and thousands of threads. There was everything. Love and hate. Lethal insults and general happiness. Yes, even an elementary mutual assistance. The regiment, like no other, was oriented on the pasturage. To whom could it turn for help? To the surrounding kolkhozes, of course. Grain, potatoes, liquids, and vegetables. The local people would run to the regiment when they had sowing and harvest work near at hand: Help us! When they sent soldiers to work under advantageous conditions, when they threw out the solarki. Yes and the officers' personal acquaintances and the families' friendly ties. And where is that not so? In Russia? In Ukraine? In the Dniester Republic?

For no other reason, 4th Army units deployed in Azerbaijan "are closer" to the Azerbaijani side. But then again, the situation is similar with the 7th Army that is deployed in Armenia. This is only a trend, you certainly can cite as many exceptions and opposite examples as you wish: everything depends on the specific situation which some security detail, company, battalion, regiment or other is in.

The 366th stood on the leading edge, while receiving projectiles from those same barrels day after day, so that all of Stepanakert could not be an exception. Now only suffering and only destroyed homes tied it to the surrounding people and watch out!—one blind projectile—a killer from "that side"...

From "that side" where the 366th's own 23rd Division saw these same ruins, these same killed and wounded—Azerbaijanis. Yes, the way it has turned out the front line separated the regiment from the division. Both in a direct and in a figurative sense. This fact will play not nearly the last role in the 366th's dramatic fate.

The regiment was hitting the target and the other side also had the 366th precisely in its sights. They authorized the commander to maneuver his men and equipment. Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Zarvigorov assured us that only specially selected crews were going out on "combat" operations. The crews were selected with the calculation of excluding Armenian officers and warrant officers from them: they did not want to give any grounds for the corresponding accusations...

And here we have come to the most painful part: did regimental personnel move beyond required self-defense? Were they unauthorized participants in attacks against Azerbaijani populated areas? Did they receive

money for "combat alert duty"? Finally, is there a connection to the Khodzhalinsk tragedy?

All of my interlocutors completely and categorically denied these facts. Yes, they fired on Shusha. But while suppressing weapons positions and according to orders. Did the unit sell weapons and military equipment? They assert that there is no way that this can be called a typical phenomenon although it is possible that individual "cadres", when given the opportunity, were not averse to drop to one side that same equipment, solarki, or some other essential—in a family that is not without monsters...

In any case, it would be naive to hope for other answers. At military district headquarters, some shrugged their shoulders: they said, it is hard to say what is the truth and what is conjecture. Others did not exclude the worst.

We managed to hear the following from a highly-placed individual: if one hundred percent of the officers in the regiment had been replaced in due course, everything would have been different and there would not have been grounds for false rumors. A no less authoritative source shares this opinion: it is still not known how others would have conducted themselves in that situation.

I anticipate the readers' dissatisfaction: "one says" and "another is convinced"... Who precisely? What is the secrecy of the Madrid courtyard?

That's just the point—it is not Madrid but the Caucasus, in all of its arch-complexity and unpredictability. Boiling, warring, incredibly suffering and therefore very vulnerable peoples. By revealing my "sources," I could unconsciously, from the best motives, create needless complications for them in the conduct of an already baffling military policy in the Transcaucasus.

To further develop this theme would mean to just rehash old myths and to produce new ones. Any war, even an undeclared one, exposes the abyss of vices. And it provides an abundance of high examples. A time will come, the unbearable pain, insults and hatred will be left in the past, and they will impartially talk about the 366th. But which war, even one from one hundred years ago, is known completely and for certain? And this tears up peoples bodies and souls—right now. So, each has his own truth there like its own gun sight slit. Who imagines himself to be an arbitration judge? I do not have any grounds for that.

On 23 February, while under attack by "Grad" missiles, the regiment, which had already spilled quite a bit of its own blood, lost 12 men in a very short period of time, two of whom were killed.

During those days, a rumor circulated: in Azerbaijan, six-figure sums of money were promised for the 366th's many daring heads.

Finally, the long-awaited news arrived about the impending withdrawal of the regiment from Nagorno-Karabakh. To where? To their own, naturally. To the division...

For the 366th, this sounded like thunder in a clear sky. The division—that means Gyandzha. Gyandzha—that is Azerbaijan. Think, that is a death sentence...

It traveled from mouth to mouth: we have been betrayed!

They did not hide their joy on that side.

Based on this, guerrilla detachments brought themselves to combat readiness and regrouped. Bearded lads with grenade launchers... and antitank guns loomed at the entrances and exits: they said, you will not withdraw so easily! Armenian women vowed to lie under the tracks...

But the regiment as before was practically cut off from the outside world. You could only reach it from the Azerbaijani side and only from roads controlled by national army subunits, the others were cut off. Only one path remained—air. But how much can you transport by air?

The subunits divided the remaining fuel and recounted the ammunition of which there was already hardly enough to suppress individual weapons positions. Depots were located "there." There was more chaos...

And then, already not for the first time, the officers and warrant officers proposed: who wants to be transferred—just submit your application. For them, this meant—to betray a soldier. Already not simply subordinates—combat comrades with whom they had undergone so much and had survived so much.

There are things in the life of a military man that are more horrible than "Grad" missile strikes. And the commanders, without reaching an agreement, made their choice: maybe no one would take advantage of the last—who knew?—opportunity to withdraw from the bloody reprisals...

Another suggestion followed: send the officers to Georgia via helicopter and the personnel in the vehicles—to the division. The officers repeated their long-standing decision: the regiment will withdraw only at full strength. If it is impossible to go to Russia, then let it be to Georgia.

On 27-28 February, the task was received to prepare vehicles for the march. And finally, at midday on 1 March, the order was issued to concentrate in the drop-zone area.

Only 3rd battalion, part of the artillery battalion and the reconnaissance company were at the designated place by the designated time. And the problem was not just the catastrophic shortage of fuel: the remaining subunits were blockaded at alternate areas by local residents and guerrillas. Could they have avoided such a turn of

events? They assert that the day before, while withdrawing the regiment from under fire, the regimental commander did not precisely carry out the order, having dispersed equipment in populated areas which he should never have done... We will not begin to delve into general tactical plans but a fact remains a fact: the 366th had not concentrated by the designated time. The most conflicting information arrived "upstairs." Information such as this arrived: The regiment has split up and part of it can remain in Karabakh and the other is prepared to offer resistance, if only it is not withdrawn to Azerbaijan (I repeat, this is what was talked about). Frankly speaking, the leadership of the operation for the withdrawal of the regiment could not dismiss this. Counter-measures were taken just in case. Right now it may seem clumsy to many people but in this war like any other war—anything can happen. And it is not easy to judge this even now...

Yes, spetsnaz and the airborne arrived to assist the regiment and the guerrillas were cut off—much has been said about this. But there was something else.

The spetsnaz personnel noiselessly "removed" the exhausted sentries who were barely standing on their own feet. The blue berets occupied the driver-mechanic seats and drove the armored vehicles to the drop-zone area. They disarmed and searched the soldiers and officers... 3rd battalion and part of the artillery battalion were captured without firing a single shot.

No, this was not assault and battery of an infant. The regiment knew how to and could stand up for itself. But spetsnaz and the assault force were performing a specific mission and the motorized riflemen were ordered to obey and not to obstruct... And the main thing—spetsnaz and the assault force were ours!

March 1, 1992 is a black day for our military brother. Perhaps for the first time in the history of the Russian, Soviet, and now already we do not know which one is our army (!), the spetsnaz and the airborne force seized—without even a single shot! our (!) regiment. Encompassed by the same battle flags and a single oath,—there were moments!—when they regarded each other as enemies... But was this the last limit of the political, moral, and legal dead end, into which irresponsible and incompetent politicians had dragged the army? Is this not a textbook example of the tragedy of the Armed Forces of a multiethnic state during the period of its disintegration?

It was extremely difficult to break through to the two other battalions due to the crowds and guerrillas that had laid siege to them and, all the more so, to withdraw the vehicles. Something blew up but this aroused the population to such an extent that they had to reject further attempts—otherwise enormous human victims were inevitable.

Even the spetsnaz are helpless against women and children.

For eight days running, helicopters landed on the helipad day and night, in blizzards and in fog. The subunits that had arrived to help repelled the desperate onslaught of the Fedayeen.

With the Battle Flag wrapped around his chest, Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Kraule, Chief of Staff, and the 366th left Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armed Forces forever.

The regiment was very rapidly disbanded. They authorized the officers to select a duty location to perform further service. And now, in anticipation of assignments and somewhat adjusted to the soldiers' barracks, they have run through over and over again their memories of the events of the last days and months. They have remembered the kind words of former Commander Colonel Aleksandr Alekseyevich Kolyvanov. Under him, the regiment was brought up to war-time strength, it was formed and acquired experience under him—praise came from throughout the entire military district: most organized, cohesive, and disciplined. They did not receive marks below good on their inspections. The last one was last autumn.

They recalled the soldiers who followed them into the fire and water. They gave blood to the wounded. Many even now have sought out their commanders: Take me with you! Wherever you want, only with you. And the ecstatic responses of the "buyers" (everyone has said so much about you, and look, you are such a young soldier!) did not make them happy—they wounded them: what a regiment it could have been!

They recalled the well-groomed military garrison in which they had invested so much effort and sweat. Masonry barracks from Catherine's era—the heritage of the hardly idolized first Russian regiments in Karabakh—like the last one...

They have survived with difficulty each memory about "their own" deserters, many of whom, judging by everything, have ended up in the ranks of the Fedayeen. Today the number is already known—more than one hundred men. They attempted to explain.

Until January 1992, there were a total of 18 deserters, despite the hopelessly bad situation. Altogether—because, according to Transcaucasian standards—this is paltry (somehow in the conversation, the chief of staff of one of the units that had been there lamented: less than half of the personnel remained). But reinforcements—more than 200 soldiers and sergeants—arrived after the New Year. They had been told that they were being sent for a week or two to assist in the preparation of vehicles for the withdrawal. In so doing, they had not been issued either monetary allowances or food vouchers. But week after week passed and many of these personnel, who were being fired upon and who were unaccustomed to the rigors of practically living at the front, faltered. And they fled to wherever they could. The officers were convinced: among those who had violated their oath—was the lion's share of precisely the new personnel.

As for those Armenian warrant officers and officers who did not leave Karabakh... Know already not in the regulations—let God be their judge!

The five officers wives who stayed with the regiment until the end while away the time here in the barracks. Of all the clothing—the old camouflage jacket. What had been accumulated over the years had burned and died under the ruins. Like the majority of the families of the 366th. But they did not talk about that. How they baked a pie on the 23rd so that the soldiers and officers could celebrate and they sang to the dead and wounded. About spending nights in damp cellars with the ends of a candle. Like Sveta Shpirkov who, despite the threats of "some colonels," surrendered her assault rifle only into the hands of the deputy military district commander..

They are sincerely proud of their membership in the 366th.

"Do you know how they seized our hostages?"

"It was at the end of November when with fuel—there was always barely enough—it had become quite unbearable. To warm ourselves, to prepare some sort of food—even if we had to drain it out of combat vehicles. They sent out a column for solar oil. A day, another, a third—neither fuel, nor vehicles, nor people. It turned out that they were prisoners of some Azerbaijan formations. Only a week later—thanks to the division commander—pressured through our own channels—Captain V. Gorokhov, Senior Lieutenant I. Fleishman and five soldiers with them returned. Gorokhov only spit: they do not know how to shoot! And the soldiers talked about it.

At first, the officers were withdrawn for execution by hanging. Later—to be shot. Once, again. They covered their eyes and they clicked the bolts. Toward the end, they already did not want anything—they only wanted them, the damned, on their knees.

Nothing came of it. The officers would not bend their knees.

The commander went down on one knee, for them, the first column. There were no solemn speeches and there were no guests. They said goodbye to the Battle Flag on someone else's parade ground. And later the hymn of the 366th thundered over someone else's garrison. Guards, Mozr. The farewell song of the officers' formation:

"...In the hands of dregs the regiment did not become a toy, You know that, Ancient Karabakh!"

#### **Dniester Women's Movement Leader, Guards Commander Interviewed**

92UM0924A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Lt Cols A. Bondarenko and S. Dyshev: "The Dniester Area: Which Battalions on Firing Line?"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In spite of the agreement separating the opposing sides, the Dniester area continues to see conflict and people dying. How to obtain some kind of calm? Each side has its mind made up and insists on defending its interests.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA two days ago presented the opinions of the Dniester area Republic Guards commander and commissar of the Bendery police. Pulled into the whirlpool of events were not only the warring sides, but also the Army and various socio-political movements. We present this article in the hope of helping people who adhere to different positions so that perhaps a comparison can be made.

### The "Women's Guard"

Galina Andreyeva of the Dniester area is known as least as well as the famous person of the same name was at one time. Military people have no special liking for her, but women believe her to be their undisputed leader.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Galina Stepanovna, someone has said—accurately or not—that you are the commander of the "black playsuit" battalion.

[Andreyeva] There is a women's movement and there is a strike committee. The not-too-bright journalist who said that would be better off if he were to help our women acquire playsuits. But to write something like that, without even having met with us, is simply a shame. Our movement started out on 31 August of last year. We responded to the arrest of our Supreme Soviet deputies by setting up a month-long blockade of the railroad. That was the first women's political strike—something all the newspapers acknowledged.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We are aware that you have a "special relationship" with the military.

[Andreyeva] Of most interest to us at present is the Army. After the events of November 1990, when OPON [Special Purpose Police Detachment] men killed people in Dubossary, we requested the military to protect the populace. They actually turned us down. We started to picket, taking action to prevent the Army from being disbanded. Then the statement was made on television: Andreyeva is in command of the 14th Army. We sent the Moscow generals back. Yes, under women's escort to the bus, and on to Odessa. We did not use force; we fed them pirozhki. We know what kind of materiel there is and where it is located, and we know the amounts; and we do not want these weapons to be turned over to Kishinev.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are there many officers' wives in your movement?

[Andreyeva] We have not made a count. Quite a few. There are many—and this is confirmed by the officers themselves—who do not let their husbands come home: Until there is peace, no sense letting them lie around the house doing nothing!

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are you being supplied information by military wives?

[Andreyeva] We possess information obtained from the General Staff. So do not worry! We have a women's intelligence activity, one that is active everywhere: in Moscow and in Moldova. We are politically motivated and we are playing a political game. The army commander is careful not to violate an order, while I with my women's strike action am concerned about obtaining protection for women, children, and the elderly. (Galina Stepanovna sighed.) The only thing we would love to have is armored vehicles.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We gathered in our telephone conversation that the women are learning how to drive tanks and fly helicopters.

[Andreyeva] That is no secret. We sent women off to other areas to learn how to handle weapons and combat equipment. If the guys hesitate to take action, we will take over and offer protection. We even carried out night exercises with the 14th Army. You should have seen how our grannies climbed over tanks and armored personnel carriers! They take up their positions faster than soldiers! We were forced to seize weapons in the chemical battalion when we found out that they were to be turned over to Moldova. No soldier tried to stop us.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Finally, tell us something about yourself.

[Andreyeva] I graduated from the Sverdlovsk Institute of Law. I worked as a jurist in the city soviet. I now occupy a quite peaceful position as head of the Tirospol Division of social security. I have under my care quite an army: 40,000 pensioners. I am in addition chairman of the Women's Strike Committee; deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, and city soviet deputy. I am married. My husband is in the Home Guard. With his wife militant, my husband also must be. What do we want? Peace! And each one of us women dreams of getting some more sleep—maybe another hour or so, cooking something for the husband, doing the laundry, baking a cake. And heaven forbid more shooting!

### The Guards Army

Hanging on the wall behind Lieutenant Colonel V. Biryukov, commander of a missile brigade, were a picture of Lenin and the Russian flag. It is clear that the residents of the Dniester area do not intend to forget the entire past and adopt a new outlook overnight.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vladimir Yuryevich, we could be wrong, but we believe you are chief of the Bendery garrison.

[Biryukov] That is difficult to say. About two months ago, the Moldova minister of defense appointed to that post Colonel Mendeleyev, who was chief of the repair shop. The latter panicked; he was able to obtain a transfer to the Moscow area on short notice. That is how I came to occupy the post of chief.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is said that a large number of military personnel wish to transfer out. Was it not the opposite at one time?

[Biryukov] Yes, we—missilemen—thought of this place as being the best: The unit was stationed in the city; the area is pleasant, the people, nice. Everything was still normal when I arrived here last year from the Far East.

It was not long before the difficulties began: with fuel, pay, logistical support. This later came to include combat training. It was decided here that we were preparing to remove our equipment, so we were forbidden to move any columns out of the unit; guard points were posted at the gates.

Also, when the republics started to organize their own armies, the soldiers were being called to stations in locations from where they had come. So, what we have now is confusion. Parents come to visit their sons, and, when they hear the shooting, they virtually sweep their sons up in their arms and take them home.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What are your feelings about the conflict in the Dniester area?

[Biryukov] Things became much worse at the end of February, when the shooting started. We assumed a neutral position: We did nothing in word or deed that would express any opinion of what was going on. This is definitely a political conflict, and the Army is now above politics. Remember how everyone demanded that it be depoliticized?

Things got to the point where officers stopped wearing their uniform during their free time in town.

But later, when the Tiraspol officers demanded an end to the bloodshed, and we supported them, good relations came back into play.

I will not enter into a detailed analysis of the course of events. There are armed people standing on both sides, and it is hard to say who is the one who shoots first. There are too many weapons here. A case in point: Dniester area female activists seized stores of a unit located not far from here and took a large number of pistols and automatic rifles. This is something they did on their own, but now the commander is threatened with legal action. He could not order fire on the women! Nevertheless, Andreyeva should be held legally accountable for her actions.

In a word, we are trying to avoid being drawn into the conflict. Even at that, weapons have been used against us. A bullet from a sniper's rifle became lodged in the safety glass of a BTR, bullets flew through windows of apartments housing servicemen, and one of our officers was fired upon with an automatic rifle at a bus stop.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Are you willing to step between the opposing sides? That certainly is more dangerous than being neutral. What does the brigade think about that?

[Biryukov] They are willing to do so. They are tired of this tense uncertainty. We do understand that, without calling the troops, nothing will be accomplished. But no one can replace us here. At the same time, we do not expect a rapid resolution of the conflict. For example, if the Moldova police or the OPON are ordered to go away, it is unlikely that the volunteers will lay down their arms in the near future.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How did the brigade react to the transfer "to Russia"?

[Biryukov] Enthusiastically. The CIS is presently a nebulous concept, but there is belief in Russia. What have appeared are certainty, three-colored flags... But that is all there is so far; everything else is the same as before. We are waiting for things to get better.

#### More on the above:

Our correspondent, Nikolay Mulyar, informs us that the bilateral commission on mediation of the Dniester area conflict held another session in Bendery. The sides presented contrasting positions. The Bendery representatives were of the opinion that implementation of the 12 April protocol would lead to nothing less than withdrawal of the city of Bendery from the Moldovan Dniester Republic.

Viktor Katane, first deputy minister for internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, has expressed his point of view. In a Moldova radio interview, he stated emphatically that both sides have accomplished much, but that it was not possible to complete the work, since it was decided to deliberate the 12 April protocol in city soviet session in Bendery. This is spite of the fact that it was "approved by the Higher Security Council of the Republic of Moldova and the Supreme Soviet of the so-called Moldovan Dniester Republic."

## UKRAINE

### Kravchuk Decree on Designation of Naval Commander

92UM0915A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Apr 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Presidential Decree on the Designation of the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy, signed by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, Kiev, 6 April 1992: "Ukrainian Presidential Decree on the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy"]

[Text] 1. Designate Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin Commander of the Ukrainian Navy.

2. This Decree enters into force the day it is signed.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, President of Ukraine  
Kiev, 6 April 1992.

### Kozhin on 'Cadres' Question in Fleet

92UM0936A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
15 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Navy Commander Rear Admiral Boris Borisovich Kozhin by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* Correspondent Major Sergey Nagoryanskiy, Sevastopol-Kiev, under the rubric: "First Interview in the New Post": "Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin: 'Our Primary Resource Is People'"]

[Text] "In general right now, as they say, it is inconvenient for me to grant an interview," admitted Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin, without concealing his unwillingness to do so. "I have held the post of commander of the Ukrainian Navy for only a short time." But all the same, he agreed to a short conversation with your correspondent and then and there thanked *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* for morally supporting at a difficult moment those Black Sea Fleet personnel who have taken an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine.

[Nagoryanskiy] Time flies like an ocean wave. Approximately two years ago, we could not have assumed that events would unfold so rapidly that our state would acquire independence and create its own army. But today we are opening the first page of the history of the native fleet through the Presidential Decree on your designation to the post of commander.

[Kozhin] Actually, two years ago, we saw our future as if in a fog. But recently, much has become clear. It's as if our society has grown up. Independence itself has required that. As for me personally, quite frankly I also could not have calculated everything accurately. Meanwhile, I believed in my own future. But I did not expect that I would become the commander of the Ukrainian Navy.

[Nagoryanskiy] Therefore, it will certainly be difficult to begin your service in that high capacity?

[Kozhin] Even before it wasn't easy. But in general I am a sporting man and, while expressing myself using sports terminology, I entered my new post from a fast start.

[Nagoryanskiy] You took your start but already on the third day after the famous duel of the two Presidential Decrees, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk has suspended the creation of the Ukrainian Navy based on the Black Sea Fleet. We do not envy you. All the more so if you add to this that you are beginning not from a ready-made navy and that you have to create many things from scratch.

[Kozhin] In an organizational context, yes. But at the same time do not consider me to be immodest if I say that I have my own experience. I have served in the Black Sea Fleet for nearly 24 years. I have learned much here. Thanks to those who helped in my formation. I am grateful to my fellow servicemen, I highly value my naval friendship with them. And in general I think that our primary resource is people. Be they seamen or admirals.

[Nagoryanskiy] As for admirals, then, as far as I know, some of them have hardly welcomed your agreement to transfer to the Ukrainian Navy. They say, he deviated from his oath and so on.

[Kozhin] One can do a lot of philosophizing on that score. But permit me to briefly state. I am a citizen of Ukraine and I serve on its territory. I underwent my entire formative period here. So, excuse me, but in this case to whom should I take an oath? If someone thinks differently and does not intend to swear to the people of Ukraine—well, that is a personal matter for each person. By the way, when some people in the task force, which I commanded until recently, decided to take the oath to their own—Ukrainian people, I did not have the moral right to prevent them from doing so. By way of illustration, this concerns the story of Captain 2nd Rank Yuriy Shalyt, who has become famous, and his subordinates.

[Nagoryanskiy] But another case also occurred on one of the ships that was subordinate to you. I have in mind the incident with Senior Lieutenant Komissarov, who refused to take the oath to Ukraine and headed out for the high seas in a small surface craft.

[Kozhin] That is precisely it—a sensationalized story. However, not everything in that story occurred as it has been reported in much of the mass media. Here they also attempted to accuse me. And do you know, how all of this ended? Komissarov later told me: "Excuse me, Comrade Rear Admiral, I have let you down..."

[Nagoryanskiy] So, you—are the commander of the Ukrainian Navy. How do you imagine the Navy—based on personnel strength and the number of ships?

[Kozhin] That must be determined by Ukrainian state policy and by its military doctrine. Therefore, I would not already begin to use specific numbers right now. But I can say one thing for certain: Ukraine does not need the Black Sea Fleet at its current size. And it would be a burden for our state to support that huge mass.

[Nagoryanskiy] But the financing problem is not the only one. In your view, what other most serious problems face the Ukrainian Navy that is coming into being?

[Kozhin] The cadre problem... Today there are people to serve but we need to think about replacing them. Previously, we obtained replacements primarily from those military schools that are located in Russia. The Naval Academy and the General Staff Academy are also there. In the future, we will have to create our own educational system.

[Nagoryanskiy] At your first press conference before native and foreign journalists, while describing on the whole the missions of the Ukrainian Navy, you said that its ships will be located in the Mediterranean Sea. This did not jive with the position of the country's leadership that our state will have nothing to do beyond the shores of the Black Sea. The journalists immediately grabbed hold of that. Please explain what you had in mind.

[Kozhin] Only that military ships must protect the fishing fleet's fishing activities or a convoy of our ships. By way of illustration, oil tankers. All the more so if their course passes near "hot spots".

[Nagoryanskiy] But in general, have you had occasion to sail in foreign seas and oceans?

[Kozhin] Yes, and quite a bit. Both when I served in first officer positions and when I became a rank higher. We made port calls to Algiers, Morocco, Tunis, Rumania, and Bulgaria. So, I cannot immediately recall all of the countries. I will repeat, I have completed many cruises during these nearly 24 years.

[Nagoryanskiy] So, you arrived in the Black Sea Fleet in 1968?

[Kozhin] Yes, after graduation from Leningrad Higher Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze. And yet, I can still recall the past. By nationality, I am Russian. I am a native of Pskov. In 1961, my family and I traveled to Lutsk. I was married at Volyni. I have many relatives there. I love to call on them. That is a beautiful region... Well, at the beginning of our conversation, I began talking about sports. I have been seriously involved with sports and precisely bicycle riding. At one time, I was champion of Volyni and in 1963 I became the silver medalist at the USSR People's Spartacist Games. Today, of course, I don't have time for bicycle riding. But then I run. Each morning—a five-kilometer run. Mandatorily. In short, as the commander, I will strive to cultivate physical exercise and sports to the highest level in our Navy.

[Nagoryanskiy] Boris Borisovich, the situation on the whole depends to some degree on your personal interrelationship with Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Kasatonov. Yesterday, you were still his subordinate. How have your relations developed?

[Kozhin] I would not like to focus any special attention on that. All the more so that I have already had occasion to hear bewilderment. They say, how will two commanders go out into one sea. You need to put yourself in the mood for cooperation. For me personally, stable, businesslike relations have developed with Igor Vladimirovich. I will try to have them move in favor of the Ukrainian Navy. Moreover, Admiral Kasatonov himself has said more than once recently that he supports the creation of a navy in our state. The main thing is, during the course of the impending organizational measures—and there will be so many of them—not to lower combat readiness on the ships and in the units.

[Nagoryanskiy] I would like to return to the question on taking the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. Until now, the ceremony itself occurred without the proper solemnity. The latest example was with a submarine. Our newspaper has already written on that score.

[Kozhin] Of course, this should not be. Believe me: We will attempt to organize the solemn ritual in such a way

that it actually becomes ingrained in the soul and absorbs within itself the best traditions: both naval and also people's. I have already leafed through some historical literature. By the way, I have not yet taken the oath. So, IZVESTIYA rushed to include me in the ranks of those who were the first to swear to their own people. And right now I am thinking about how to better organize this. I am interested in how they conducted oath taking day at the ground forces units.

[Nagoryanskiy] You are just beginning your career as the commander. And do you have anyone to rely on right now?

[Kozhin] Of course. And this support is expanding. I will name only some of my closest comrades-in-arms. They are Captain 1st Rank Anatoliy Danilov, Colonel Vladimir Indilo, and Captain 2nd Rank Yuriy Shalyt. While standing alongside such people, you can look to the future with optimism. I believe that this future will actually be like what is visible to us today. Let us approach it through our own labor and successes. Each of us individually and all of us together.

#### Implications of Decree on Naval Commander Designation

92UM0915B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Apr 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Press Service Release: "Ukraine Will Have Its Own Navy"]

[Text] Society's attention is once again fixed on the events surrounding the Black Sea Fleet. L. Kravchuk's Ukrainian Presidential Decree "On Urgent Measures for the Structural Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces" has been issued, in accordance with which all military formations on the territory of Ukraine, including the Black Sea Fleet and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, are administratively subordinate to the state organs of rule of Ukraine.

The Decree was published in total compliance with the previously achieved agreements within the framework of the CIS since it is yet another step by Ukraine toward the formation of its own Armed Forces which is its inalienable right, as was noted at the CIS member-countries negotiations both in Minsk and in Kiev.

The Ukrainian Navy is being created based on that portion of the Black Sea Fleet which is registered to ports on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine does not claim the entire Black Sea Fleet, although its contribution in the creation and maintenance of all currently operating fleets of the former Soviet Union would permit it to raise the issue about a greater share. Furthermore, a portion of the Ukrainian navy that is being formed can, as a result of negotiations, be transferred to the operational subordination of the CIS strategic command for the period until total elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Sovereign Ukraine does not have global strategic missions in the Mediterranean Sea. Its Navy will carry out missions in the interests of defense. At the same time, Ukraine will simultaneously guarantee the security of other Commonwealth states.

The Decree narrows the very concept of Strategic Forces. They include the Strategic Rocket Forces and air and naval nuclear forces and units that are involved with their maintenance and support. The Strategic Nuclear Forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine are transferred to the operational subordination of the CIS Strategic Forces commander to ensure unified control of the nuclear arsenals of the former USSR for the period until their manning is totally eliminated.

We think it is necessary to clarify the concept of "operational" and "administrative" subordination. Operational subordination—is temporary subordination for the period of total elimination of manning and total reduction of the Strategic Nuclear Forces in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense exercises administrative control in accordance with the Ukrainian Presidential Decree. It provides for total control over personnel policy, over compliance with legal standards in the troops, control over the exercise of Ukrainian law, and protection of the interests of personnel in accordance with their citizenship. Thus, all strategic forces deployed on the territory of the state are operationally subordinate to the CIS Strategic Forces commander while under the administrative subordination of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Delimitation of these concepts will permit the protection of Ukrainian servicemen from administrative arbitrariness by other CIS Allied Armed Forces officials and eliminate social tension in military collectives that has been caused by the duality of their situation. The Ukrainian State guarantees social protection and employment, including assistance in retraining of military specialties, for servicemen who have linked their fate with Ukraine.

A Presidential Decree has already designated a Ukrainian Naval Commander. He will form the administration which will be involved with command and control of the fleet, monitor compliance with Ukrainian law, and provide legal and social protection of personnel.

#### **Sailors Appeal to Morozov**

92UM0914C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
9 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant V. Petrenko, aide to the commander for personnel: "We Want to Serve Ukraine: Submariners Have Submitted This Request to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense"]

[Text] There are quite a few letters in our editorial mail that are addressed to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov with requests to accept into the Armed Forces those people whose fate is

being lost in the political fray. Quite a few of these letters are arriving from the Black Sea Fleet. We are publishing one of them.

Our submarine is a modern Black Sea Fleet boat. Everyone has always repeatedly remarked that our crew is the best. In December 1991, Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral I. Kasatonov visited us and he said: "This is the best boat in the fleet." We have repeatedly had to prepare the boat to receive the most varied delegations (both ours and foreign delegations). Incidentally, Ukrainian Prime Minister V. Fokin was our first honored guest.

The majority of the members of the crew completely support the course of the Ukrainian leadership and its Ministry of Defense on the formation of our own Armed Forces, including a navy.

While proceeding from this, a ceremony to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine was organized on the boat on March 13, 1992. Black Sea Fleet Submarine Division Deputy Commander Captain 1st Rank Ye. Lupakov led us in the oath-taking. And although they prevented us from completing this solemn ceremony (the brigade leadership arrived on the boat), ship officers took the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. Only Commander Captain 2nd Rank A. Romanov and his Senior Assistant Captain 3rd Rank I. Leukhin refused to do this.

Repression began immediately. They took me to the brigade KPP [control and check point]. They ordered that I not be permitted on brigade territory. In the words of Brigade Commander Captain 1st Rank Kostkin, I was removed from my post. Officers from the submarine are being hastily reassigned to posts which will be reduced this summer.

The Black Sea Fleet Commander ordered Captain 1st Rank Ye. Lupakov recalled from leave on March 14, 1992 and removed from his post.

Among ship's officers are people who should have been sent to the academy or on foreign assignments and they should have received promotions and housing this year. Now we have been told: do not even think about that.

There are also other crews in our unit who are prepared to take the oath. But, having seen how they have dealt with us, they are simply not taking the risk of dooming themselves to that same fate.

Comrade colonel-general! On behalf of the officers of the Black Sea Fleet's best submarine who have taken the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, I beg you to take us under your protection and to stop this mob law and to make it so that we are under the jurisdiction of Ukraine which we are prepared to faithfully and truthfully serve.

We beg you to preserve the officers of this boat just like they were on March 13, 1992.

**New Naval Commander Holds Press Conference***92UM0915D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
10 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article by unidentified Ukrinform correspondent, Sevastopol: "Ukrainian Naval Commander's First Press Conference"]

[Text] Sevastopol. Ukrainian Naval Commander Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin's first meeting with journalists has occurred. Naturally, everyone was interested in what the commander intends to undertake and what his first steps in the new post will be.

Boris Kozhin stated that first of all it is necessary to create the Ukrainian Naval Headquarters and then to begin normal work to form all of the administrative structures. As for the Ukrainian Navy, it must be a modern navy with high combat readiness and equipped with new ships. It must be created using civilized methods and a political solution of disputed issues. At the present time, the Ukrainian Naval Commander thinks that the navy will not be strategic. It will be made up of antisubmarine warfare and minesweeping ships, water area defense units, submarines, and also naval aviation and shore defense forces.

The Ukrainian Naval Commander plans to create the Naval Headquarters in Sevastopol. At the same time, he stressed that he does not wish to create parallel navy command and control structures.

"What part of the Black Sea Fleet do you claim?"—I asked B. Kozhin. While answering the question, the rear admiral said that, while resolving this problem, they must proceed from those tasks that the Ukrainian Navy will face.

**Fuel Diverted From Transport Units***92UM0914B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Apr 92 p 2*

[Interview with Kiev Military District Acting Motor Vehicle Battalion Commander Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zadornev by Major Aleksey Trubitsyn: "Life Is Compelling Us to Economize..."]

[Text] On March 18, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov signed an order "On Regulating the Utilization of Motor Vehicle Transportation and Supplemental Measures to Save Petroleum-Oil-Lubricants [POL]" which specifies troop activities in execution of the 17 February Presidential Decree that is directed at increasing POL savings in the national economy.

Our correspondent visited a Kiev Military District motor vehicle battalion and asked Acting Commander Major A. Zadornev to discuss the collective's efforts to save POL and to reduce engine mileage.

[Trubitsyn] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, the order's primary requirement is to reduce motor vehicle trips to a minimum. Each day no more than five vehicles can leave the motor pool at the battalion and the separate unit. Is this adequate to carry out combat training issues and to perform the vital functions of subunits?

[Zadornev] It is difficult. But in principle, it is adequate to, as they say, keep us afloat. We need to keep in mind that the battalion has not had for a long time already those remote temporary duty assignments that cost the battalion a million kilometers per year. The POL transportation company currently does not leave the motor pool—there is nothing to transport.

Life is compelling us to economize in everything. Previously, there was an order—after a trip, totally refuel the motor vehicle but now we allocate fuel immediately prior to a trip. We consider where the vehicle will go and what sort of cargo it will haul...

[Trubitsyn] And do you obtain savings in that way?

[Zadornev] Yes, but not only through that. Carburetor engine motor vehicle operations have ceased completely. The only exception is the commanders' UAZs for which a 10-liter standard has been prescribed. And that is not each day.

[Trubitsyn] Are you short of gasoline?

[Zadornev] That is not the correct word, there is no reserve whatsoever, we issue it in a miserly fashion and with great difficulty. And everyone demands: give us a vehicle with a full fuel tank. One commander was not able to drive up to the battalion—his UAZ ran out of gas and he cursed us roundly. But what can we do if only a few miserable liters are allocated to us?

[Trubitsyn] The minister of defense demands that cases when empty vehicles are driven be eliminated. I know that this had occurred previously but what about right now?

[Zadornev] Even before we took cargo that was going the same way. But insofar as the battalion is tied in to the Ministry of Defense's rear services, this is a mandatory condition today. No commander will sign a piece of paper for a departure if, let us put it this way, a payload has not been found for the motor vehicle at both ends of the trip.

[Trubitsyn] The order also states that the pretraining of young drivers must be closely tied to the fulfillment of national economic work and the transportation of cargo. Is it turning out that way?

[Zadornev] Not yet. The fact is that the routes that have been defined for the battalion for marches with young drivers do not permit them to become involved with transporting cargo. We need to change the direction. I think that it will be this way during the next training period.

I am certain that life will compel us to depart from our customary patterns in the organization of training and support for the vital activities of the troops. A very strict order will do it that much faster...

[Trubitsyn] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, nevertheless, while driving up to the battalion, I met a column of your vehicles—no less than 10. How am I to understand that?

[Zadornev] Today we are participating in the evacuation of families of servicemen who are in the Transcaucasus. This is the fourth day that we have been receiving them at the airport and driving them to designated locations: to their relatives and friends. We are carrying out a Ukrainian Presidential Decree and the corresponding order. Ministry of Defense Rear Services Headquarters Representative Colonel Vyacheslav Davydovich Kuprenyuk is managing the transport movement.

This is a special situation for which the required material resources have been allocated.

[Trubitsyn] Are they refugees, you certainly cannot call them anything else, from Kiev and the oblast?

[Zadornev] Mainly, yes. But for example two days ago Captain Igor Konopol had to lead a column to Cherkassy. The vehicles had to be refueled. They drained the last drops of diesel fuel for the KamAZs. This trip had not been envisioned.

[Trubitsyn] I understand the difficulties with gasoline but there was always enough diesel fuel...

[Zadornev] Alas, there have also been interruptions in diesel fuel deliveries. Right now, at best we have 300 liters at the AZS [motor vehicle refueling facility]. In the morning, we sent two fuel trucks for fuel but there is no certainty that they will bring back fuel. Lately, they have returned empty more than once...

[Trubitsyn] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, how do people regard the forced and planned savings of POL and the reduction of engine mileage?

[Zadornev] Everyone understands the difficulties which our state has encountered. I will say it like this: Soldiers are not squandering fuel.

And we are sending our best drivers on trips. Those who know their vehicles well, skillfully operate them, and are distinguished by their discipline. They are drivers like Junior Sergeants Kobelyatskiy, Baglay, Privates First Class Zakusila and Ragoza, Private Nosa and others. These servicemen will not permit the overconsumption of fuel.

[Trubitsyn] And how is the training organized of those drivers who have been deprived of the opportunity to sit behind the wheel of a vehicle due to the fuel shortage?

[Zadornev] In class and in the vehicle in the motor pool. Of course, you cannot learn to drive using visual aids but

for now we are emphasizing technical training. I hope that the lack of fuel will nevertheless be a temporary phenomenon...

### MD Deals with Problem of Providing Clothing, Essentials

92UM0915E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
10 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Armed Forces Clothing Supply Directorate Chief Colonel Mikhail Dmitriyevich Trofimenko by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "What Kind of Army Will the Ukrainian Army Be?": "How Much Does a Soldier's Overcoat Cost?"]

[Text] Among the numerous problems that are arising in the process of forming our own Armed Forces, one of the most acute is supplying clothing to servicemen. This was not so easy to do during the times when ordering and delivery discipline was still being observed. But under contemporary conditions of the disintegration of not only economic but also of state ties, this task falls into the category of practically insoluble. Even though the overwhelming majority of our readers as before are mostly worried about new uniform items. For rear services personnel, the vital problems are more prosaic in nature—what do you dress a serviceman in today?

How does the clothing supply directorate emerge from the situation that has developed? What are the current and future plans to supply the troops with required items of clothing? Our correspondent asked Ukrainian Armed Forces Clothing Supply Directorate Chief Colonel Mikhail Dmitriyevich Trofimenko to answer these questions.

[Klyuchikov] How do matters stand with supplying clothing to Ukrainian Armed Forces military units?

[Trofimenko] In brief, very poorly. Any clothing deliveries whatsoever from the CIS countries have practically totally ceased. In the past, it has historically developed that we have received the primary types of clothing from the country's numerous republics. Only very little from the long list of clothing that is prescribed for servicemen was produced on the territory of Ukraine: caps, underwear, and shirts. Yes and that was from imported raw materials.

All remaining clothing items were supplied to Ukraine by numerous enterprises located in the most varied regions of the former USSR.

Indeed, we have definite supplies of clothing in warehouses. However, we should not seriously count on them. They will quite rapidly come to an end. First of all, irregularities with deliveries did not nearly begin yesterday. In recent years, we have frequently encountered numerous cases of partial or total disruption of deliveries of individual types of clothing.

However, not only Ukraine has found itself in this situation. A similar situation is characteristic for all the military districts that have ended up, figuratively speaking, in an economic blockade due to the breakdown of ties between enterprises and due to their monopolistic diktat in the market.

Secondly, Ukraine continues to conscientiously supply clothing to servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet and Strategic Forces that are deployed on its territory. By way of illustration, already this year seamen have received substantial shipments of clothing, footwear, and detergent, everything that they should be receiving according to the summer plan.

But the former reserves, alas, are not endless. Already today we are experiencing a very acute shortage of box-calf footwear and smooth woolen cloth for overcoats.

[Klyuchikov] What steps are being undertaken to solve the problem of supplying Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen with clothing?

[Trofimenko] As of today, figuratively speaking, the light has already appeared at the end of the tunnel. During the course of difficult but quite effective contacts with representatives of the CIS Allied Armed Forces command authorities and Russian Federation ministries and departments, we have managed to work out and sign a treaty on reciprocal deliveries of many types of clothing.

Unfortunately, we still have not managed to arrive at a common opinion on the issue of deliveries to Ukraine of brown box-calf footwear, fabric, and smooth woolen cloth for overcoats. However, negotiations are continuing. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense representatives have visited a whole series of Russian enterprises which carry out deliveries of certain types of clothing. So, we quite recently visited the Kupavna and Pavlov-Posad worsted combines.

[Klyuchikov] How will the problem of supplying clothing to the Ukrainian Armed Forces be resolved in the future?

[Trofimenko] Of course, the purchase of numerous types of clothing in Russia is an emergency measure. I need to say that this is not the cheapest solution. I will not say how expensive all of these deliveries are for us, but I will cite some numbers.

We have to lay out 600 rubles for a pair of tarpaulin boots, R1,060 for a pair of box-calf boots, R2,400 for a soldier's overcoat and, R1,100 for a set of wool mixture clothing.

There is no doubt that prices will increase in the future. That is why we are orienting ourselves in the future toward the fact that Ukrainian enterprises themselves are able to master the production of all types of clothing for servicemen. In any case, Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov has tasked us with developing a

military uniform that will be entirely produced in Ukrainian enterprises prior to 1995.

I need to stress that already today serious work is being conducted in this direction. We have managed to reach an agreement with Kirovograd and Dnepropetrovsk Oblast sewing enterprises to sew dress uniforms for soldiers. Legteks Corporation, Kiev Technological Institute of Light Industry, and NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Light Industry have been enlisted for active work to develop new types of fabrics and types of uniforms and negotiations are being conducted with the Ministry of the Economy.

[Klyuchikov] Can't you tell us, albeit briefly, what stage the process of developing a new uniform for Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen is at?

[Trofimenko] As you know, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced a competition for the best development of a new uniform design. A special commission has been created under the Ministry of Defense which is studying the opinions of not only servicemen but also of civilians. A special survey has been distributed in military units and at enterprises for this purpose.

But at this time, the introduction of a new uniform is being delayed not so much by the lack of practical designs as much as by factors of an economic nature. First of all, the stock of the previous uniform has still not been exhausted. Secondly, our state does not now have adequate resources for such a massive measure and, thirdly, Ukraine does not have the required raw materials, without which all new uniform designs are empty talk.

That is why a decision has been made to replace only those elements of the uniform that contain a symbol of the former USSR (cockades, buttons, and belt buckles) during the first transition stage. The minister of defense has already approved the developed uniforms and they are being prepared for production.

In conclusion, I want to once again point out that the current situation with the supply of clothing to servicemen is characteristic not only for Ukraine. It is difficult for everyone. Therefore, we need not be indignant and grumble but simply endure this difficult period. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Armed Forces Rear Services Headquarters are doing everything to maximally utilize any chance to restore deliveries of military clothing as soon as possible.

### **Odessa MD Troops To Aid Agriculture**

92UM0915C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
10 Apr 92 p 4

[Interview with Odessa Military District Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) Chief Colonel Viktor Mikhaylovich Sarychev by Odessa Military District Press Center Associate Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Fedotov: "The Army Will not Leave Them in Trouble"]

[Text] An extremely difficult situation has developed with fuel in many oblasts of Ukraine on the eve of the spring sowing. According to a Republic Cabinet of Ministers decision, Odessa Military District has been ordered to render assistance to rural workers to carry out agricultural work. Odessa Military District Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants [POL] Chief Colonel Viktor Mikhaylovich Sarychev tells us how this work is progressing:

[Sarychev] During the first stage, assistance to rural areas will total 12,000 tons of diesel fuel. More than half has already been transferred to kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Fuel transfer points have been selected through an agreement with Ukrainian oblast ruling bodies. Deliveries are occurring via railroad transportation along the most convenient routes for the recipients. We are proceeding from the fact that the spring sowing campaign is our common cause.

[Fedotov] Viktor Mikhaylovich, did military personnel previously render such assistance to rural areas?

[Sarychev] Yes. Last year, we allocated 6,000 tons of gasoline and diesel fuel to kolkhozes and sovkhozes during the hectic harvest campaign. Our service helped not only with fuel. Many people remember that a difficult situation with the supply of drinking water developed on the Bolgrad-Izmail Line. Our pipeline personnel helped the local population. They extended a branch from a well, the length of which totaled nearly 30 kilometers. This work cost 3,000,000 rubles. Many pipeline laying soldiers were rewarded by local ruling bodies for the outstanding fulfillment of this task.

Our soldiers are working conscientiously even now while processing train loads of fuel. This is, so to speak, our contribution to the future harvest.

And yet. During several recent years, Odessa Military District soldiers have been rendering quite a bit of assistance to airport workers. I will point out that this is also advantageous for us because the aviators have impressive storage tanks and help us store fuel and accurately repay debts.

[Fedotov] Will the allocation of fuel to rural areas not be reflected in troop combat readiness? Won't you have vehicles lying idle?

[Sarychev] Under no circumstances. Of course, 12,000 tons of fuel is quite a bit. But it is being borne at the expense of current needs and from the reserve with the calculation of planned replenishment. While issuing a portion of aviation fuel reserves, we hope to reimburse the shortage with the winter type during the second half of the year.

[Fedotov] At a press conference, Military District Commander Lieutenant-General V.G. Radetskiy stressed that he currently needs to prepare all measures with a pencil in hand and to consider conservation measures. How does this look in practice?

[Sarychev] In February, the commander signed a directive based on which all conducted tactical-special drills, command-staff and frontal exercises, and various training must be conducted while strictly taking into account the fuel limits approved for them and the restrictions on combat vehicles going out into the field. The instructions are as follows: do not take out to the field those activities which you can rehearse at permanent deployment locations. The main thing, besides planned training, is to insure transportation of food, transportation of the sick to treatment institutions, and to solve other vitally important problems. The rear services directorate calculates each measure to the ruble and reports to the commander and he makes the final decision on the advisability of utilizing some or other vehicles.

Each of us understands: in the young Ukrainian State, all types of resources are extremely precious, especially fuel. We structure our work while taking this into account. People and their professionalism and responsibility for the assigned sector of work play an important role in the rational conduct of the matter. We can rely on such subordinates of ours as Lieutenant Colonel Firsov, Majors Yakimenko and Samikov and Captains Aboimov and Borodulin. Thanks to them, our service is functioning without problems.

Of course, close contact with representatives of Gosnefteprodukt [State Petroleum Products] and petroleum processing plants helps in this productive work. In a word, businesslike relations at all levels permit the military district fuel service to carry out complex tasks to supply the troops and to assist rural areas.

#### Panel Discusses Question of Military-Scientific Research

92UM0937A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
11 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel Leonid Alganov: "At the Level of the Today's Requirements: For Two Days the Future of Military Science Was Discussed at an Expanded Session of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Scientific Experts Council"]

[Text] Military scientists, politicians, and representatives from the defense industry, the Academy of Sciences and the Ukrainian Ministry of Education heard a report by Acting Ukrainian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General G. Zhivitsa. The speaker stressed that the republic's military leadership is counting on the fundamental nature of the conclusions of the session's participants, among whom were 13 academicians, 41 doctors of sciences, and 62 candidates of sciences. It was noted that one of the most important trends in military reform is the reorganization of military education and military science.

The significant scientific potential which Ukraine has at its disposal and which was adapted to the functioning of the command-administrative system should be brought

into conformity with contemporary requirements. First of all, Lt-Gen G. Zhivitsa stressed, this affects the administration of military-scientific research. The speaker defined the priority tasks of military science. He noted that, along with the unity of the management of research in the military sphere, we should ensure the broad introduction of democratic principles into science. It is also important to ensure the cost recovery of military-scientific research and to introduce a competitive contract system into the organization of research to achieve more effective utilization of scientific potential. As a result, in April-June 1992, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense plans to certify the scientific-research institutions and scientific subunits of the Armed Forces VUZ's [Higher Educational Institutions]. As Lt-Gen G. Zhivitsa indicated, the Scientific Expert Council and the Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate should play a leading role in carrying out this task. The current expanded session of the expert council is viewed as the manifestation of a new approach to the scientifically based directions and paths for Ukrainian Armed Forces structural development. But, the expert council itself sees the Ministry of Defense military-scientific committee as a prototype and the primary organizing and coordinating element of military science.

Later, Expert Council Chairman, Academician, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Lt-Gen I. Olenovich presented a report on the military-scientific research organizational concept in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He noted that leading experts had participated in working out the basic directions for military science reform. The work was begun in August 1991 in a situation when much was still unclear and when not only outstanding thinking but also civic courage were required of every scientist. The work was conducted in a responsible, well thought-out, and coordinated manner and with a detailed study of the proposals of experts and the public.

The speaker revealed the future structure of Ukrainian military scientific-research institutions. First of all, the Armed Forces Scientific Center, which unites the scientific centers of operational-strategic research, war games and simulation, trends in the development of weapons and equipment programs, rear services and military-technical information must become the basis for it. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy also is an important element of the system. It is also advisable to open scientific centers under VUZ's to conduct scientific research in the interests of the Armed Forces combat arms and branches of service. Analytical groups should be created at the headquarters of the appropriate commands. The work of scientific-research problem centers, laboratories and temporary collectives can be organized to carry out scientific developments along separate, prioritized directions. Similar structures may function in the Academy of Sciences, in sectors of NII [Scientific Research Institute], at scientific production associations, and at civilian VUZ's to coordinate and conduct basic research. The speaker revealed in detail the mechanisms

for ensuring military science's close ties with practical work and stressed that military science should not be restricted to military problems but is also called upon to serve the interests of the national economy and, to a certain extent, to eliminate the acuteness of the issue of its financing.

The expert council's point of view was also expressed on other approaches in the organization of military-scientific research. While considering that today up to 95 percent of scientists are concentrated at military VUZ's, the maximum integration of military science and education is advisable. It is also important to grant military VUZ's greater independence in questions of the organization and conduct of scientific research. Ministry of Defense directorates and other departments should be the customers and not the managers of scientific work. Other convincing arguments in favor of creating a logical system for organizing military science were also proposed.

The conclusions that were stated in the Expert Scientific Council's report were supported by the majority of the speakers, among whom were quite a few respected scientists. Specifically, Doctor of Technical Sciences Colonel V. Sorokin noted that the proposed system would promote an increase in the prestige of military science and ensure its independence. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate Chief Maj-Gen Yu. Prokofyev specifically stressed that the creation of the Armed Forces Scientific Center would permit not only preserving but ensuring the highly effective work of many military scientists that is very important under the conditions of army cutbacks. We cannot permit the thoughtless destruction of the republic's scientific potential that it took decades to create.

Ukrainian People's Deputy Maj-Gen V. Tolubko advocated the support of the military science reform concept proposed by the Expert Council. He specifically stressed that the military science reform variation that was being discussed is the state's attempt to resolve exceptionally complex problems. Lt-Gen M. Lopatin, Maj-Gen A.A. Kovtunencko, Colonels Kokoyko and A. Matov, Rear Admiral V. Tarasov and others favored the creation of a new system of organization for military science.

All of the speakers expressed concern with regard to the catastrophic exodus of military scientists and skilled experts who, under the conditions of market relations, are being compelled to seek more acceptable variations for applying their knowledge and experience. As KB [design bureau] Chairman V. Avtonomov said, in some industries there are actually only a few experts left and they might be lost. While disputes are occurring on the fate of military science in Ukraine, the defense industry is literally falling apart. And there is the danger that when the decision is made, some enterprises will only be capable of manufacturing shovels.

Ukrainian Central NII VS [Armed Force's Scientific Research Institute] Chief Maj-Gen I. Losev and Operational-Strategic Research Center Chief Maj-Gen V. Grechaninov were the opponents of Lt-Gen I. Olenovich's proposed military science reorganization concept in the system of military-research institutions. If the former unequivocally gave us to understand that he sees his institute, which until recently was involved with research in the PVO [air defense] sphere, at the foundation of the military science system and does not recognize VUZ science, the other expressed some doubt in the advisability of creating separate scientific center structures due to the state's lack of resources.

As for I. Losev's point of view, his attempt to risk opposing the military science leadership did not go unnoticed. The scientist was the target of quite a few critical comments. He especially caught it for the enormous banner that proclaimed NII's achievements since 1974 and the author's careless use of a speech as an argument in the dispute for the leading role in science. Maj-Gen V. Grechaninov's opinion forced me to ponder. Actually, under the conditions of the impending Ukrainian Armed Forces reduction, is it worthwhile to create this system of military science centers? Quite a few opinions were expressed on this score. And a response was given to the expert council chairman. Ukraine needs a small but effective, combat capable army. And it can be made that kind of army only through the development of the effectiveness of military science.

At times, the discussion was quite sharp. Ukraine Academy of Sciences Applied Problems Section Representative M. Mitrakhovich's speech added a certain passion. M. Mitrakhovich proposed developing an NIU [scientific research institution] structure after the approval of the military technical policy concept, although the military technical policy encompasses far from all problems of military science.

The session ended with the adoption of a decision.

#### **Mobilization Chief on Manpower Policies**

92UM0952A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff Main Manpower and Mobilization Directorate Chief Major-General Anatoliy Vasilevich Palamarchuk by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondents Lieutenant Colonel Vasiliy Bilan and Major Sergey Nagoryanskiy, under the rubric: "First Interview in the New Post": "Ukrainian Armed Forces Main Staff Main Manpower and Mobilization Directorate Chief Major-General Anatoliy Vasilevich Palamarchuk: 'Not a Single Conscript Will Leave the Borders of Ukraine'"]

[Text]

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] Anatoliy Vasilevich, the Directorate you head was one of the first to be formed. And this, in our opinion, was the most serious logic...

[Palamarchuk] When he spoke with me back in September 1991 on the subject of my designation to this post, the Minister of Defense expressed himself quite graphically and correctly: this Directorate would have had to have been created not today but already yesterday. What's true is true. The Mobilization and Manpower Directorate is, if you will, the foundation of the Armed Forces.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] But is the Directorate itself even manned?

[Palamarchuk] As of today, we have approximately 60 percent of the authorized number of officers. Nevertheless, we are carrying out all worthwhile tasks. This does not in the least suggest that the directorate staff, for example, is excessive, we simply have to crowd significantly more into our work time and to frequently forget about days off. We are selecting officers to man the Directorate who have a great deal of work experience on military district and oblast military commissariat staffs. Colonels I. Davydov, N. Gorda, V. Remennyy, and V. Anders, and Lieutenant Colonels Yu. Martynov and V. Voychenko are carrying out worthwhile tasks in an organized and qualitative manner.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] I would like you to acquaint our readers with the tasks with which your Directorate has been tasked.

[Palamarchuk] If you are talking about the tasks being carried out by our Directorate, then in summarized form I can say this: all Armed Forces reform will pass through our hands. If, let's say, the graphic rendition of our army's structural development concept that has already been approved by the Supreme Soviet is placed on one poster, we are faced with enormous work to give personal designations to division-sized and smaller units and to determine their deployment locations. It would take a long time to list the tasks.

Let me cite just one example. Say, we need to work an aviation regiment into the approved organizational plan. At first glance, this is not such a cumbersome matter. But that is only at first glance. Really, the vital activities of this aviation regiment are supported by another dozen military units. And it is yet one more large plus of the problems which we also need to take under control.

We think it is worthwhile to, figuratively speaking, reshuffle a list of unit designations and determine which of them will remain in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and which will find themselves overboard. In so doing, I stress: only the Directorate's first department—the approved organization department—will be involved with all of that. The remaining departments have no fewer matters to attend to.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] Recently, everyone is increasingly talking about the significant warming in the international climate. And suddenly we see the smoke of military fires, including near our own borders which requires us to maintain combat and mobilization readiness...

[Palamarchuk] High mobilization readiness—this is our primary reference point and our primary concern. This is no simple matter. All the more so since today we are utilizing all of those documents which at one time were developed by the Armed Forces General Staff of the former Union. The task consists of preparing this entire documentation base all over again, now already for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We have to “thoroughly study” the entire national economy of our sovereign state. The concept of “mobilization readiness” of, say, that same Ministry of Atomic Power, and of various motor vehicle enterprises—is not simply words. A colossal amount of information is set forth in them and an enormous responsibility in the well-known case. I will decipher just one aspect: each of these departments has been directed to have some reserves of fuel, metal, or food. But we are not managing to solve this task everywhere from the first attempt. The collapse and crisis of the economy, the attempt of some leaders to become auctioneers and to transform their enterprises from state to private enterprises—all of this has promoted the squandering of mobilization reserves in many places. We are pinning great hopes on the local representatives of the President—we hope to correct the situation with their help.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] You have touched upon a problem that will continue to grow: it is a question of your cooperation with enterprises which are changing their state status to private. Yes, it was easier to conduct “mobilization work” with state enterprises. A private entrepreneur, who will be subordinate to God knows whom during a time of massive destatization and privatization, is another matter. How seriously does this fact disturb you?

[Palamarchuk] Of course, today any private entrepreneur can state: but why do I have to have this motor vehicle column in the event of mobilization?

It is no secret that we have an appropriate list of motor vehicles and other equipment at state enterprises which must in turn have a certain range. Say, a vehicle has run up 10,000 kilometers—it is removed from the mobilization plan and the leader is obliged to provide a replacement for it, of course, with the required complement of emergency reserve.

The legislators who will also formulate, let's put it this way, this mobilization standard for it must also speak their weighty words to solve the problem with the private entrepreneur. Really, each person must defend the Homeland.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, it seemed to us that you spoke with pain about the fact that the emergency reserve of material resources is being consumed in some places. But maybe, this is a forced step? Say, our newspaper is running out of news print, where we can obtain it at a fairly good price is the question—

but we have several dozen tons in our NZ [emergency reserve]. Why would we not use it—if the situation is actually becoming critical?

[Palamarchuk] We are attempting to maintain the emergency reserves using every possible means. And if you take paper from it, it will nevertheless run out in a month or two. Meanwhile, the emergency reserve will also no longer exist.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] And if we take it with the obligation to replenish the emergency reserve in several months?

[Palamarchuk] I do not think that anyone will give you that authorization.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] The draft that has begun in accordance with the Ukrainian Presidential Decree—is the first independent draft for our young sovereign state which is called upon to guarantee service for young men exclusively on the territory of Ukraine. While forecasting the situation, what difficulties are you preparing for?

[Palamarchuk] The fall draft plan and the dispatch of young replacement troops to the Armed Forces was 96.1 percent fulfilled throughout Ukraine and totaled 101,976 men. Young replacement troops have been dispatched primarily to the troops deployed on the territory of Ukraine. Conscripts have been sent to training centers outside the borders of Ukraine for training as specialists that are needed for the republic Armed Forces, but only with their personal concurrence. A total of 3,000 men have departed.

The primary reasons for not fulfilling the Fall 1991 detail consist of the fact that the number of conscripts who were recognized as unfit for military service during peacetime for health reasons significantly exceeded their assumed number. For example, we assumed 7,000 would be recognized as unfit throughout Kiev Military District but it actually turned out to be over 10,000; in Odessa Military District—these figures equaled 800 and 900; and, in the Carpathian Military District—nearly 6,000 and over 10,000.

A large number of young men have turned out to be under investigation as evaders from the draft and dispatch to the Armed Forces. A total of more than 3,000 men evaded the draft in Ukraine, a large portion of whom are in Carpathian Military District oblasts.

During the Spring 1992 draft, the plan has been composed in accordance with the Ukrainian Presidential Decree and a ministry of defense order has been issued. We plan to draft a total of 20 percent fewer than in autumn 1991.

All of the young men who have been drafted in spring 1992 will remain at military units that are deployed on the territory of Ukraine and not a single man will be sent outside the borders of Ukraine. And we will even train specialists at training units and centers that are located on Ukrainian territory.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] During the current draft campaign, let's assume that the difficulties will be the previous ones. Both in the past and right now some of the lads do not desire to serve in the army. Only the arguments have changed. If previously they ran away from military service from remote locations, right now they are also running away from units that are located in their native Ukraine. And this problem certainly remains ours, although we ourselves will hardly manage to solve it. You need to prepare a young man for service ahead of time and not rely on his decency and discipline alone. In this context, I liked the position and arguments of many people's deputies during the discussion. The law on military obligation and performance of duty in that context that we need to radically change the preconscription training of young men. We have placed great hopes both on school military instructors, voyenkomats [military commissariats], local organs of power, and certainly on the mass media.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] You did not name parents in this series...

[Palamarchuk] I did not forget about them—I want to say something especially about them. Many parents send us requests: take my son into the army. We at the Directorate understand what gives rise to these requests: that is to save sons from the bad influence of the street and to alleviate financial problems for the family—everything around them is becoming more and more expensive and we know how young people currently love to, say, dress up—not all parents can afford that... I am already not talking about the fact that many young men obtain extremely scarce specialties in the army.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] Evasion of military service, to desert... are there any better arguments in favor of the shift to contract manning of our army?

[Palamarchuk] Remember that a bit earlier there were only conversations about contracts... Right now many people have already begun to understand that we cannot afford that variation for the time being. You won't be able to get by with 100-200 rubles in salary for a servicemen on contract. Plus give him an apartment and give him other social benefits for his family... And we have tens of thousands of officers and warrant officers who have not been provided with apartments as of today. And if you add to them another approximately 120,000 officers who plan to be transferred to Ukraine in the next 3-4 years, then it becomes quite obvious that it is premature to shift to the contract principle of manning the army.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] Publication of the already mentioned Law on Military Obligation and Performance of Service is being delayed for some reason, and interest in it is enormous, judging by the numerous appeals to the editorial offices. How would you briefly comment on this Law?

[Palamarchuk] I think that your readers are mostly interested in the fact that the term of service for compulsory service military personnel has been reduced to 18 months. Although the workload per soldier will naturally increase—the vehicles which he has to master are not being simplified. Perhaps this is the primary difference in the Law.

[Bilan/Nagoryanskiy] Thank you, Anatoliy Vasilyevich!

### Artillery Units Future in Face of Force Reductions Viewed

92UM0954A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
16 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel Vladimir Tertichnyy, chief of the intelligence section of the Directorate for Missile Troops and Artillery of the Kiev Military District: "What Did the God of War Do Wrong?: An Opinion of a Specialist on the Processes of Reducing the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text] Artillery is one of the oldest branches of service, whose roots are found in remote history. It was over centuries rather than years that its structure was formed, the strategy and tactics of use developed, highly skilled personnel were trained, and traditions came into being. There is probably no sense in enumerating the outstanding sons of the Fatherland who contributed to its development and formation or in recalling the stages of its glorious path. All of this is in the history textbooks. We will merely note that not a single engagement and not a single great battle in all the past wars would have been won without artillery.

So how did it happen that in establishing its own armed forces Ukraine simultaneously is pursuing an active policy of eliminating this branch of service? Whereas the sharp reduction of missile forces can be explained by the drive to be a nonnuclear power (although it is no secret to anyone that nonnuclear warheads have long since been developed for the missile forces of the operational-tactical and tactical echelon), the dramatic reduction of artillery is inexplicable from the position of mature realism.

There is no need to finish the General Staff Academy to realize the simple truth that the artillery is the basis of the firepower of any army and any armed forces, even under doctrines that are defensive in nature. Artillery has always been a collective weapon. This is a peculiarity of a branch of service based on profound mathematical computations. The staffs of the missiles forces and artillery of the divisions, armies, and districts are dealing with all of these questions.

Therefore, having eliminated the district staff of missile forces and artillery and having replaced it with two separate sections in different directorates of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, short-sighted

military politicians are doing irreparable harm to the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that are now being established.

And this needs to be understood by the leadership of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, upon whose decision it depends whether or not the structure in question will exist. As a counterargument, they refer to the experience of the West, mechanically copying it. Indeed, there is no such organizational-staff structure in foreign armies. But they thereby forget that the level of automation, collection, processing, and analysis of reconnoitered data and planning of fire is three magnitudes higher there than it is here. Only by fully automating these processes, linking them with satellite reconnaissance and systems for communications and topographic surveys, and by establishing fully automated systems for fire control that are interdependent in all parameters can one give up the accustomed system for the command and control of missile forces and artillery.

The young Armed Forces of Ukraine will need a minimum of 8 to 10 years for this if the questions of the financing of scientific research and experimental design work, the placement of orders, and the manufacture and series production of the corresponding prototypes are resolved promptly. To fail to understand this means to put a delayed-action mine under the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The first thoughtless blow against artillery was inflicted two years ago, when incompetent military commanders helped out Moscow politicians by deciding to cut artillery of more than 100 mm caliber, which really defines the basic firepower of this branch of service. It was then that the most up-to-date types of weapons were urgently removed from the territory of Ukraine and sent beyond the Urals. And instead of artillery divisions, bases for the storage of property remained in Ukraine, simply depots with ammunition. Some of the best domestic types of guns were cut—122 and 152 mm howitzers made during the years of the Great Patriotic War that have served dependably to this day. What were they left with? With 76 and 85 mm guns of the 1944 model. Why not with just the 7.62 mm service rifles with which they went against tanks in 1941?

A second rather important aspect of the problem at hand is that a process has begun of reducing artillery units and, accordingly, of artillery officers. An artillery officer, unlike an officer of the general forces, cannot be trained in a month or in three months. This requires years of schooling, an excellent knowledge of mathematics and the theory of probability, and daily training.

The problem of cuts is directly linked with the fate of the VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. Artillery officers were trained at three military schools in Ukraine—at Sumy, Khmel'nik, and Odessa. What is the solution, their elimination? But again, that would be destroying something that came into being over a period of decades: a material base and a highly qualified body of

professors and teachers. In our view, it is expedient to retain the Sumy Artillery School, reducing the number admitted to optimum levels, and, on its basis, to train reserve officers as well. And, on the basis of the school in Khmel'nik, to establish research institutes (which the Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot do without) and central artillery courses for officers (artillery cannot exist without continuous retraining of officer personnel, this being one of its characteristic features). But the school in Odessa should be eliminated. Indeed, there is no place for a school with firing ranges in a zone of health resorts. But neither in the directorate of VUZ's nor in the General Staff do they want to listen to the opinion of specialists. Unfortunately, these questions are still being resolved autocratically by those who do not know the true situation in the localities and are indifferent to the fate of the oldest branch of service.

I appeal on behalf of regular artillery officers through your newspaper to those upon whom the course of further events depends: bring us together, consult with us, and make a reasonable decision, remembering that is always more difficult to build than to destroy.

#### **Military Institute Commander Issues Order on Oath**

92UM0953C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Lt. Col. Vyacheslav Voronkov: "The Commander Took the Oath First"]

[Text] On Thursday evening, the chief of the training center of the Strategic Forces Col. Vladimir Mironov signed the order on the taking of an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine by officers and warrant officers. The next day in the garrison, they found out that the solemn event would take place Saturday morning. To say that they were all filled with joy is an understatement: the officers, warrant officers, soldiers, sergeants, and family members of servicemen literally rejoiced.

What can you say, it was not easy for Col. V. Mironov to give this order. He has a quarter century of service in the armed forces behind him and he finished two academies. After the General Staff Academy, the post of general beckoned, as they say. Emissaries from Moscow, who have come to the garrison more frequently in recent times, spared no eloquence in trying to convince the commander and his subordinates not to take the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. And when eloquence was not enough, they made threats about their immediate dismissal.... In short, a nearly critical atmosphere prevailed in the garrison after literally just a few days. Everyone awaited the decision of the commander. And he made it.

What guided him? He himself says in this regard:

"Kotovsk Garrison is justifiably considered one of the best in Odessa Military District. We have a wonderful material base, cable television, and a swimming pool.

The housing problem has practically been resolved and the medical service is functioning well. And by decision of Moscow all of this was supposed to be removed to Russia."

Lt. Gen. V. Radetskiy, commander of Odessa Military District, visited the unit at the request of officers and warrant officers. Vitaliy Grigorevich met with the officers and warrant officers in the officers' club. He told of a package of legislative acts of the Ukraine Supreme Soviet on defense matters and answered their many questions. While the generals from Moscow were mostly threatening and trying to intimidate the officers, the commander of the district forces told them confidentially about the situation in Ukraine and about the complex process of the organization of its armed forces.

"The organization of the Union of Officers of Ukraine that was established in the garrison carried out a survey of the officers and warranted officers of the unit. It showed that the overwhelming majority of them are prepared to give an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. All of this encouraged me to make the decision to have the personnel swear an oath of military allegiance."

Vladimir Nikolayevich spoke these words a few minutes after he took the military oath. The commander was the first to do so.

The officers and warrant officers come to the tables covered by Ukrainian towels. They come to utter the words of the solemn oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. It was not the first time that I was present at this solemn ceremony and every time I cannot restrain the gut-wrenching feeling when I hear the words of the military oath. I see that these same feelings affected those taking the oath as well as those who came to the unit to congratulate the soldiers taking part in the ceremony. They included the chairman of the Kotovsk Gorispolkom [city executive committee] Anatoliy Ivanov, the director of the local meat combine Ivan Polishchuk, veterans of the armed forces, and members of a regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard.

The melody of the Ukrainian national hymn is heard over the parade grounds. The director of the orchestra, Ret. Sr. Warrant Officer Anatoliy Ivanovich Pavlovskiy, a participant in the Great Patriotic War who helped to liberate Ukraine, was agitated. The musicians had had practically no time to practice the melody of the hymn and they had difficulties with the notes but in the end everything was fine.

The holiday in the unit continued. Soldiers of the Ukrainian National Guard regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Vladimir Turchak presented an instructive program to their comrades in arms. The regiment has been at the garrison for only a month. It came to Kotovsk from Lvov to carry out the ukase of the president of Ukraine on the strengthening of the protection of the national border.

The guard members showed elements of hand-to-hand combat and delighted those present with their strength and skill. And their capture of an automobile with "terrorists" evoked a burst of applause.

The tables were set in the soldiers' mess hall and there was a festive lunch.

On that day, telegrams were sent out to Odessa and Kiev: "80 percent of the officers and warrant officers of the training center swore a military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. The unit has gone over to the jurisdiction of Ukraine. Chief of the training center Colonel Mironov."

It would not be correct to say that the swearing of the oath was unanimous in the unit. A complex situation has developed in the subunits today. Here is one example. The subunit commander Lt. Col. Aleksandr Didenko did not swear a military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine but his assistant for personnel work Capt. Ivan Krylenko did. How will their service interrelationship develop in the future?

"Only on the basis of the regulations in effect," says Col. V. Mironov firmly.

He stressed that at any moment those who have not yet made a final decision on the military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine may be given the opportunity to swear allegiance. For those who are categorically against this act, there will be no obstacles to their being transferred for further service in the CIS.

We left the garrison toward evening. The festivities were continuing. Ukrainian songs were wafting over the military post.

#### **Servicemen, Families Address Questions to Odessa MD Commander**

*92UM0953B NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
16 Apr 92 p 2*

[Report on personal questions from the reception of the commander of the forces of the Odessa Military District: "All Grief Is Shared"]

[Text] Reception days on personal matters occupy a special place in the monthly work plan of Lt. Gen. V.G. Radetskiy, commander of the forces of the Odessa Military District. He is receiving questions from servicemen, members of their families, veterans, parents of soldiers, and representatives of public organizations. To be admitted to the reception, it is sufficient merely to state the nature of the request or petition to Col. V. Shershyuchenko, secretary of the district military council.

Behind the personal questions are anxiety, pain, everyday problems in life, and sometimes grief.... The commander receives 30 people or more a day. He is assisted by military jurists, a medical man, a representative of the district housing authority, the chief of the personnel

director, a representative of the trade union committee, and the chief of the trade directorate.

The first visitor on the list is invited in.

Lt. Col. Osipov is concerned that he, a candidate of philosophical sciences and a sociologist, may be discharged early to the reserves, although he has no apartment. He is therefore asking for the opportunity to continue to serve. The decision is made not to discharge him to the reserves until he obtains an apartment.

The questions that the visitors had for the commander on that day mostly involved housing. For there are thousands of servicemen in the district without housing and many of them were forced to rent a room for extremely high prices. We will say frankly that lieutenant colonels P. Melnik and V. Kvasov, Ret. Col. I. Fedorov, Reserve Col. V. Ruban, and Capt. V. Anikeyenko found themselves in a critical situation. The commander was attentive to each of them. He could not, however, allocate housing to all of them through the wave of a magic wand.

"To make the housing problem less acute," said Lt. Gen. V. Radetskiy, "it is necessary above all to have a state program to provide apartments to servicemen. The district is not able to satisfy the housing requirements of all those in need through its own efforts."

Still, the commander was able to help some officers get out of a difficult situation. One, in particular, was Maj. Sergey Babanin. He has been waiting for three years to receive an apartment and has been living in a private apartment. His family suffered misfortune a few days before he was received: thieves cleaned out the apartment that they were renting, carrying off literally everything. The commander decided to allocate Babanin a room in a family dormitory. This sort of housing was assigned to the families of Col. I. Korotich and Capt. V. Anikeyenko.

The housing problem that was discussed during the reception illuminated another facet of it. It turned out that by no means all local officials are efficiently resolving the matters of concern to officers. As strange as it may seem, some think like this: if the commander gives his approval, then we will allocate the apartment immediately. It has become obvious that not all housing commissions are operating effectively and in places their work lacks openness. In particular, such blame was addressed to the housing commission of the district staff and directorate.

The time allocated to personal questions at the reception was three hours. The visitors asked many questions. Some of them had tears in their eyes. Thus, the mother of Lieutenant F., who was to be discharged to the reserves on account of a serious misdemeanor, asked that they leave him in the army. This has become a drama for her. For her son had twice entered the Suvorov Military School and dreamed of becoming an officer. And suddenly his dream is shattered.

It was not easy for Lt. Gen. Radetskiy to make the appropriate decision. Lieutenant F. bore a great deal of personal guilt. After thinking everything over carefully, he said:

"Tell your son, Galina Nikolayevna, that he will remain in the service. But he will be severely punished for his misdemeanor."

Because they so greatly affect the fate of people, personnel problems are perhaps no less important than housing problems. Capt. Vasilii Krabinets was left with a 6-year-old son when his wife died. He asked the commander to transfer him to Cherkassy, where there is housing. Maj. Gen. A. Maltsev, chief of the district personnel directorate, was instructed to resolve this question affirmatively.

Lt. Pavel Belen came to the reception together with his mother, Galina Aleksandrovna. He finished communications school in 1990 and is serving in the Volga-Ural Military District. He is asking to be transferred to Odessa, where his mother lives. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry explained to Lieutenant Belen the system for transfer to the Armed Forces of Ukraine but this did not satisfy him.... Lt. Gen. Radetskiy ordered the chief of the personnel directorate to look into everything and to make the appropriate decision.

Commercial questions occupied a special place. Cooperative members asked the commander to allocate building materials to them and to sell them equipment that has been written off. It was explained to them that the sale of military equipment and property is the prerogative of the commercial center under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

Then a delegation of the Black Sea Cossacks led by Ataman V. Lashkerich entered the office. The Cossacks expressed the desire to participate in the military and patriotic education of young people and offered to set up rooms in honor of Cossacks in units of the district. And they also asked that they be given assistance in the acquisition of horse saddles. The commander supported this initiative and promised to give them help and support.

The reception on personal questions was coming to an end. There was no end of those wanting to participate in it. People came to Odessa from Kiev, Kherson, and Sevastopol. Lt. Gen. Radetskiy said:

"Ask the next visitor to come in."

It was the fourth hour of the reception on personal questions.

## BYELARUS

### Council of Ministers Announces Provisions of Call-Up

92UM0894A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 10 Apr 92 p 8

[Unattributed report from Minsk]

[Text] The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus has adopted a resolution on the next call-up, which is to take place in April-June, for fixed-term military service in the Armed Forces, Border, Internal, and Railroad Troops, and other military formations stationed on the territory of the republic, and on transferring fixed-term military servicemen to the reserves.

"Draftees from Byelarus will serve in troops stationed only on the territory of the republic," said Byelarus acting minister of defense, Colonel General Petr Chaus, commenting on this decision. "Only volunteers who wish to serve, for instance, in the Navy or other types of troops we do not have will have this opportunity." A personal request will also be needed for the draftee to be sent to serve in the CIS Joint Armed Forces, said the colonel general

### Seizure of Military Land for Civilian Use

92UN1254A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Apr 92  
Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Mikhail Shimanskiy (Minsk-Brest): "Byelarus Confiscates Military Land"]

[Text] This is extraordinary news: Civilians in Byelarus have decided to find out how much land the military has and to confiscate part of it.

Kolkhoz lands "torn asunder" by enormous military proving grounds are a common sight in Byelarus. Dozens of hectares have been shredded by powerful military equipment, but is this how our land should be used?

The issue is of crucial importance to Byelarus today, and there are serious reasons for this. The first is that the republic ranks highest in the CIS in terms of the concentration and number of military combined units. There is one serviceman for every 43 civilians in the republic today. The figures for other regions are 98 for Ukraine, 118 for Kazakhstan, 526 for Tajikistan, and 624 for Russia.

The second reason is that the republic lost almost one-fifth of its agricultural land to the Chernobyl disaster. Hundreds of rural communities were stricken by radiation and were abandoned. Their inhabitants were moved to uncontaminated parts of the republic, but they needed land for farmsteads and private plots, and the amount they needed was sizable. Land for the new settlers was being taken away from farms, but the "military" lands were off limits!

Furthermore, thousands of inhabitants of Byelarus, especially urbanites, want to build country homes and grow their own fruit and vegetables. Local soviets have received 380,000 applications. There are already several hundred family farms in rural areas, and soon there will be more. They also need land. It will take at least 10,000 hectares of farmland to satisfy all of the requests.

And what about forests? Can huge forests be kept under guard now that one-fourth of the world-renowned Byelarusian forests have been severely polluted with radio-nuclides from Chernobyl?

How was the republic to replenish its supply of land and forests? The government decided to confiscate part of the military establishment's land. This was one part of the solution. Another was a long-overdue inventory of military property. I do not know about other former republics of the former USSR, but in Byelarus no one has ever checked how much land the military has and how it has been used in the almost 50 years since the war. The leadership of the Byelarusian Military District admitted that much of the land was not on record and was not being used. The job was done by a special joint commission made up of representatives of the republic committee on land reform and land use and the military. I spoke with G. Kuznetsov, the deputy chairman of the committee.

"Georgiy Ivanovich, how much land does the military have in Byelarus?"

"Colossal amounts. When all of it had been itemized, we were astounded. There was half a million hectares of land."

"What is on this land?"

"There are many proving grounds, tank training areas, firing ranges, and airfields. In addition, there is a great deal of land that is not being used at all, because the military simply does not need it."

From the very beginning, during the very first stage of the inventory, 20,000 hectares of land was confiscated from the military establishment in Byelarus to serve the needs of the national economy. This affected only the largest military "concerns." One example was the famous Minsk Training Center with its huge proving ground.

The land committee achieved its goal: The center lost 2,130 hectares to the local rural soviet for housing construction and a vegetable factory and to the Minsk city executive committee for an industrial zone. In addition, 1,800 hectares of wonderful forests became part of the Minsk forest-park. The city gained a marvelous recreational area.

There is no reason that military airfields should take up so much land in Byelarus. It is true that this is a complex branch of military service, requiring a great deal of space, but why does the military establishment have so many alternate and reserve airfields in the republic? The

situation with regard to these, according to Kuznetsov, is chaotic anyway. No one on the staff of the Byelarus Military District even knows the exact number of these airfields. Only 13 of the 29 the commission investigated were actually being used.

As a result of the inventory, 16 alternate airfields were turned over to the national economy.

In this way, the Byelarusian Government finally claimed part of the military land. Was this an encroachment on something essential to the army, something without which the army is certain to lose part of its fighting ability?

"No," said Major-General V. Demidik, the Byelarusian military district deputy commander. "There was no encroachment, and our interests were not infringed in any way."

"But these 20,000 hectares are only a small part of the half a million hectares."

The general looked annoyed:

"I repeat, we have given all that we can give today. We must not lose sight of the distinctive nature of some military installations. One example is the safety zone around the proving grounds. We cannot have tractors working next to them. Besides this, each tank regiment needs its own proving ground, and each air division needs its own airfield...."

On the one hand, this sounds reasonable. On the other, can the economy afford to reserve dozens of hectares of land for one round of fire a year?

The problem has to be solved by passing a law. If we have the kind of economic mechanism in which the military establishment will have to pay a certain amount for the use of each hectare of land or forest used, we can be certain that it will give up all surplus land voluntarily. Byelarus is probably not the only one with a need for this kind of law.

## ARMS TRADE

### **MiG-29 Adjudged Best Aircraft in Bundeswehr**

*PM2104130192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
20 Apr 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Yevgeniy Bovkun report: "MiG-29 Best Plane in German Air Force"]

[Text] Bonn—That was the conclusion reached by the federal accounting chamber in Frankfurt am Main. Indeed, it merely reaffirmed the high appraisal which our fighter received when in service with the GDR National People's Army before subsequently being transferred to the FRG. Last summer it was thoroughly and meticulously assessed near Cottbus, as a result of which all 24 aircraft entered service with the Bundeswehr.

The experts have worked for many months and have now decided to make their findings public. Relying on the opinions of U.S. and German test pilots, and on their own calculations, they concluded that in terms of its characteristics the MiG-29A is not only comparable with third-generation Western aircraft, but should be recognized as one of the most modern and effective fighters in the world.

In particular, they note qualities such as its "superior weapons load [podyemnaya moshchnost]," its "impressive acceleration," and its economical engines. Their relatively short life—800 hours—is offset by their "almost complete reliability and minimal servicing." With these engines the aircraft is "almost impeccable" in operation.

Moreover, it is highly combat capable thanks to the smooth operation of certain instruments, mechanisms, and some technical improvements hitherto unknown in the West. One such, for instance, is the missile guidance device installed in the pilot's helmet: Targets can be "acquired" with a slight move of the head.

The aircraft's service life is 4,500 hours. It may fly 120-150 hours a year. Consequently, the accounting chamber experts conclude, the 12-year figure set by G. Stoltenberg—the former head of the military department—for the maximum service life of the MiG's is a clear underestimate. They could remain in service until 2010.

Thus, the MiG's are of higher quality, easier to fly, and almost three times cheaper than the U.S. F-4 Phantoms in service with the Bundeswehr.

The remarkable qualities of our MiG's were known to the FRG before. They had once been used as an argument by those working on the "arms upgrading" of the German Air Force. Now that the MiG-29 is the best aircraft in the German Luftwaffe, military specialists and politicians are asking whether it would be better to continue supplying the Bundeswehr with MiG's in the

future as well. Obviously, there would be nothing to stop this as far as the producers are concerned.

The difficulty lies elsewhere. The idea of possible MiG purchases is in conflict with the interests of the German aviation industry, which would obviously profit from the "Fighter '90" project. Incidentally, orders are issued by the state. The last word, which is yet to be spoken, lies with its people.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

### **Conversion at Yuzhnyi Production Association**

*92UM0904A Moscow TRUD in Russian 14 Apr 92 p 2*

[Interview with Leonid Danilovich Kuchma, general director of the Yuzhnyi Machine-Building Plant, by TRUD correspondent I. Ostrovskiy under the rubric "TRUD's Ukrainian Page": "Buy Our Missiles: Conversion—The Hopes and the Reality"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk—To take a more thorough look at problems and to cover more fully the life of Ukraine, which is closely linked economically and spiritually to Russia and other peoples residing in the CIS—this is the purpose of TRUD's Ukrainian Page for Ukrainian subscribers. Today we are publishing another edition of it.

The military-industrial complex is just about the main subject of the mass media. For some of them it is a monster devouring the people's property. For others it is the inspirer of the August putsch. Yet others see it as a force opposing radical reform. But then the VPK [military-industrial complex] at the same time consists of labor collectives with their difficulties, troubles and a desire to place all their considerable potential at the service of the civilian society. This was the subject of an interview by our correspondent with L. Kuchma, general director of the Yuzhnyi Machine-Building Plant, the nation's largest space and missile production association.

[Ostrovskiy] Leonid Danilovich, here we have an agent of a large-circulation newspaper at a highly secret enterprise. What is this, a symbol of change in the society?

[Kuchma] Perhaps. We want people to know about us. And possibly to help us reach more rapidly the situation for which we are striving: to become a production facility capable of using our considerable technological capability for the people.

[Ostrovskiy] Is your desire for openness not due to those difficulties which you are experiencing because you are unprepared for such a complicated matter as conversion?

[Kuchma] You are wrong there. The worst times are passing for us. The politicians only talk about conversion, but the labor collective really feel the "delights" of it all. Turbulent and uncontrolled conversion has

brought a successful enterprise to the brink of bankruptcy. We have been saved only by the fact that by the time orders for missiles and space equipment had ceased we had managed to complete the development of projects which could become the basis for civilian production.

[Ostrovskiy] What kind of projects, if it is not a secret?

[Kuchma] In the very near future we shall begin producing trolleybuses. We have already displayed the cost-effective, articulated vehicles. Not just the former Union republics are showing an interest in them, but the developed nations as well. We are forming a joint-stock company, the Ukrainian Trolleybus, each of the shareholders in which will be able to contribute his mite and receive his portion of the profit. We thus view this interview with an agent of a very large-circulation newspaper as an invitation to cooperation.

Even before this year we have applied missile technology to produce wind-power units. Orders already exceed our current capacities. People here in our nation, in Denmark and Spain are interested in an eternal energy supply. It would be a sin not to take the opportunity to break into the world market with the science-intensive, highly technological product. We have developed a unit for purifying smoke emissions at thermal electric power plants. It removes 98-99% of the dust and particles from noncombustible fuel. We are putting the final touches on a new generation. It will prevent the formation of nitrous oxides in furnaces. These are the oxides which cause acid rain. Russia and Kazakhstan have ordered dozens of the units. Ukraine, unfortunately, where the ecology is suffering, is still dragging its heels.

We have a large project for the future. We shall begin producing a new aircraft, the AN-218. This is a creation of the Design Office imeni Oleg Antonov, a 250-passenger airbus. It can compete with the best American and European counterparts.

We are working with metallurgists and pipe designers on new models of equipment for applying anticorrosion surfaces to pipes. Their service life will increase 10-fold. Just calculate the benefit, particularly in municipal service systems. I could tell about mastering the production of new pieces of equipment for the meat and sausage industry and about the production of synthetic fibers. Our collective is the largest supplier of household appliances.

[Ostrovskiy] Can you enter the world market with your missile and space equipment?

[Kuchma] The problem is neither technical nor economic. It is a matter of higher politics. We recently won an international competition, but we cannot take advantage of the fruits of our effort. Australia is building an international, commercial space-vehicle launching site. It will select the system making it possible to launch satellites at the lowest cost and with the least harm to the environment. It turns out that our Zenit system has no

equals with respect to power, automation of the preparatory operations or ecological purity. We could expect a large order for hard currency, but, unfortunately, the developed nations have not yet lifted all the restrictions depriving us of access to modern technology. We know that the USA has begun implementing a program for a guided interplanetary flight to Mars. The experts have stated more than once that they would gladly enlist us for the development of the space ship and its launching system. This will require political decisions, however.

[Ostrovskiy] But can the missile industry be adapted for peacetime production?

[Kuchma] In part, yes. We can produce containers for the food and chemical industries in the shop where we assembled the missile hulls and fuel tanks. People who have visited America have admired the aluminum grain bins which almost every farm has. We could make them just as good. We are just waiting for orders and the materials.

[Ostrovskiy] What is needed in order to implement these plans?

[Kuchma] We are talking about 60-70 million rubles. If we receive them, we can "remake" the missile production operation for producing civilian products.

[Ostrovskiy] Ukraine has claimed as its own all enterprises on its territory....

[Kuchma] Until recently the republic had neither the government structures nor the specialists for this. A Ministry of Heavy Machine-Building of the Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion is only now being established. Enterprises of the former Ministry of General Machine-Building, which employ a quarter of a million people, have not waited for it to begin functioning but have set up a corporation.

[Ostrovskiy] And you were elected president?

[Kuchma] On a volunteer basis, as director of the largest enterprise. We agreed that each enterprise would retain complete independence. Together we decide on matters of technical policy, cooperation and the development of promising new items.

[Ostrovskiy] You have replaced a monopolistic ministry with a monopolistic corporation....

[Kuchma] There is a folk saying to the effect that "I don't want to be rich, just to survive." The corporation exists in accordance with that principle. An enterprise cannot survive the transition to a market situation alone. The corporation will find the assembly parts which are no longer being delivered. We need cooperation for the production of agricultural equipment. We need an agency which will represent the interests of the former defense plants in the government. These are the objectives of the corporation. As you can see, they have nothing to do with restoring the former monopoly.

## SECURITY SERVICES

### Ukraine Border Troops Chief of Staff Named; Weapons Seized

92UM0953A Kiev *NARDONAYA ARMIYA in Russian*  
16 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "In the Ukraine Border Troops"]

[Text]

#### Chief of Staff Appointed

By decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Maj. Gen. Viktor Ivanovich Bannykh has been appointed first deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Protection of the National Border of Ukraine—chief of staff of the Ukraine Border Troops.

Maj. Gen. V.I. Bannykh was born 28 June 1949 and finished the advanced border school and military academy with the specialty of jurist and legal expert. He served in various command positions in the East Transbaykal and Western border districts. In recent times, he performed the duties of deputy commander of the Ukraine Border Troops. He is married and has two children.

#### No Changes on the Border

The press service of the Ukraine Border Troops reports that no significant changes have taken place on the national border of Ukraine with the Republic of Moldova. The border troops together with subdivisions of the National Guard and internal affairs bodies are carrying out the measures foreseen by the statute on the special zone in the region of the national border with the Republic of Moldova.

From the time when the border troops began to protect the national border, they have confiscated 12 pistols, 5 automatic rifles and machine guns, 19 grenades, 2 rifles, more than 100 hunting guns, 18 gas cylinders, more than 1,000 cartridges for automatic weapons, 200 pistol cartridges, and about 100 hunting knives. Six armed groups were disarmed.

More than 150,000 persons and about 60,000 transport vehicles were checked and allowed to cross the national border in April. More than 250 citizens of foreign states who tried to enter Ukraine without visa documents were detained and sent back to Moldova.

Busses with tourist groups from Feodosiya, Kremenchug, Gorlovka, Donetsk, and Kherson were not allowed to enter Moldova. In this connection, the State Committee for the Protection of the National Border reminds people once again that under a ukase of the president of Ukraine group trips through the territory of Ukraine into the Republic of Moldova are temporarily prohibited.

### Nakhichevan Border Troops Clash With Locals

92UM0921A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
17 Apr 92 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Captain B. Soldatenko, Moscow—Nakhichevan—Moscow, under the rubric: "Border Guards in Nakhichevan": "The Situation Is Normal. They Are Shooting at Us!"]

[Text] Shots ring out in the Transcaucasus and blood is spilled. The former interethnic friendship has evolved into interethnic hatred. And soldiers in green service caps are serving in this difficult situation. They often do not receive newspapers and have to wait several months for letters from home, but the border guards approach the performance of their service obligations with responsibility.

#### Reporting in this Issue

Having taken off from the runway of Moscow airport, our small aircraft takes a course toward Azerbaijan, there, where the sovereign Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is located on its southern border, on the border with Iran. In the aircraft cabin along with Border Troops Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Socio-Legal Work Center Chief Major-General G. Martykov are the parents of border guards and Committees of Soldiers' Mothers representatives.

"You know, I literally have not found a place for myself during the last few weeks," Arkadiy Borisovich Zhezherenko, who arrived especially for this trip from Volgograd, told me. "My son will soon be released but the situation at the border guards unit is very tense. I recently learned from the newspapers that guerrillas had attacked the border guards unit and here, as luck would have it, there has not been a single letter from him. You can't sleep, you don't know what to think..."

As Arkadiy Borisovich explained to me, he plans to talk to all of the soldiers who have been drafted from Rostov Oblast, take letters from them for their parents and, well, of course, see his son and calm his mother at home.

Time passes unnoticed during the conversations, we are landing on Nakhichevan soil, and a platoon of armed border guards places us under guard. This is not a formality, later I will again and again understand this.

There is this same protection on the territory of the border guards detachment, moreover, reinforced with an armored personnel vehicle. But even these precautions, as events demonstrate, are not always effective. Criminals seize hostages and cut off the lights and communications. Of course, it is difficult to guard the border if all of these "surprises" are presented to you, not from alien territory, but hit you from behind. Yes and there are also enough border violators.

Incidentally, guarding the border is being complicated by the fact that already at the end of 1989, the residents of villages that border on Iran have knocked down all of the

fortifications. Nearly 137 kilometers of fortifications, which in the money of that time cost nearly 150,000,000 rubles, have been put out of commission. The only border guard unit in the entire sector has the required equipment—the border troops subunit imeni A.V. Bochkarev which Senior Lieutenant V. Kravchenko currently commands.

"It is very difficult for us now without the fortifications," said Colonel V. Zhukov, chief of the Nakhichevan Border Guard Detachment. "So, we frequently have to guard the border using so-called 'dedovskiy' [hazing] methods—reveal additional secrets or go out on guard duty with a dog. Naturally, all of this cannot guarantee 100 percent inviolability of the border although we are doing everything that we can."

As the border guards themselves think, frequently the so-called "Islamic factor" is only a pretext for border violators. Metal utensils, alcoholic beverages, and electric lamps are smuggled from our country to the territory of Iran and radios and consumer goods—from Iran to our country. It frequently occurs that they shoot at the border guards only to divert their attention from the smugglers.

Yes, people here have become accustomed to much. For example, Dzhulfa Border Sector Deputy Commandant Major Anatoliy Lappo began his service here as a lieutenant in 1986. He has received two early promotions for personal courage and high commander's qualities and he has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. I recall when he described his recent short leave and explained for a long time how difficult it was to fly from Nakhichevan to Baku and from there to Tbilisi. Their helicopter was shot down somewhere in the Azeri sky. I must admit that I had calculated that Anatoliy would tell me how terrible it was in a falling helicopter but Lappo just bitterly noted: "I lost a day of leave because we were shot down..."

Really, what can amaze or frighten an officer now? Indeed, soon he will not be on the personnel rolls of this detachment. Anatoliy is thinking of continuing his service in the Byelarusian border troops. Not the difficulties of service but the ordinary lack of everyday services has prodded him to this step. Despite everything, he has served here for six years but it has recently become entirely too much to bear: there was no heat or light nearly all winter long in the housing area and he fears for the lives of his wife and two daughters, the youngest of which is just six months old, and Anatoliy has been compelled to sleep with one eye open and to keep his loaded assault rifle in readiness.

And although Nakhichevan Republic Supreme Mejlis Leader Geydar Aliyev said during our conversation that each incident in the republic with regard to the military is reviewed at the highest level, it seemed to me personally that Geydar Aliyevich was slightly deceitful. Otherwise, how do you explain the fact that so far they have found none of the criminals who have committed the

attack against one of the border guards units, as a result of which Private Panasenko was killed and an officer was wounded? They also have not found any of the guerrillas who disarmed the border guards unit about which Arkadiy Borisovich Zhezherenko had already told me on the aircraft.

As Geydar Aliyev himself thinks, the individual incidents of clashes of local residents with the border guards actually occur but, in the words of the Supreme Mejlis leader, criminal elements, which he said exist not only in Azerbaijan but also in Moscow, organize these clashes.

However, Aliyev is most of all interested in something else—what is the status of military subunits on the territory of the sovereign state? Geydar Aliyevich thinks that the presence of the troops of a foreign country on the territory of the republic is abnormal but, while recognizing that this is a reality, he agrees to temporarily leave the troops here but to almost completely resubordinate them to the Supreme Mejlis.

"We need for there to be complete trust," said Aliyev, "we will not interfere in the course of border guards' military training, but then we will control all troop movements on our territory, moreover, as for the border crossing procedures, the border guards must fulfill our requirements."

Yes, of course, much is still unclear. However, the status of this border guards detachment has been determined—in Nakhichevan it guards the state border as it was decided in the Agreement on the Protection of the State Borders and Maritime Economic Zones of the Commonwealth of Independent States Member-States that was adopted in Kiev. We do not know what it will be like in the immediate future: Is everything going to remain like it was before or will the Azeri side create its own border troops.

When our aircraft took off from Nakhichevan, I paid attention to an enormous cliff standing alone in the suburbs. Snow was already falling from it and it reminded me of the statement of one of the soldiers concerning this "Wolf's Tooth", he said, when snow falls from it, those border guards who have served two years are released. Right now there already isn't any snow but the soldiers continue to perform their duties. And this is not the whim of the commanders, it is simply that undermanning is reaching 50 percent in some border guards subunits.

As for the situation on the border, then, while saying goodbye at the airport, Border Guards Detachment Commander Colonel V. Zhukov simply said: "The situation is normal. They are shooting at us!".

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